The third round of talks, held on 22 June 2006, between the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) assorted civil society groups, the People's Consultative Group (PCG), and the Union government, created an optimistic atmosphere. All parties agreed to maintain restraint. It is unfortunate that in early July, the ULFA served an extortion notice demanding Rs.15 Lakhs from the Regional Director of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in Guwahati. Subsequently, three ULFA cadres were arrested on 7 July 2006 and the Union government has made negotiations conditional to a categorical assurance from the ULFA that it will renounce all illegal activities. How sincere are the ULFA and the Indian government in carrying forth the peace process?

Initiated by writer Mamoni Raisom (Indira) Goswami, the peace effort was given a pragmatic structure by the ULFA on 8 September 2005 when it formed the PCG with individuals from diverse backgrounds. Its primary agenda was to prepare for direct talks between the Union government and the ULFA leadership, eventually leading to bilateral ceasefire agreement. The government maintained that the ULFA should restrain from any violent and subversive activities to expedite the peace process. The ULFA has linked the progress of the peace process to the suspension of military operations against its members the release of its jailed central committee members, and information regarding its missing cadres during the Bhutan Operation in 2003, as pre-conditions for direct talks. Its core demand remains sovereignty, swadhin (free) Asom.

After three rounds of talks (earlier rounds were held on 25 October 2005 and 7 February 2006), there have been no tangible results, abstention of violence, or any indication of a ceasefire. The Union government has reciprocated positively by expressing its willingness to suspend counter-insurgency operations and to consider favorably the release of its cadres in jail. The demand for sovereignty remains non-negotiable and unacceptable to the Union government. However, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asserted his willingness to discuss all issues affecting Assam as long as they were within the framework of the Indian Constitution. While the ULFA is blaming the continuing police and military operations against it as vitiating the atmosphere for talks, the persistence of aggression by the ULFA raises doubts regarding its commitment to the peace process.

The ULFA has made its presence felt by repeatedly exploding bombs and demanding extortions. The second round of talks witnessed sporadic acts of violence and boycott of the Republic Day celebrations in January 2006. In June 2006, the ULFA complained about the delay in the third round of talks, which were postponed due to the Assembly elections. However, when they were announced, the ULFA responded with a series of blasts from 8 to 12 June 2006 killing civilians, police and army personnel. Crowded markets, police stations, oil and gas pipelines, government offices and railway tracks were systematically targeted. Extortion notes were imposed on the ONGC in January 2006 and to an independent candidate in the Assembly elections. These subversive acts create suspicion about the actual motive of the outfit.

The Operation Red Rose, in Arunachal, and the Operation Balwan, in Dibru-Saikhowa, both of which were launched by the Indian Army in August 2005, served major blows to the ULFA. This was complemented by the arrests of Shailen Sharma, a self-styled Commander for Kamrup from Amber and Azad Barua from Kolkata in September 2005. Four more ULFA leaders, including the outfit's 28 Battalion Commandant Mrinal Hazarika, were arrested in West Bengal in May 2006. These spurts of arrests have strengthened ULFA's complaints about state-sponsored military and police operations against its members.

Some positive developments included the scaling down of military operations by the government and the ULFA upholding relative restraint during the Assembly elections of 2006. Despite the desire exhibited by both sides for peace, they have evidently tried to exert pressure on each other. The ULFA has to realize that it is loosing support by targeting the common people. Illegal migrants from Bangladesh were a prime concern for the ULFA at the time of its birth. However, it has readily abdicated its original ideology of what it regarded as bideshi (foreign) to collaborate with Bangladesh, where it now has active camps with its leaders living a lavish life. Thus, the people have started questioning its motives. In a state-wide opinion poll conducted by the PCG, a majority of the respondents opposed ULFA's demand for sovereignty.

Engaging the country's largest and most organized terrorist group in peace talks holds the potential of ending 27 years of insurgency and restoring calm and security in Assam. However, any anticipation of durable peace would depend on the mutual rethinking of pertinent concerns. While the ULFA has to reconsider its demand for sovereignty and shun terror in the region, the government has to reassess suspending army operations and the release of the ULFA cadres. With the interest of the people in mind, the onus of heralding peace in the region rests on their respective commitment and restraint, along with mutual agreement and cooperation.