The border trade agreement between Tibet and Sikkim was signed in 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's trip to Beijing. Nathu La, however, only reopened on 6 July after 44 years. The agreement ensures China's recognition of Sikkim as part of India. The trepidations of the Indian security establishment prevented Nathu La opening earlier. It was the Sikkim government that persuaded for the reopening of the pass for its strategic and commercial significance. Other proposals to network Sikkim with the Indian heartland include the establishment of an airport at Gangtok, extending the Golden Quadrilateral road network into Sikkim, and rail links with Silguiri. Unfortunately they have received a lukewarm response from New Delhi.

China sees trade at Nathu la as establishing greater connectivity and economic integration between Western China and the Gangetic plains. India is wary of this, fearing Beijing's grand vision of infrastructural and economic connectivity. The low-key ceremony at the opening of the pass demonstrates India's position; what is being offered for trade also indicates the government's apprehensions. China has offered to import manufactured items like cycles, clothes, farm implements, and agro-chemicals though New Delhi has limited trade to items like yak tail and butter.

Why is India's China policy awash with self-doubt and ambivalence when India faces no overt military threat from China? Concerns about the transit trade with China and an inability to match Beijing's communication plans are not reason enough for backing down from the Chinese challenge. This challenge should be met head-on with imaginative policies, since Nathu La can greatly benefit Sikkim and help revive New Delhi's commercial influence north of the Himalayas.

Nathu la is only the first step in Beijing's long-term vision and the opening of the Qinghai-Tibet railway has compounded Indian concerns. While Beijing extends the newly launched line from Lhasa towards Nathu La in the strategic Chumbi valley, the Indian government has been sleeping over proposals for rail links into Sikkim. Rail and road connectivity are long established geopolitical strategies and Chinese sources have reported plans for extending the rail line from Lhasa to Nyingchi, a township being developed by China just north of Arunachal Pradesh at the trijunction with Myanmar. This line will run along the Brahamaputra River and the Sino-Indian border in the Eastern sector. There are bigger plans to extend this rail line from Nyngchi to Kunming in Yunnan. Rail lines have always been used to feed markets and project military and political power. China is complementing these rail links with massive road networks and infrastructural investments in Tibet, thus increasing the connectivity in border regions.

On the other hand, the Indian government since 1961, weighed down by the security paradigm, has consciously left its border areas underdeveloped to block communications. Even today, it does not have a clear strategic policy on transport links along the Sino-Indian border. The government has decided to build rail links between the Silguiri corridor and Bhutan, and expand its existing rail links between India and Nepal, but it remains ambivalent about extending them to Sikkim. Infrastructural development on the Indian side of the Sino- Indian border is dismal; to safeguard its security interests the government has adopted a defensive strategy of simply limiting access to the border areas.

Why is India so insecure that it even disallows development in the name of security? Where is the required maneuverability to accommodate the emerging race for markets and natural resources? By rehashing 1962 war memories, India would only lose out the historic opportunity of collaboration with China. Both left- wing sentimentalism and right wing defensiveness are shortsighted. India needs to build modern transport connections for transit trade and establish communications with Western China. It should reestablish its consulate in Lhasa and a trading mission at Yatung.

India cannot stop China from developing infrastructure and transport links in its own territory, and must evolve policies with pragmatic and long-term interests in mind. China need not be viewed through a belligerent lens and its policies towards its border areas make an economic argument. If China is perceived as India's strategic and economic competitor, it is imperative that India engages the former. Non-engagement in the name of security is what poses the real danger. India's China policy needs to be creative and aggressive as it moves away from its current defensive mindset to one that seeks mutually beneficial collaboration with China. Shying away from the China challenge is not a viable solution and India must make every effort to develop its border areas.