When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed the nuclear deal statement he committed India to play a leading role in international non-proliferation efforts. Ask Indian strategists how they will honor this commitment and one gets diplomatic evasions.  Specific entreaties--on Iran and the Proliferation Security Initiative--are dismissed, most often with a reminder that India's foreign policy will not be dictated by the US.  And India is too important to stand on the sidelines while dangerous materials and weapons proliferate.  What can it do? This article presents five out-of-the-box proposals for South Block's consideration.

First, play a constructive role on the North Korean proliferation challenges.  Indian diplomats have rightly condemned North Korea's weapon test.  South Block must keep the heat on Pyongyang--it is of vital importance that the international community isolate the North and send a message to Iran that a decision to test a bomb will incur severe economic and political consequences.  Likewise, India should use its full diplomatic weight to convince the Japanese and the South Koreans to eschew a nuclear weapon program. 

Second, on Iran's nuclear program, India should ensure the future it desires. India does not want to choose between Washington and Tehran, while recognizing that an Iranian bomb makes it insecure. How can India shape a future that enhances its relations with Iran and the US?  With the US and the EU-3 reevaluating their approach to Iran's bomb program, India could work towards a successful diplomatic solution. It uniquely understands Iran's interests, and its good relations with Iran allow India to be the bridge between Iran and the world. A creative strategy would be to encourage Iran to accept a grand bargain in which it gives up its bomb program in exchange for US pledges that it will not attack Iran, EU promises to open European markets to Iranian goods, and Indian commitments to help Iran improve its oil refinery capabilities. Iran might indefinitely halt uranium enrichment in this scenario. Some are skeptical whether the EU-3 and the US would welcome India's assistance on Iran. Significantly, India will never know unless it asks. In the meantime, India sits on the sidelines, and its destiny passes into the hands of diplomats in the US, Europe, and Iran.

Third, prove the US non-proliferation lobby wrong, which claims that the nuclear deal will allow India to increase its nuclear arsenal and prompt an Indo-Pak arms-race. Responsible Indian leaders can promote non-proliferation by ensuring that neither arms-racing nor any dramatic increase in India's strategic arsenal occurs.

Fourth, India should update and enforce its export controls. India passed comprehensive export control legislation in 2005, but it lacks teeth-the US State Department has sanctioned at least seven Indian entities for transferring nuclear weapon related technologies to Iran in the last twenty months, including Y.S.R. Prasad, Managing Director of the Government of India's Nuclear Power Corporation. Likewise, despite US prodding, India has not harmonized its material control lists with that of the Australia Group or the Wassenaar Arrangement. India needs to clean up its own house.

Lastly, make dirty bombs in India an unrealistic scenario rather than a credible threat. The threat dirty bombs-conventional explosives packed with radiological materials-pose to India is serious. If a dirty bomb went off in Delhi or Mumbai, the economic and human costs would be grave. More dangerous is the reality that a dirty bomb attack with linkages to Pakistan could lead to nuclear war. Currently, obtaining radiological material for a dirty bomb is easy-poorly guarded hospitals and research labs are prime targets. A comprehensive Indian initiative to secure radiological materials to prevent such an attack will promote nuclear stability in South Asia.

With the proliferation stakes higher than ever, three facts are clear. One, if India upholds its commitment to non-proliferation, the world will be safer. Two, there are many ways-apart from those suggested in Washington-for India to combat proliferation. Three, "no" is not a policy. Neither does it display leadership.