North Korea became the eighth country to announce it had conducted a nuclear explosive test on 9 October 2006. The official announcement asserts that the underground test was conducted with 100 per cent indigenous wisdom and technology and hails it as a historic event that will contribute to defending peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. However, North Korea's nuclear test has serious implications for India- especially on Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation, and India's status as a de facto nuclear power.

India has accused Pyongyang of violating its international commitments and jeopardising peace, stability and security in the Korean peninsula; condemning for the test, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said on 10 October 2006 that any further erosion of the non-proliferation regime was not in India's interests, and that it did not support the emergence of another nuclear weapon state. The clandestine nature of the proliferation which facilitated North Korea's test highlights the dangers of clandestine proliferation. In fact, India's own security has suffered due to clandestine proliferation in its neighbourhood.

The international community, especially the United States had adopted an indulgent attitude towards the clandestine nuclear cooperation between Pakistan, China and North Korea. Pyongyang's nuclear efforts, in fact, were boosted by Pakistan and the father of its nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who supplied enrichment technology to North Korea. Khan shot into global notoriety for stealing nuclear technology from the Netherlands, and build a global network of vendors and manufacturers to run a nuclear black market from Pakistan. US intelligence agencies, which monitored Khan's network, did little to halt the traffic, ostensibly because they did not wish to compromise sources and methods or jeopardize US-Pakistan relations. For short-term gains, an opportunity to prevent nuclear proliferation was squandered. The consequence is a nuclear North Korea that will change the security dynamics of Northeast Asia.

The implications of North Korea's nuclear test on India are acute. India is averse to diluting the nuclear club. Its own claim to be accommodated as a Nuclear Weapon State suffers. The Indian predicament is that since 1998, India has virtually become a status quo power. It is not in India's interest to see emergence of more nuclear weapon states. Therefore, while continuing to stress its unique status as a responsible non-NPT nuclear weapon State, India will use the opportunity to highlight Pyongyang's past record of covert collaboration with Islamabad.

In a historic meeting between President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 18 July 2005, the United States recognized India as "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" and agreed to assist its civilian nuclear energy programme ushering a new warming of relations between the two countries. However, the delay in closing the Indo-US nuclear deal will affect New Delhi, since the nuclear non-proliferation lobby in the US, which opposes the nuclear deal, will be strengthened. The North Korean challenge places the Bush administration on the back foot; hence its political will and capacity to steer the Indo-US nuclear deal through the US Congress may suffer.

North Korea's emergence as a nuclear weapon power alters the balance of forces in East Asia. Whether Japan and South Korea, which possess advanced nuclear capability, feel compelled under strong domestic pressure to respond remains to be seen. North Korea has virtually torn apart the nuclear non-proliferation regime built around the NPT. This has profound implications for the regime since there are several countries that have nuclear weapon capability but have hitherto exercised restraint. They will keenly watch how the international community reacts to Pyongyang's strategic defiance. Iran, for instance, will watch how the international community reacts to North Korea's threat to carry out more nuclear tests if it is threatened. So the international community has to take a strategic mix of strong sanctions and dialogue for a peaceful settlement of the crisis through United Nations Security Council resolution, and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime so that there will not be any further nuclear proliferation.

India needs to ensure that the collateral damage upon the Indo-US nuclear deal is minimised, if not avoided. This calls for a harmonization of its policies with the US stance on the North Korea problem. Indian government needs to make an attempt to stress its own "impeccable non-proliferation record" and no-first-use policy with respect to nuclear weapons. As a responsible non-NPT nuclear weapon State, India also needs to raise the issue of clandestine nuclear proliferation at the IAEA, and take steps with other nations to bring North Korea back into the nuclear non-proliferation regime by resuming the six-nation talks to resolve the problem. India will strive to have greater say in the negotiations that may ensue in any restructuring of the architecture of nuclear non-proliferation that may now become unavoidable. This calls for delicate balancing on the diplomatic front, and sustaining the present climate of trust and confidence in India's relations with other nations.