French Special Forces in Afghanistan: Implications of an Exit
26 Oct, 2006 · 2140
Constance Roger contends that France's attitude is regrettable for both Afghanistan and the Atlantic Alliance's unity.
The French Foreign Minister, in his January 2006 statement at the London Conference on Afghanistan, justified the presence of NATO in Afghanistan. The current discussion in France about reducing and reshaping French involvement is based, however, on the premise that the future of Afghanistan looks increasingly grim. In October 2006, the eventual withdrawal of French Special Forces from Afghanistan was hinted; Le Journal du Dimanche announced that while this decision still had to be officially enacted by the French President, it was being seriously considered by the army. The 200 troops should be sent home by early 2007.
Since their arrival in July 2003, the French Special Forces' presence in Afghanistan has been regularly used to illustrate Franco-American solidarity against terrorism. To avoid any misinterpretation of this withdrawal, French officials have tried to justify their decision by evoking the changing strategic context of the war. According to them, the nature of the fighting has changed as NATO has gradually taken over the whole country. This recent change in command has left only 8000 American troops outside NATO control, including the French Special Forces.
The French COS (Commandement des Operations Speciales), whose initial task was to track down Taliban groups and stop them from infiltrating Afghanistan through Pakistani tribal zones, now has to undertake other missions. The training of the Afghan National Army, which now figures among the most important goals of the coalition, is receiving increasing attention and resources. French officials are making clear that this is not the primary aim of the COS, which has received specialized training to deal with extra-conventional situations. Possessing only 2000 trained Special Forces and participating in more than fifteen external operations, France hinted that these elite units could be of better use elsewhere.
Le Monde and Le Figaro confirmed the eventuality of the withdrawal of the Special Forces, and added that this move would certainly be accompanied by a reduction in the number of French troops participating in the ISAF. Following declarations made by various NATO officials calling for additional forces and in a context of escalating violence in Afghanistan, the timing for such cutbacks does not seem to be ideal. So has France lost its enthusiasm for a "better future for the Afghans"?
According to the two newspapers, the 1200 troops will be reduced by March 2007 when Italy will take command of the ISAF. The French are certainly busy in other external operations (Kosovo, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Democratic Republic of Congo). With the recent sending of 2000 soldiers to Lebanon as part of the UNIFIL and a total of 16,000 troops abroad, the French defense forces have entered their critical "red zone" in which troops procurement is becoming extremely difficult. Yet this is no reason for France to diminish its engagement in Afghanistan. Despite several losses in the recent months and an undeniably deteriorating situation in southern Afghanistan, the French people remain relatively favourable to the participation of their troops in the war. The French government and armed forces are therefore under no particular domestic pressure to diminish their efforts. It simply seems like France has indeed lost hope for an improvement of the Afghan situation, and prefers to focus on more promising missions elsewhere.
France's attitude is regrettable for Afghanistan and for the Atlantic Alliance's unity. For General James Jones, NATO's top operational commander, there is a need for 2500 more troops to combat Taliban insurgency and reverse the situation before the onset of winter. Germany has approved to extend its contingent's mandate for another year, but skepticism is spreading among the other members; some of ISAF's main contributors are increasingly doubtful. Several members of the British Army have recently denounced the inefficiency of the fighting in Afghanistan, while the Netherlands and Canada are starting to question the role of their armies there. Apart from Poland and Romania, General Jones appeal has remained largely unanswered, and the US is hoping to get some of their Afghanistan troops to join their struggle in Iraq.
While France is trying to minimise the gravity of the withdrawal of its Special Forces from Afghanistan, its attitude towards the conflict augurs bad for the approaching winter. This pessimism is spreading to other members of the Atlantic Alliance, which is called on to undertake an increasing number of missions, from reconstruction-building to narcotic-traffic prevention. Recent attacks on civilians and the unfruitful efforts to establish peace in the regions it controls are endangering local support for NATO. All these elements added together can only make one doubtful of General Jones' belief that "Everybody's working very hard to make sure that we have the right amount of forces at the right place at the time?[thirty-seven nations are] dedicated to a very important mission, one that I personally believe has all of the ingredients for a success".