Panelists: Amb. Hamid Ansari and Dr P. R. Kumaraswamy

Opening Remarks

Salman Haider

The focus of the discussion is on the most troubled region of the world. The Israel-Palestine conflict, nuclear crisis in Iran and the war for Jerusalem all buttress this point. The conflict in Afghanistan is also far from being over. Hamid Karzai seems barely in control of the situation as Taliban remains active. The new addition to this long list of woes in West Asia is the war in Lebanon. In a way, the Islamic world is being reshaped. The Shia groups are becoming more assertive with the Sunni states like Saudi Arabia and Jordan underlying their uneasiness. Visibly, the peace process between Israel and Palestine is on no one's agenda. Oil, terror and civilizational distinctions still persist. The panelists are going to discuss the situation in Lebanon and its implications for West Asia and specifically India.

Hamid Ansari

The war in Lebanon is still being assessed. There is a linkage between all the crisis points in West Asia. One has to question the rationale behind the war on Afghanistan and Iraq. The Security Council is very active in passing resolutions. Resolution 242 is very important to understand the politico-military dynamics in West. It was adopted unanimously in 1967 after the Six Days War and was a result of great diplomatic maneuverings. It calls for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency." It also calls for the recognition of all established states by belligerent parties (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan) of each other and calls for the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries for all parties. However, there is a difference between the English and French versions of the resolution. This is the only resolution where there is a difference between the two versions of the resolution and is not by accident. The trouble lies with a definite article. While the French version of the resolution states "withdrawal from the occupied territories," in the English version, this definitive article is missing leaving Israel and the United States to contend that the quantum of withdrawal should be negotiated. The US is not a neutral player in West Asia. It has helped Israel to expand its territories prior to 1967 as well. Even during the Oslo Peace Process in 1993 leading to Camp David in 1999-2000, the whole American exercise was aimed at convincing Palestinians to relinquish what they legitimately owned. Over the years, Palestine has built up important military capacity. The first Intifada was a result of this capacity enhancement, whereas the second Intifada happened due to the failure of Oslo.

After 9/11, the US sent its forces to Iraq on false evidence. Indeed Iraq was a dictatorship but the war destroyed it as a society. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have time and again accused Israel of War Crimes in their respective reports but that has had no impact on American support to Israel.Hezbollah is motivated by regional sectarian concerns and has garnered a regional following that is quiet inexplicable. Saudi Arabia had urged the other Arab states to be careful of Hezbollah when the Israel-Lebanon crisis was coming to a brim. After the conflict, it believes that the Americans have failed to keep their part of the bargain which has led to enormous loss of trust in Saudi Arabia. It's the Saudis who are looking stupid. Moderate Arab regimes are going to be in trouble because of the war in Lebanon.

In July 2002, the Pentagon Advisory Board gave a presentation which was leaked. A total of 24 slides were used. The basic argument of the presentation was that some degree of 'cartographic engineering' was required since the settlement of 1970 had failed. It was suggested that Iraq should be divided into three and Saudi Arabia into two states. Since 1970 there has been a systematic convergence to achieve these goals. There have been three results: Complete destabilization of the region, the friends and allies of the United States are in a spot and it has created monsters like 'Islamic terrorism' and 'Islamic Fascism'.

The Congressional Report on 9/11 contains an annexure with a bar chart on 'Progress of Islamic Terrorism'. Surprisingly, there is no mention of the fact that Bin Laden was an US ally in the 1970s. The story began in 1979 when Bin Laden helped organized jihad against the Communists. For India, West Asia is too close to ignore; a destabilized neighbourhood is not in India's interest.

PR Kumaraswamy

Lebanon was never an independent state in the last sixty years. Syria, Palestine and Israel have all faced the problems of surviving as sovereign states. These three along with Hezbollah are the four important players in Lebanon. Hezbollah is not like any other militant group. In fact it is more efficient than the Lebanese Army. Hezbollah was able to withstand the Israeli onslaught for the entire period of 34 days. Hassan Nasarallah issued a belated statement that the Israeli soldiers would not have been kidnapped if Israel's violent reaction would have been anticipated. The timing of the kidnapping is very important as there was a national dialogue going between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah was formed in 1982 to thwart Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982. However, its legitimacy ceased to exist once the Israeli occupation ended in 2000. Hezbollah challenges Israel's annexation of the Sheeba Farms during the Six-Day war and proclaimed as a reason for its continued attacks on Israel after Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. By responding to the Israeli attack, Hezbollah has successfully managed to sabotage the attempt to disarm it.

Lebanon is not like India. It is a confessional state. Each religious group was granted a constitutional position. The president is always a Maronite Christian and the most powerful in the executive structure of the state; the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim and the relatively powerless position of speaker of parliament goes to a Shia Muslim. In comparison, India is heterogeneous. Syrians came to Lebanon and gradually became an occupation force. Their presence came to an end in 2005. The prominence of Hezbollah works to the advantage of Syria. Outside powers like Syria and Iran have helped Hezbollah and therefore any tranquility in Southern Lebanon needs Syrian cooperation.

