India has the second largest Muslim population; however until today Indian Muslims have not joined the international jihad. India's democracy and secularism are seen as two reasons for their non-involvement. How far are these assertions correct? Are there other issues that need investigation? This article aims to initiate a debate on this issue.

The primary reason for the non-involvement of Indian Muslims is the structure of the international jihad movement led by the al Qaeda, which carries out attacks on crucial targets, but uses its subsidiary organizations for attacks on peripheral targets. While attacks on Western targets are primarily undertaken by the al Qaeda or its close allies, its regional allies carry out attacks in their respective countries. In South Asia, organizations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Sipah-e-Sahaba have established close links with the al Qaeda and Taliban. Most jihadi activities in India and Pakistan are undertaken by these organizations. Hizbul Mujahideen, the only 'Kashmiri' organization with an established network, is a militant but not jihadi organization. Hizbul's attacks are political in character and restricted to Kashmir. The Lashkar and Jaish have carried out attacks outside Kashmir that include Bangalore, Akhshardam, Ayodhya and New Delhi. In most of these cases, the attacks were carried out by Pakistanis and though Indian citizens might have aided the attacks through logistical support they were not directly involved. The absence of an organization in India that has direct linkages with the al Qaeda could be the primary reason for the non-involvement of Indians in international jihad. There is no direct recruitment into these jihadi organizations.

The Lashkar, in particular, has been using Dawood Ibrahim's criminal network to carry out its activities, rather than establish a parallel structure. While Dawood resisted such moves in the early years, the ISI is believed to have forced him to succumb to their demands. Lashkar also has access to select religious seminaries which hosts students from Pakistan and other parts of the world, including Bangladesh and Indonesia. Fortunately, India has its own religious schools of repute, and there are no Indian students studying in any of the Pakistani seminaries with jihadi links.

Secondly, the radical Muslim organizations in India have not formed a pan-national network representing all sections and regions. Linguistic, ethnic, and regional factors play an important role in keeping the radical organizations focused on regional issues. Violence relating to Ayodhya and Gujarat had the potential to result in Muslim radicalization though, fortunately for India, this did not happen because of regional pulls. This explains why SIMI has not become a radical organization at the national level.

Thirdly, the media has indirectly played an important role. The vernacular media focuses on local issues and provides hardly any coverage of international events. Palestine, Chechnya and Bosnia, are, therefore, non-issues for the population outside metropolitan centres. It is doubtful that many people in rural areas have even heard about Bosnia or Chechnya. Therefore, the radical mobilization of the Muslim community with regard to Palestine has not happened due to the absence of the issue subject in local discourse.

The role of democracy and secularism needs to be examined further. If these two parameters were relevant how would one explain the active participation of British Muslims in international jihad? Why did these two factors not discourage British Muslims from taking part in international jihad? Is Britain's democracy, and its secular values, inferior to that of India? The negative answer to this question suggests that other factors are at play.

Three specific reasons can then be identified. Firstly, British Muslims were generally better aware of happenings in Palestine, Bosnia and Chechenya than Indian Muslims. Omar Sheik apparently converted to radical Islam after seeing a movie on Bosnia. Secondly, organizations like Al Mujahiroun and Hizb-ut-Tahir, and Imams like Abu Hamza, play an important role in exploiting religious sentiments. Hate literature was also systematically disseminated through the mosques. In India, the mosques and madrasas have generally remained moderate and have not become agents of hate. Thirdly, the economic and social conditions of British Muslims have been recognized as a factor behind their radicalization. Undoubtedly, in India, Muslim citizens live in poor conditions. However, what has been lost in private space has been gained in public space as India has towering personalities from the Muslim community in two of its most visible faces - Bollywood and Cricket; from Sharukh Khan to Zaheer Khan, the public image of Muslims is strong. Further, when nuclear nationalism was on the rise in the late 1990s, Abdul Kalam became the most prominent face outside cricket and Bollywood.

The absence of direct organizational linkages with the al Qaeda, regional cleavages within the Muslim community, limited exposure to international issues like Palestine, a prominent public space provided by Bollywood and Cricket, and the absence of an organized hate campaign at the national level, are all factors explaining why Indian Muslims are not joining the international jihad movement.