HE Chrysantha Romesh Jayasinghe

Sri Lanka has been very much in the news these days in India. This is only natural, given the many bonds the two countries share, which in turn also lead to developments in Sri Lanka being of concern to the Indian authorities. The central theme of this discussion is the variations over the past two decades in the conflict resolution framework in Sri Lanka, and how these variations have come about.

The variations in the framework have stemmed from the basic fact that up to now Sri Lanka has not had the good fortune of a conclusive and successful peace process. Rather, there have been a series of peace processes, with the current one being the fourth in the series, on the basis of July 1983 being a major turning point. That month saw the intensification of the conflict with the decimation in the northern Jaffna peninsula of an Army patrol due to a land-mine explosion set off by Tamil militants, followed by serious riots against the Tamil minority community.

The riots and the physical and mental trauma to the Tamil minority community led to their displacement in significant numbers. While some moved northwards to be in Tamil majority areas in the north and in the east of the island, others who were more affluent began the process of migrating to the west, by claiming asylum. There was also a very significant movement of persons across the Palk Straits, to claim refuge in India.

The Indian position in reaction to this development was that India could not be a disinterested party. New Delhi pointed out that if the Centre were unreceptive to the sentiments aroused in the State of Tamil Nadu, concerning the plight of their fellow Tamils in Sri Lanka, implications adverse to the very Centre-State relationship could arise. Moreover, India had to meet the financial and other costs of hosting thousands of persons arriving in a destitute condition. Added to all this was the situation of the downward spiral in India-Sri Lanka bilateral relations in the early 80s, due to a misplaced Indian perception that Sri Lanka was undermining New Delhi's security interests in the neighbourhood through her links with third parties.

The first peace process therefore took place very much as a consequence of Indian pushing and prodding. It progressed from first, the involvement of Mr. G. Parathasarathy in talks in 1984 between the Government in Colombo and the Sri Lankan Tamil political parties, leading next to the talks in Thimpu in 1985 facilitated by the Indian Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari and finally, the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987. This process had a tripartite framework. The Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil parties, both political and militant, were the principal protagonists. However, the Government of India too had at that particular time, a role extending beyond that of an uninvolved observer of the conflict.

The Indo-Lanka Accord is today seen by many in Sri Lanka as a strong opportunity for peace that was regrettably missed. The LTTE passed up the opportunity to enter into the political mainstream. Where the Government was concerned, it did fulfill its obligation of enacting the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, thereby establishing a system of Provincial Councils along with the Northern and the Eastern Provinces being temporarily merged, as per the request of the Tamil political parties and the militant Tamil groups. However, there are those who hold that while Colombo went through the form of devolution, it did not fully implement its undertakings in keeping with the spirit of the Accord. Perhaps a reason for the disappointing outcome was that at the time both a significant number of the majority community in Sri Lanka, as well as the LTTE and it sympathizers, allowed their reservations concerning the role played by India, to cloud the intrinsically positive features of the Accord. Those elements from the majority community critical of the Accord, short-sightedly allowed their resentment at the various forms of assistance provided by India to Tamil militancy in the early and mid 1980s, to overshadow the positive reality that India never wanted the disintegration of Sri Lanka. As for the LTTE, one can speculate that it perhaps felt let down by being offered something less than a separate State.

The second attempt at peace had more of a home grown or from within the island nature. The LTTE then embattled with the IPKF made overtures in the late 1980s for direct negotiations, with the administration of President Premadasa. The immediate outcome is well known. The President was persuaded that the withdrawal of the IPKF would lead to the climate for negotiations becoming more conducive. Once the IPKF left the LTTE massacred 600 Sri Lanka Policemen, and resumed the conflict.

The framework which applied in this instance then appears to be one of both the two involved parties engaging themselves without a common immediate objective in mind. The LTTE saw the IPKF that was inexorably squeezing it, as its more immediate threat and therefore made a temporary alliance with its traditional foe, the Sri Lanka Government. As for the Government, it was at that point in time finding it difficult to fight the flames of nationalism whipped up by the then extreme JVP, which went on a deadly rampage in the south of the island, protesting against the presence of foreign troops in Sri Lanka.