Israel is the fourth player in Lebanon. Absence of a military background of the present Israeli leaders has disastrous consequences for Lebanon. Ariel Sharon, with his background ably handled the situation created by Hezbollah after it kidnapped three Israeli soldiers in 2000. In comparison, Ehud Olmert went on a rampage. One should not forget that Hezbollah has the potential to strike at Tel Aviv. Except for the loss of 100 soldiers, Israel has nothing to show. The UN peacekeeping operation may just be reduced to peace monitoring.

As far as the disarmament of Hezbollah is concerned it seems difficult. Following are the reasons: Initially Hezbollah was not viewed as a resistance force like Hamas. But the popular perception has altered considerably after 34 days of Israeli onslaught. The public support is in favour of Hezbollah and this has prompted the Arab leaders to dilute their opposition to the militant organization. Second, Israeli onslaught has now come to be loathed by most Arab states. Finally, Massive civilian casualty caused by the Israeli forces is not winning it any friends.

Hezbollah is not just fighting Israel; it is also fighting the Lebanese state. The Lebanese government does not want to fight Israel. There is, therefore, conflict in the basic objective.

Gurmeet Kanwal

The Westphalian nation-state is fraying at the edges and Lebanon is a primary example. Lebanon has a regular army and Hezbollah, is a terrorist organization that is officially tolerated if not recognized as the army of the south. The Islamic Resistance has taught the seasoned Israeli army several hard lessons, just like the LTTE had cocked a snook at the Indian army in the late 1980s. A post-modern terrorist army - Hezbollah - has defeated a powerful state on a conventional battlefield. The strategic echoes will reverberate throughout West Asia and beyond. There are following lessons to be learnt from the war in Lebanon:

Lesson No. 1: No matter what the peaceniks may say, conventional war simply cannot be wished away. Sub-conventional warfare and low intensity conflict may dominate the strategic scenario, but preparation for conventional war can be neglected only at immense peril.

Lesson No. 2: Terrorism is no longer a nebulous threat somewhere out there. Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamist militias, hard-line Islamist regimes in Iran, Pakistan and Syria are together, the "New Superpower". Terrorism is a cohesive, organised threat with strategic depth and startling resilience. It needs a carefully coordinated multi-disciplinary response - not knee jerk reactions. Islam versus the West may be a bogey, but Shia versus Sunni is the new reality.

Lesson No. 3: While surgically delivered modern air power can wreak immense havoc, no nation can win the war from the air alone. To achieve political and military objectives, air strikes must be combined with a ground offensive to physically eliminate enemy soldiers or terrorists from their bunkers and hideouts. However, modern technology can only facilitate combat, not help a technologically superior nation to win due to its asymmetric advantage.

Lesson No. 4: Offensive action on the ground naturally entails incurring casualties. This factor must be carefully weighed before launching a major offensive. Any nation that is not prepared to suffer casualties can at best hope for a stalemate, not victory. In war, from day one, the only bargain at any price is victory. Such a course of action naturally entails incurring casualties.

Lesson No. 5: No matter how carefully the targets are selected, there will always be collateral damage. Modern technology has an ugly flip side.

Lesson No. 6: The media will go to town beaming gory images into hundreds of millions of homes across the world. The media is now the third party in every conflict. The media can no longer be relied upon to be neutral. It takes sides based on the predilections of its owners. The media also decides who will be the victor and the vanquished.

Lesson No. 7: There is no such thing as a short and sharp low-cost conflict. The enemy is always far more resilient than military planners are ready to concede. While he may take initial losses, he always bounces back with a vengeance. Democracies need to acquire the will to take a fight to its logical conclusion. The Israelis grossly underestimated Hezbollah's preparedness for a serious war, its armaments, its training and its tenacity. So did the Americans after the fall of Baghdad.

Lesson No. 8: Accurate intelligence is necessary, but very hard to get. In Lebanon, both sides were surprised but, the jury is still out.

Lesson No. 9: Sound strategic planning is a pre-requisite for victory. Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq and now Lebanon: good tactics, bad strategy. A nation can prevail in all tactical engagements, as the United States and Coalition Forces did in Iraq, and still lose at the strategic level. The Israeli Defence Force will eventually pull out from Lebanon without achieving its major strategic objectives.

