Would the release of ULFA cadres end the stalemate on the dialogue process between the government and ULFA interlocutors? Can ULFA's participation in direct talks be assured after their release? Is the ULFA using the peace process as a strategy to get its leaders released and subsequently go underground? Is there an alternative? How can the dialogue be expedited to end the three decades long insurgency?

In late 2005, the ULFA conceded to negotiate with the Union government; the People's Consultative Group (PCG), a team of human rights activists, writers, lawyers and journalists was selected by the ULFA for the purpose. After three rounds of negotiations, the prospects have turned futile, with both sides making the other responsible to carry the process forward. The government insists on direct communication by the ULFA; the latter expects a written assurance on sovereignty issue as an agenda of the talks.

The commencement of direct talks is hanging on three preconditions of the ULFA: releasing six of its cadres, the issue of sovereignty and information about missing militants since the 2003 Bhutanese Operation. While the government has rejected the demand for sovereignty as unconstitutional and therefore untenable, it is silent on the issue of the missing cadres. However, the Union government assured the PCG, that the release of the militants would be "favourably considered" in consultation with the state government.

The release of the ULFA Vice-Chairman Pradip Gogoi, Cultural Secretary Pranati Deka, political advisor and ideologue Bhimkanta Buragohain, Publicity Secretary Mithinga Daimary and Executive Committee member Ramu Mech is being sought. Gogoi was arrested in Kolkata in 1998. Deka, released on bail in 1998, was arrested while trying to escape to Bangladesh in 2003. Buragohain, Daimary and Mech were apprehended during the Bhutanese operation in 2003. Mrinal Hazarika, commanding officer of the 28 Battalion, arrested from Siliguri in May 2006, was also added to the list. Their presence, asserts the ULFA, is essential for the Central Committee meeting, which alone can take decisions regarding the modalities of direct talks.

The release of ULFA militants is critical considering the efforts invested in their arrest. ULFA's previous record does not stand as its alibi. The attempt for direct talks in 1992 failed miserably after the five ULFA rebels, released from jail for negotiations with then Prime Minister, P V Narasimha Rao, went underground. The ULFA also rejected the offer of safe passage, from 7 to 21 January 2006, calling it a political manoeuvre. The peace initiative becomes murkier with neither the ULFA relinquishing violent activities nor the government halting army operations against it. August 2006 began with four ULFA militants being killed by a joint army and police operation and suspected ULFA militants hurling grenade, killing and injuring several CRPF jawans and civilians.

Such acts are generally defended as resulting from frustration due to lack of any progress in the parleys. Though the Union and state governments has repeatedly assured the release of the imprisoned insurgents, lack of any concrete step in this direction is thwarting the peace process. It is interesting to note that both the PCG and the People's Committee for Peace Initiative (PCPI) have accused the Centre of a 'two-pronged' policy of simultaneously holding peace discussion and conducting army operations. After the expiry of 31 July deadline, set by the PCPI, for the release of the jailed rebels, cessation of Army operations and holding of direct talks, it has launched a fortnight programme, beginning from 1 August 2006, demanding the speeding up of the negotiations to bring peace in the state.

Surprisingly, nobody questions the ULFA's continuing subversive activities including the explosions and extortions. The "misguided sons of the soil" theory has long exhausted its efficacy. The government has to examine all possibilities before considering the release of the rebels. The likelihood of the militants escaping to neighbouring countries or going underground cannot be ruled out. Though the state might possess the resources and coercive apparatus to crush the separatist movement, such ambitious posturing appears unpragmatic. The social base of the outfit and the complex social, political and cultural linkages in the region cannot be ignored. No matter how prolonged or indecisive it might be, any fruitful alternative to parleys seems presently nonexistent.

Hence, the task at hand is to create conducive atmosphere to accelerate the dialogue process. An indispensable condition is the surrender of arms by the insurgent group. An assurance by the ULFA that they will not indulge in bomb blasts, extortions and other subversive activities and come for direct talks with the Union government, would strengthen both considerations of scaling down counter-insurgency operations by the state and the release of its jailed cadres. This will corroborate its sincerity thereby rejuvenating the process that holds the potential to end bloodshed in the state.