The third round of negotiations took place in late 1994 and in early 1995, consequent to the election to office of President Kumaratunga and her Sri Lanka Freedom Party led administration. Once again, there were face to face negotiations and a great deal of optimism which however was abruptly deflated when on 19th April 1995, the LTTE resumed the conflict without warning by sinking two vessels of the Sri Lanka Navy in the north-eastern port of Trincomalee. The negotiations between Mrs. Kumaratunga's administration and the LTTE were initially focused very much on confidence building measures, including improving the ground situation in the conflict affected areas, to create a conducive atmosphere for political talks. As a justification for halting the negotiations and resuming conflict, the LTTE claimed that the tardy progress in establishing CBMs led them to feel that reverting to conflict was the only viable option.

The framework or rather the approach which applied in the Kumaratunga administration and LTTE talks, therefore appears to be one whereby both parties opted to plunge straight ahead into dialogue, without being sensitive to the deep chasm of distrust that had come to divide them, and which would ultimately negate their efforts.

The fourth and current peace process began in the late 1990s, when President Kumaratunga and her Foreign Minister -the late Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar -accepted the reality that the distrust was now so strong as to preclude the parties even having direct contact with one another, began the search for a disinterested facilitator, who would nevertheless be acceptable to both and also to India- the regional and dominant power. Norway was selected for this role and began its task, initially without public knowledge. However, a public confirmation of the work it was undertaking took place when at her swearing-in after her re-election as President in December 1999 ,and immediately after her surviving an attempted assassination by the LTTE, President Kumaratunga pledged the continuation of the efforts for peace, with Norwegian facilitation. During 2000 and 2001 however, the role of the facilitator was limited mostly to conveying messages between the two parties, who remained locked in conflict.

The more formalized and accelerated peace process began in February 2002 with the operationalization of a Ceasefire Agreement of CFA that month, in the wake of the Parliamentary election 1 ? months before, which brought to office the United National Party led administration of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The Ceasefire Agreement established a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) staffed by five Nordic countries, Six rounds of across the table negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE thereafter took place under Norwegian facilitation. The framework that was applied therefore to this fourth peace process had the distinct characteristic of facilitation through a disinterested third party. Secondly, the process was largely predicated on the assumption that inducements for peace offered to the two parties, would spur them to sustained and sincere efforts. Thirdly and finally, it offered some distinctive advantages to the LTTE, on the premise that this party being the weaker in terms of legitimacy, etc., would need some definite inducements to be more forthcoming.

The center-piece of the inducement was of course the June 2003 Tokyo Conference where a sum of US$ 4.5 billion was pledged for the development of Sri Lanka. While the sum of US$ 4.5 billion was in a certain sense rather hyped up, since a good portion of it was money that was already in the pipeline through the multilateral donor agencies and therefore only re-pledged at Tokyo, nevertheless a certain amount of fresh funds predicated on peace were allocated. Moreover, the four co-Chairs of the Tokyo Conference, namely the European Union, Japan, Norway and the US, undertook to monitor the progress of the peace process, so that the disbursement of the funds would have a solid foundation of space opened up through political agreements, for rehabilitation and reconstruction. The methodology for the disbursement of the money was the establishment of a North-East Reconstruction Fund designed to operate under a Sub-Committee for Immediate Rehabilitation and Humanitarian needs, that had representation on it from both the LTTE and the Government.

The mechanism of the co-Chairs set up at the Tokyo Donor Conference and the establishment of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission certainly brought the international involvement in the conflict in Sri Lanka to a greater extent than ever before. It would also be fair to say that the international community, that is the co-Chairs and other concerned parties such as India, have found the Government of Sri Lanka to be more malleable than the other party to the peace process, the LTTE. This is because Sri Lanka with all her tribulations has retained without break, her commitment to a democratic framework of governance. Democratic Governments are obliged to renew their mandate periodically and therefore especially those of the developing countries, do need the continued goodwill of the international community to achieve their goals of economic progress in order to retain the electoral support of their people. In contrast, a militant organization such as the LTTE does not face any such compulsions. Thus, although there was rhetoric from both sides, from the Government and from the LTTE, concerning the need for the people of Sri Lanka including the populace in the conflict affected areas, to be able to perceive a tangible peace dividend, in reality the seriousness of the Government in that direction, was not even reasonably matched by the LTTE.

