The militancy in Pakistan's troubled province of Balochistan has entered a new phase with the killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the doyen of the powerful Bugti clan in the region. However, the euphoria of the Pakistani Government over the killing of the 80 year old leader faded soon with riots erupting in Quetta, Karachi and other Baloch areas in opposition to the attack.

The killing of the charismatic tribal leader may be just an interregnum in the struggle for equity and sovereignty waged by the Balochis for the third time in Pakistan's history. While the Pakistani Army has been successful in suppressing similar unrest by force in the past, it is unlikely that a pure military strategy will succeed in the present situation despite over 400 Pakistani soldiers and many locals having died in the past few years.

Akbar Khan's end seemed within sight in the past one month. He was isolated due to a large number of his followers having surrendered to government forces recently. The Farrari (Absconder - frequently miss spelt as the more familiar Ferrari) camps had also come under heavy attacks and over 50 of them had been neutralized. However ensconced in his mountain lair, the fire brand leader seemed oblivious of the dangers around him. He even gave interviews to the influential British weekly and the Economist (June 2006), in the hope of inviting greater international attention to the Balochi struggle.

Modern militancies are not dependent on a single leader for the continuance of the struggle. They are neither centrally controlled nor resemble autocratic hierarchies of the past. Thus the killing of Akbar Khan may not yield dividends which President Musharraf hopes for as he was a political rather than a military figure fighting to establish control of his tribe over their economic resources. Despite the disinformation campaign launched by the efficient Pakistani propaganda machine claiming that the tribal sardars were fighting for their feudal rights rather than a common cause, the support may now increase with Akbar Khan being seen as a martyr in the struggle for freedom from Pakistani misrule.

The demands of the Balochis have been both political and economic. Politically they seek greater autonomy, while economically greater share in the profits generated by the natural gas of the Sui fields, prospective minerals and the development of the Gwadar - Pasni ports. These are however external manifestations of a deeper malaise plaguing the Pakistani state. The key issue is the lack of a representative and democratic political culture which can accommodate the Balochi aspirations. The ethnic composition of the government, military and the bureaucracy is of considerable importance in a military-bureaucratic state as Pakistan. The Balochis find themselves marginalized by the Punjabi - Pathan combine in the government. Thus, increase in the number of central government jobs is another key demand.

Absence of mechanisms for creating equity have resulted in the growth of the alternate arm of the Balochi struggle, the Balochistan Liberation Army which is seen as a unifying force by the antagonists, fighting beyond the interests of the tribal Bugtis and the Mengals. It has considerable support from the Baloch diaspora spread across many continents. Balochi pockets in Afghanistan and Iran which have a common border with the area have always been vocal supporters of their brethren in Pakistan.

The federal government has also been trying to create a rift between the relatively modernist struggle represented by the Balochistan Liberation Army and the tribal by holding jirgas that proclaim loyalty to Islamabad. The credibility of these pronouncements is however limited. The Balochis are also unhappy with the spread of the Taliban culture in the region and the increased presence of radical Islamists in the Quetta - Chaman area which is seen as a base for the Taliban operating in Kandahar.

A key problem in Pakistan is lack of democracy at the grass roots, be it Waziristan or Balochistan. Pakistan has attempted two approaches, Talibanisation which has visibly failed in both the areas and the "jirga" route of providing a voice to the people through their tribal elders, which many seem as merely reinventing the wheel. A population which is becoming increasingly egalitarian is unlikely to be satisfied with these half measures of democratic dispensation. There is an urgent need for restoring the imbalance in the state structure of Pakistan. The Balochis should be provided greater control and share over their natural resources and also in the political, military and bureaucratic set up. A ruthless military policy is unlikely to bear fruits as apparent from the experience of the insurgencies that dot the post cold war world.