Comments

• Nasrallah seems to have succeeded in bringing the Shias and Sunnis together. There has been no victory in this war. There is now a blame game going on in Israel between the politicians and the military. It is clear that Israel's intelligence had underestimated the Hezbollah. UN troops too are unlikely to be effective in disarming the Hezbollah.Israel's standing as an island of military power has been debunked. Part of Israel's litany of failure is the fact that Israel's asymmetric war has also brought it asymmetric results. Israeli failure has in a sense become a victory for the Hezbollah. It has now been shown that there are limits to Israeli military power - a balloon has been pricked and the Hezbollah has shown how it is to be done. Israel had learned the limits of asymmetric warfare from the two intifadas and yet persisted with it.
• The fact that for the first time the Air Force Chief (Dan Haloutz) became chief of the General Staff, was possibly a factor in the way the war was conducted. The war against Lebanon was only a tactical war; the real strategic war still lies ahead. Hezbollah is no longer a sectarian force and distinctions between Shias and Sunnis are gradually being obliterated.
• The Hezbollah took over southern Lebanon following the unilateral Israeli withdrawal a few years ago, but both the Hezbollah and the Christian Amal militia maintain visibility in the areas under their control, and have considerable legitimacy. Perhaps, incorporation of these militias into the regular Lebanese army is a possible solution.
• Grouping the Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran with the Al Qaeda under the heading of Terrorism is plainly wrong. The Lebanese leadership despite sectarian differences remains largely progressive and to describe the country as a failing state is unwarranted. Since the Israeli action, backed by the US, seems to be stretching the limits of internationally accepted behaviour, how can terrorist organizations be accused of a similar behaviour?
• The impact of the conflict on moderate Arab states is yet to be examined. The question is how soon can they readjust their positions? Egyptians were the first to come out with supportive statements when they saw the deal was falling through and how the Hezbollah resistance was being appreciated. The Saudis do not like to make statements; when they make statements it is under some sort of compulsion. The first statement they made was one expressing annoyance with what the Americans did. Saudi Arabia is an important player in Lebanon and it will render help with the reconstruction efforts but it will now be the Hezbollah in the lead. There are some political developments that have been set off by this conflict; Jordan is the place to watch because that is where the structure is most fragile.
• Israel's quest has been one of trying to be accepted as a legitimate state. Ten days after the end of the 1967 War, the Israeli cabinet had decided to withdraw from all the occupied territories. That would have been a wise decision, but it was never implemented. They could have then got their recognition and legitimacy. Subsequently, however, the arrogance of power took over.
• As Hedley Bull states, there are three stages in the exercise of power - dominance, hegemony and primacy. The US has been trying to move from hegemony to a stage of primacy. As Iraq has shown, it has not succeeded. There is no doubt that the US is the most important power in the world but there is also an imperialist impulse to dominate and occupy territory.
• When the question of Islam versus the West arises, one has to remember that Islam was the closest ally of the West prior to 9/11. It was the rallying cry to mobilize people to fight the Soviet threat in Afghanistan. In fact, prior to the Clinton administration in 1993, there has been no American foreign policy pronouncement on Islam.
• A year after 9/11, Bush issued a statement that "We shall join the battle of minds in the Islamic world and ensure that everyone becomes moderate and modern." Moderation is all very good, but modernity remains a nebulous concept and cannot be enforced. This sort of a theoretical mistake can be absolutely disastrous. But, it is difficult to see why there should be a conflict, and the bulk of Muslim opinion remains moderate. Majority of the Muslims from Indonesia to Malaysia to Pakistan, to Turkey, remain very friendly towards the US except on specific issues which is the US policy in West Asia and the Israel-Palestine question. The Americans have assumed a neutral position, as the two-state solution has now been accepted by everyone.
• What are the Indian stakes in West Asia? It can be divided into two segments: the Persian Gulf Area and the area beyond. The Persian Gulf Area is in our security parameter. The first is absolutely vital for Indian interests with approximately 3.5 million Indians living there. Over $7 billion come in the form of remittances and the bulk of our energy supplies will be coming from the region until about 2030. The states of the region are friendly towards India and its citizens. We are sitting comfortably, but we need stability. The Pakistan factor has virtually disappeared from the region.
• Peace in West Asia has to be a negotiated peace but it also has to be an acceptable peace. Islamic fundamentalism is a motivating factor, but it has not produced anything beyond protests. It does not have a programme of social reconstruction; no Islamist party has a programme of social reconstruction. They want to overthrow the existing system but have not chalked out a plan for governance.
• The so-called Shia-Sunni divide is not really a problem as such. The Shia-Sunni "banter" is more substantive than real. The more serious divide is between the Arabs and non-Arabs, which is a legacy of the past.
• Iran is looking for its place in the sun. Only in the OPEC is Iran treated with some respect while everywhere else it is ostracized and its assets remain frozen by the US. Complicated negotiations are underway on the nuclear issue. The Iranians want the US to forego its demand for a regime change and accept that Iran has legitimate security concerns in the region. Iran wants to negotiate its position on enrichment and does not like to concede in advance.
• Iran requires normalcy for economic development and this requires political stability. The Americans, however, are persisting with putting pressure on the regime. Iran, therefore, has a fair case. The Europeans are willing to concede the point, but not the Americans. Iran has been prudent in the current conflict. It realizes that the credibility of Hezbollah must be maintained.The bigger Iranian game is to push for the denuclearization of the West Asian region. The GCC has already come out with such a proposal and more Arab countries are coming round to this view. This is of course being opposed by Israel and the US.
• India blundered last year in voting against Iran at the UN. Iran occupies a central and strategic position and can provide India independent access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran is and will remain the second most important source of hydrocarbons. These are "hard factors" that need to be considered in India's security calculus.
• When it is claimed that Israel has lost the war, it is a loss based on Israeli popular perception. The Yom Kippur in military terms was a victory as Israel was in control of more territory than it started out with but in Israel it is still remembered for the initial surprise of the Arab attack. So it is a question of time before the top brass will go following the enquiry into the conduct of the war. This includes Netanyahu, because the financial problems facing the IDF, including the lack of funds to buy equipment, cropped up in his time. There were not enough radars in northern Israel, and that is one of the reasons why the Hezbollah was able to penetrate the blind spots in the Israeli defence.
• When Yitzhak Rabin took over in 1973 following the Yom Kippur War, the great advantage lay in the fact that he was not tainted by the controversies of the War. Today there is no one similarly untainted to take over in Israel. What the Hezbollah has to consider is whether it has the political wherewithal to use its military strength in another campaign.
• It is to be noted that the Hezbollah is not described as a terrorist organization by the Israelis, but as a militant group. Hamas is considered so because it has used suicide attacks against Israel. Lebanon has been a quagmire for the Israelis for the last 18 years with 700 military casualties. As a result, in this conflict, they dragged their feet on initiating the ground offensive.
• It has also to be remembered that the IDF Chief of General Staff is a political appointee. This is likely to be cause for future trouble, including for the previous Defence Minister who appointed him. Israel's willingness to have UN troops from friendly Muslim countries such as Malaysia is a political decision, as contacts have been on for several years despite the lack of diplomatic ties.
• Lebanon is politically divided, and national solidarity built up during the 34-day war with Israel is temporary. Post-7 August ground realities must not be ignored. So far the Israelis had been able to inflict painful damage on the Arabs but in this conflict for the first time the Hezbollah was able to inflict painful damage on the Israelis. One million Israelis were in bomb shelters. This was also the first time that the Hezbollah ambushed Israel within the Israeli territory. Nasrallah's statement on 12 July that the kidnapped Israeli soldiers would be swapped for Lebanese prisoners meant that he was setting the terms, and this the Israelis could not stomach.
• For the US, the dilemma was whether to support Israel against Hezbollah or the Lebanese state against Syria. So by supporting Israelis against the Hezbollah, the US was undermining Lebanese sovereignty vis-?-vis the Syrians. If Ariel Sharon had been the Prime Minister, the war would not have been prosecuted in this manner. It would either not have come to an all out war or, if war was inevitable, it would have been escalated rapidly and brought to a swifter conclusion.
• Where relations with India are concerned, Israel is extremely aware of domestic compulsions in India, but the military relationship between the two countries has moved to an extremely professional level after the first few years of hesitation
• Political objectives have to be clearly defined in any military action and the final victory can be claimed only if these political objectives have been achieved. It cannot be denied that the media have their biases, that they take sides, and play a role in influencing public opinion. That terrorism is the new superpower maybe an idea that is difficult to swallow but it needs to be considered nevertheless.