Thus the LTTE never participated in the Sub-Committee on Immediate Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Needs, which therefore remained still born. It used frivolous reasons to justify its refusal to do so. For example, it took umbrage at the holding of a preliminary gathering of the donors for the Sri Lanka peace process in Washington in early 2003, on the grounds that the venue of the United States precluded it from participating, since America had banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization. It overlooked that the Washington meeting was merely preparatory to the Tokyo Conference, and despite entreaties from all over the world, adamantly refused to attend the Tokyo Conference. In fact, even prior to Tokyo, it pulled out in April 2003 from the face to face negotiations.

Not only did the LTTE remain unreceptive to the inducements in terms of tangible possible relief to the people it claims to represent, but it also deliberately aggravated the difficulties of its negotiating partner, the Government. The Government unlike the LTTE had the democratic constraint of requiring popular approbation for its efforts. This support the LTTE set about undercutting. The LTTE abused the provisions of the Ceasefire which allowed its cadres to move into areas dominated by the Government for political work, for the quite different objective of assassinating members of other Tamil groups opposed to it who had come into the political mainstream, and for killing intelligence operatives, both covert and overt, of the Government. The LTTE also added to its numbers by large scale recruitment, including several thousands of child soldiers, as documented by UNICEF. Its efforts for re-armament led to clashes with the Sri Lanka Navy when LTTE vessels bringing in weapons and ammunition were interdicted. Despite the interdictions, many vessels however did undoubtedly get through.

The approach of facilitation with inducement as a key feature was therefore by mid 2003 or 18 months into the fourth peace process clearly not having all the desired results. This was compounded by the LTTE appearing to acquire for itself an increasing aura of impunity, despite the steady increase in the determinations by the SLMM of the LTTE violating the Ceasefire, as against the relatively minor quantum of infractions by the Sri Lanka Security Forces. Having pulled out of the negotiations in April 2003, the LTTE then said that it would need time to prepare its own proposals for an interim arrangement, which it said would be in contrast to the vacillation on the part of the Government, and provide meaningful relief to the conflict affected areas. These proposals which were presented at the end of October 2003 under the title "Interim Self-Governing Arrangement" or ISGA were seen by objective observers as being not a half way house towards a negotiated solution, but rather as an end objective by itself. Constitutionally the proposals went far beyond federalism and towards confederation, with the ISGA envisaging in the LTTE dominated areas an autonomous judiciary, independent financial mechanisms and absolute law enforcement authority over the land and the adjacent sea areas, without any oversight by the Centre.

In the meantime, the waning of public confidence in the peace process and concern as to whether it was becoming a one sided process, with only advantages to the LTTE and concessions by the Government posing increasing danger to the territorial integrity of the country, was among the factors that contributed to the success of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party led coalition at the 2004 April Parliamentary Election, with President Kumaratunga gaining once again full command of the administration. During her second tenure with full political authority, Mrs. Kumaratunga took up the position that while certainly the Interim Arrangement proposed by the LTTE could be discussed, the negotiations should also have some focus on the possible contours of a final and negotiated political solution. The LTTE however, was adamant that only its ISGA could be discussed. The end solution they said could be looked at, only once the ISGA had been agreed upon and fully operationalized. The Government of course had to act with prudence and could not blindly agree to this sequencing demanded by the LTTE, which once again brought into question the motives of that organization. On this issue, the attempts to restart the negotiations floundered.

In the meantime the Ceasefire had an unintended outcome, with the largely monolithic LTTE having its eastern Commander Karuna break away, with the parent body being unable to ruthlessly eliminate him, as had happened to earlier dissidents. The undoubted gains that the Ceasefire brought by affording respite to the entirety of the nation from conflict, perhaps also led to an inevitable loosening of the restrictions within the LTTE, against any questioning of the dictates of Prabhakaran.

