Will we or won't we? Will we stay and even expand our contribution to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, or will we pull out? More importantly, on what basis should we make such a critical foreign policy decision?

India has a proud record of commitment to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), in both principle and practice. India is among the largest troop contributors to UNPKO in numbers of missions, force commanders and personnel. Of the 73,008 people serving as UN peacekeepers on 31 July 2006, 9,290 were Indians. Bangladesh (10,126) and Pakistan (9,797) are the only others to contribute personnel in that ballpark range. The next largest contributor is Nepal with 3,510. That is between them, the South Asians contribute a staggering 45 percent of all UN peacekeeping personnel.

India also provided the bulk of the personnel for the three international control commissions in Indochina after the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Many Indian officers and soldiers have been decorated or received commendations during UNPKO. This is a record in which India and its armed forces take immense pride. It is seen both as the nation's commitment to international peace and as a showcase of its military proficiency and tradition.

Of the 2285 UN peacekeepers killed until 31 July 2006, 117 have been Indians. This is the ultimate sacrifice for the most abstract of principles: fidelity to international peace and brotherhood.

Participation in UNPKO is neither a politically contentious issue in India, nor a constitutionally complicated exercise. It has not been a divisive subject of public debate. PKO permit India and other countries to reconcile the potential tension between the commitment to international idealism and the requirements of national security, but there is no automatic commitment to participate. Each request for a contribution to a UNPKO is decided by the government of the day under normal democratic processes.

The Indian Army has adequate manpower readily available and trained for peacekeeping, experience in all types of climate and terrain, and the full range of military capabilities from mechanized operations to dismounted infantry, engineer-dominant and humanitarian support, to meet all types of UNPKO. It maintains a 4,000-strong Standby Brigade Group for UNPKO with a comprehensive all-round capability. An infantry battalion group is deployable within 30 days, and the remainder of the brigade within eight weeks. The force is kept at a high state of readiness; its actual commitment, of course, is subject to the government's decision.

Why has India been popular as a peacekeeper, and why has international peacekeeping been popular in India? There are three broad reasons why India was asked to contribute troops to traditional peacekeeping operations: the size and professionalism of its armed forces; the lack of such forces from most developing countries until recently; and India's influence in world affairs through the Non-Aligned Movement.

The principle of equitable regional representation pervades every aspect of the UN system. India was doubly attractive: as a representative of the developing world, and as a co-founder of NAM. There were not many countries in these two groups that could field professionally trained and competently equipped soldiers for overseas deployment. The size of its defence forces meant that India could detach some units from duty on national borders without jeopardizing national security.

Why did India agree to take part in so many UN operations? The answers mirror those in the preceding paragraph. In the case of the Indochina control commissions, India's sense of being a great power in the making was a key factor: "We cannot shed the responsibilities that go with a great country," said Jawaharlal Nehru. India's chairmanship of the three Indochina commissions "became one of the necessities of the settlement? our refusal would have meant imperilling the whole agreement." Just as important was Nehru's conviction that as a result of the Geneva Agreements, there were better prospects for peace and stability in Asia as a whole.

The two calculations, the contribution to the proposed peacekeeping operation by India, and to regional and international stability by the proposed peacekeeping mission, have been constant refrains in the history of India's involvement in international peacekeeping. Part of the explanation for this has been a creeping apartheid in UN peacekeeping, where the poor countries contribute troops while the rich Western countries provide logistical support and dominate the senior policy-making ranks in the UN system. Of course India gains some credit for this. But have Indian policy-makers done a hard-nosed evaluation as to whether the credit ledger is overshadowed by the debit? In particular, in public, governmental and UN perception around the world, this may contribute to the bracketing of India with poor third world countries with bloated and antiquated defence forces instead of a highly professional and modern military force?

If this sounds too harsh, consider the following from a recent article: 'the usual suspects of UN peacekeeping, the impoverished third-world armies who only deploy their soldiers for their per diem' (International Herald Tribune, 26 July). To make it worse, the writer, Margarita Mathiopoulos, is chair of the Transatlantic Forum of the Free Democratic Party of Germany and CEO of the European Advisory Group.

We believe strongly, even passionately, in the United Nations and in the great value of its numerous peace operations. Independent analyses by US-based think tanks, most notably the Rand Corporation, have confirmed that such operations represent excellent value for money. We also believe that India has much to offer and much to gain by contributing generously to such UN operations. But this cannot be open-ended and unqualified. What, in hard terms, has India gained in return? Certainly not a seat at the high table of Security Council permanent members.

There is a tendency among us to feel gratified by verbal prise and thrilled by a pat on the back. Such token gestures are no substitute for rigorous calculation of national interests. We would strongly urge that India look at the balance of composition of UN missions, and contribute only if and when there are at least some Western and industrialized countries also willing to shoulder the burden. Only so will we begin to put a distance between the professional Indian military and the image of UN operations as something fit only for impoverished and amateurish contributors in it for the money.

Such political cost-benefit analysis is a better calculus for making decisions than security risk assessments. Deploying into risky conflict environments is part of a soldier's professional identity.

(A shorter version of the article appeared in The Indian Express on 1 September 2006. The article can be accessed at: http://www.indianexpress.com/story/11750.html)