Concluding Remarks

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee

West Asia is of critical strategic importance to India. No two situations are exactly alike and a willingness to use force cannot be a lesson drawn from the present conflict. Policy objectives must be clear in any conflict. What did Israel hope to achieve strategically from this operation? UN peacekeeping operations need a stronger mandate under Chapter VII or at least Chapter VI of the Charter to be effective. India has to also consider whether its national interests are served by undertaking UN peacekeeping operations.

Salman Haider

The people of Lebanon have had to watch helplessly through the years of strife and destruction. The current conflict cannot be termed a major turning point for the country or the region. The big players in this conflict are elsewhere and the Lebanese are only unwitting victims. We must not only look at where the threat comes from but also at where the seeds of settlement lie. It must be noted that Nasarallah, apart from displaying the outward signs of a Shia, is speaking to Muslims in general and not only Shias. The Al Qaeda, which has been unchallenged so far ideologically, is now being challenged from within the Muslim world and has to modify their statements accordingly. We should not be carried away by the media on the Shia-Sunni divide. The points of assonance are certainly more important than the points of difference. Finally, we have not had a penetrating enough discussion on the response of Indian foreign policy to the present situation. There is a sense that we have not been active enough. Given the extent of our interests in the region, is there something that could be done, or any lessons that can be learnt?