Without responding to the inducements offered, but encouraged by the perceptions of acquired impunity, the LTTE took the next step of assassinating the then Foreign Minister Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar on 12th August 2005, a little over two months before the Presidential election that same year in Sri Lanka. At the Presidential election in November 2005, it once again expressed its contempt for the longstanding Sri Lankan tradition of democratic governance, by not allowing the populace in the areas it dominates to exercise their right of franchise.

The newly elected President of Sri Lanka Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksa made it clear immediately upon the assuming office, his strong commitment to a negotiated solution. He reiterated the offer he had made in his manifesto to meet with the LTTE leader to resolve issues face to face. President Rajapaksa also emphasized that his vision is for "maximum devolution", to resolve the national issue.

The LTTE however, without responding to President Rajapaksa's positive gestures has remained true to form, with continued endeavors to weaken and narrow the political space for a solution. From the time that President Rajapaksa took over, there have been a steady series of covert attacks resulting in the deaths of almost 230 members of the Armed Forces and of the Police, during the period from 1st December 2005 up to the present. Civilians too have been targeted, in clear attempts to provoke a backlash. The LTTE is no doubt unhappy that the balm of time has somewhat healed the wounds caused by the 1983 riots, so that today over 54% of the island's Tamil community feel secure to live in areas traditionally habituated by the majority Sinhalese. All these attacks have been well reported, especially by the Indian media, and do not require repetition.

The President and his administration by contrast have exercised tremendous restraint and patience. Even as the regularity of the covert attacks was stepped up, the Government proposed to the LTTE what would have been a very practical approach, namely of strengthening the Ceasefire, so that once the level of violence began to decrease, a better atmosphere for the resumption of peace negotiations could have been brought about. It was this approach that then led to what was at that time envisaged to be the first in a round of talks, taking place in Geneva in February 2006. At the end of the talks, the LTTE undertook to ensure that there would be no acts of violence against the Armed Forces and the Police, while the Government for its part recommitted to meeting its obligations under the Ceasefire Agreement. It was also agreed that the second meeting in the round could take place in Geneva in April 2006.

As it happened, the second meeting never took place. Again, the LTTE used a flimsy pretext, and claimed that adequate arrangements were not made by the Government for its cadres in the east to travel northwards for consultations with the leadership, as part of the preparatory process before departing for Geneva. Finally, matters came to such a state that even the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission came under threat, when LTTE craft attacked a Sri Lanka Navy vessel which was sailing under a flag to denote that she had a SLMM Monitor on board. The immediate issue then became not strengthening the Ceasefire, but rather the more basic yet vital imperative of allowing the Monitors, who provide the underpinning essential for the CFA, to go about their work.

With this narrower, but yet important objective in mind, the Norwegian facilitators then convened a meeting in Oslo on the 8th and 9th of last month. However, at Oslo, the LTTE refused to talk to the Sri Lanka team on the grounds that it did not have Ministerial level leadership. In the meantime, the LTTE had finally by its outrageous actions brought upon itself on the 29th of May 2006, the situation of its being listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union.

There is no gain saying that today Sri Lanka and her people face a most challenging time. The LTTE for its part has the best of both worlds. It abuses the opportunities provided by the Ceasefire Agreement to continue its covert attacks against the Government. The Government on the other hand is constrained by its obligations under the CFA from taking the more effective forms of deterrent action. There have been occasions when the Government has resorted to air strikes in the face of outrageous incidents, such as the attempted assassination of the Army Commander through the use of a woman suicide bomber on April 25 , and the destruction of a passenger bus in the North-Central Province of Sri Lanka on June 15 through a claymore mine, causing the death of 64 civilians. Air strikes however as we know, can never be as effective as ground operations. Ground operations of course cannot be launched, since they will constitute a further violation of the CFA.

