The Crisis and its Escalation

Sri Lanka witnesses worst fighting since the signing of ceasefire agreement (CFA) on 22 February 2002. The fighting was sparked by blocking of Mavilaru reservoir in Trincomalee district by the LTTE and the government's attempts to open it by use of force.

The root of the crisis goes back to three decades when the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) created Mavilaru reservoir to benefit government-sponsored Sinhalese settlements in Trincomalee district. During Eelam War II, in 1991, the LTTE tried to capture the area around the anicut by blasting the sluice gates of the reservoir. The Army, however, captured it and held on till 1997. During Eelam War III, the government forces lost the area to the LTTE and when the CFA was signed, in 2002, the Mavilaru reservoir fell well within the LTTE controlled areas.

The recent edition of the crisis started with the ADB funded project on drinking water supply to the area along with the use of the reservoir. The initial project plan was to supply drinking water only to the government controlled areas. But when people of the LTTE controlled areas protested, ADB decided to extend the project to the whole area, irrespective of who controlled them. The tense situation in Trincomalee since last year prevented the project to take off. But, when the GOSL recently announced to go ahead with the project in the areas under its control, the people in the "uncleared" areas, without giving room for negotiations, closed the sluice gates of the anicut, blocking water to some 30,000 acres of ripe paddy fields and 60,000 people. The inducements of Tigers behind this blockade cannot be denied.

What has actually aggravated the crisis to the present war situation is government's belief in settling the issue by military force. When negotiations, mediated by the Monitoring Mission and some Buddhist monks, was about to commence on 26 July, the Army launched 'Operation Watershed' to address the "urgent humanitarian need". The plan was to open the reservoir by Army personnel, aided by aerial bombardment. The LTTE immediately withdrew from the negotiations and launched, what it termed, "defensive actions" to "neutralize the Sri Lankan military's attacks on civilian targets". The ground situation is now one of "undeclared war" with severe casualties and large scale civilian displacements. The government in desperation to open the sluice gates by all means has aggravated the crisis. Neither it is in a position to remove the blockade nor can it successfully prevent the advancement of forward defence line (FDL) by the LTTE. The movement of the Army personnel towards the reservoir has been severely hampered by landmines in the area and hit-and-run teams of the LTTE, effectively using the jungle cover. The government is determined to continue the military offensive until sluice gates are opened; but the LTTE is firm not to talk about lifting the blockade unless offensive is halted.

Implications for CFA

Article 1.2 of CFA states: "Neither Party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as: a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units; b) Aerial bombardment; c) Offensive naval operations." The present confrontation is a clear violation of CFA by both parties. Violations have been there in the past, but the present hostilities clearly signal the beginning of the end of 53-month-old CFA. Though the GOSL continue to maintain that CFA is still alive, the LTTE has started questioning the validity of the Agreement.

Norway is involved in hectic parleys to diffuse the crisis and stabilize the CFA. Even if the hostilities cease immediately, it is going to be a challenging task to implement the CFA in the area due to reconfiguration in population and territory controlled by the antagonists. Impending shortage of monitors, owing to withdrawal of Finland, Denmark and Sweden from the SLMM, is another challenge to confront in the coming days. Ironically, both sides are not keen on stabilizing the CFA and in turn are using it as a stepping stone to address the ethnic question. Ground situation is turning worse, as days go by, making futile all efforts of the international community. While the government must cease all military operations with immediate effect, the LTTE should lift the blockade, unconditionally, to save the paddy harvest. The most urgent step required, however, is to move the trapped civilians caught in the conflict to safer areas.