In this situation, how should the Government and the people of Sri Lanka plan to move ahead with the peace process? Returning to the theme of the variations in the frameworks, the framework now envisaged is one that provides important continuity, while having built into it some necessary modifications. One feature of the framework that the Government of Sri Lanka hopes will remain unchanged, is pertaining to the assistance of a facilitator, by a disinterested third party. In the wake of the aborted discussions in Oslo last month, the Norwegian authorities addressed five questions to both the Government and to the LTTE. These questions sought responses on issues such as a continued commitment to the Ceasefire, the desire for Norway to retain her facilitatory role, and guarantees for the safety of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, etc. To all these, the Government of Sri Lanka replied immediately in the affirmative. Where the Government is concerned, it recognizes that the Norwegian facilitators have a very difficult task. Their commitment is appreciated and it is hoped that they would continue their endeavors.

The modification arises from Sri Lanka henceforth not being ready to rely only on inducements to motivate the LTTE. Certainly, the aspect of inducement is very important and every effort must continue be made to improve the prospects for the people in the conflict affected areas, who have had to face first the man-made ravages of combat taking place in their areas of abode, and then the ravage of nature, through the Asian Tsunami of December 2004. However, when inducement alone is not working, then it is necessary to be resolute enough not to shy away from recourse to well-targeted sanctioning. The fact that the LTTE has now been listed by the European Union is a step that we believe would be intrinsically helpful to the peace process coming back on track. The European Union list of terrorist organizations, as we all know, is subject to regular revision. The LTTE's inclusion on the list therefore is a "negative inducement". After all, if they want to come off the list, it will not be difficult for them to do so. All they have to do is to desist from violence and manifest and bring to bear for a reasonably sustained period of time, a sincere commitment to meaningful political negotiations.

Sri Lanka for her part will therefore continue to urge the Governments of countries well disposed to the peace process to have the political will to effectively implement the legal provisions that have now become available to interdict the flow of funds to the LTTE, consequent to that organization being increasingly recognized as terrorist in nature by a good part of the western developed world. The objective must be to dent the fund raising capacity of the LTTE and cause it enough discomfort to persuade it to re-consider its present adventurist path.

The third feature of the modified framework will be that even as the "negative inducement" remains in place, the Government would endeavor to make it clear to the LTTE, that the window for peace remains open. In fact, even as the LTTE came within the EU list, the Presidential Secretariat in Sri Lanka made a Statement on 30th May re-affirming that the "Government will press ahead with its search for a political solution based on democracy and human rights that meets the aspirations of all communities in Sri Lanka, and will preserve the territorial integrity of the country." The key instrument in this regard is the All Party Conference (APC). The genesis of the APC is President Rajapaksa's perception that an inclusive approach which engages as much of the political spectrum in Sri Lanka as possible in the peace process, will ultimately work for the success of the endeavor. Inclusiveness admittedly does have the disadvantage of a reduced pace in comparison to a restricted group, drawn only from like minded parties. However, the reality is that the Constitution of Sri Lanka is extremely rigid, and when it comes to enacting constitutional changes for delivery on any understandings reached, the need would be for the greatest possible cross party support.

The APC has held five Sessions up to now. All its participants, including the JVP and the JHU, have gone on record reaffirming that the way forward must be through negotiations, including with the LTTE. The APC has now taken the further step of constituting a 12 member multi-ethnic group of legal experts, to consider all options in relation to a final settlement within a decentralized, and or devolved framework. Only the sovereignty of Sri Lanka remains non-negotiable. As of the present, it is difficult to predict as to when the LTTE will return to the negotiation table. Obviously, the Government and the people of Sri Lanka hope that it would do so, sooner rather than later. However, in the meantime, the Government will work through the APC to develop a national consensus on the broad contours of an equitable solution within an undivided Sri Lanka. It is the intention of President Rajapaksa to go to the negotiating table with a proposal agreed to by all parties in the south by consensus, to be offered to the LTTE for further negotiation with them.

The Sri Lanka peace process has its ups and its downs. What has remained steadfast however is the deep desire of the people of Sri Lanka and of their Government for a political solution. While the end objective accordingly remains the same the modifications to the current framework are therefore only a pragmatic correction of course, to hopefully enable successful navigation of the present turbulent waters, and to move to calmer seas.