If the recent proceedings of the London based International Institute of Strategic Studies sponsored conference, popularly known as the Shangri La Dialogue, are any indication, India is gradually being recognised as a core state in Asian security architecture along with China and Japan. The formal support for New Delhi's policing of the Indian Ocean came from none other than Australia that still has an 'underdeveloped' relations with India.

One factor that has had an impact on India's changing fortunes in Asian security calculations is its recent 'defence diplomacy'. Apart from a seminal contribution in Tsunami relief measures in 2004-2005 in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Maldives, the Indian Navy initiated several maritime security and capacity building measures including joint exercises with foreign navies. India also managed a nuclear deal with US, a privilege that was denied to Pakistan. High level defence contacts were established with countries as far as Mongolia, South Korea and Japan. India has also shown its willingness in the Compulsory Pilotage Project of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and is taking steps to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI) led by the US.

The reward has come as an 'encouraging response' from major powers for a more proactive role for India in the Asia - Pacific. While India stole the show at the Shangri La Dialogue, China kept a low profile. Apparently, it was not too happy with the Taiwanese presence. In recent times, China has shown willingness to be a partner in Asian security by supplementing the theme of 'peace and development' with the concept of 'peaceful rise'. It has also come with regular white papers on defence to show greater transparency, the last being in December 2005. In addition, it has engaged Asian countries through diplomacy, regional institutions, trade linkages and joint defence exercises. However, its military modernisation and growing assertiveness in the region deter a sense of confidence among the regional players. While engaging China through institutional mechanisms, they are seeking a balance of power through the US and India.

Given the proliferation and diversification of security challenges in Asia, both China and India are vital cogs in Asian security. Not only have they an unresolved border between them and hence may be considered a part of the problem, they also have stakes directly or indirectly, in many other security issues in the region. Hence, Sino - Indian mutual engagement is the sine qua non of Asian security.

On bilateral front too, China is a challenge as well as an opportunity for India's defence diplomacy. It has strengthened its infrastructure in Tibet through roads, railways and airports. China has also consolidated its presence in the Bay of Bengal through collaboration with Myanmar and in Arabian Sea through Pakistan's support. As Pentagon's recent Annual Report on China's military power puts it, China is rapidly building up its capacity for area denial, precision strikes, expeditionary operations and extended maritime operations. Competitive advantage in military modernisation and power projection will have spill over effects. This may not bode well either for Asian security project or for India's own future.

The developmental priorities of the Chinese regime as well as the booming Sino - Indian trade have provided the Indian leadership an opportunity to engage China at a higher level defence diplomacy. When the Indian Defence Minister recently visited China, it was not a bandwagoning exercise. Rather, it was meant to engage China in creating additional confidence building measures (CBMs) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Instead of seeing each other as threats, the two countries decided to look at broader challenges in the Asia Pacific. To this end, the visit was also meant to narrow down differences between India and China on major security threats in the region. India is conducting regular security dialogue with China to work out a common stand on issues such as cross - border terrorism, sea piracy, drug trafficking and health hazards to bigger issues such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sovereign intervention, internal conflicts, ethnic violence and separatism.

'Engaging China' policy will not succeed unless India supplements it by modernising its own military and enhancing its power projection. This is what China has done in South East Asia where its diplomatic activities are backed by offensive defence policies. Unfortunately, India is seen as a conservative power in its own neighbourhood. The benefit of doubt goes to China. Without being interventionist, India can create more strategic space for itself in issues involving Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The Nehruvian tradition of assertive diplomacy and policy initiatives to resolve conflict issues can get India laurels and help in its image building. After all, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Boao Forum are China's own initiatives with a high success rate. China is also getting all the credit for Six Party Dialogue, irrespective of its fate.

Events like the Shangrila Dialogue remind that India need to enhance its economic, political and military linkages with the rest of the region to have a say in regional issues. Unless India recognises this reality, it cannot hope to be an equal partner with China in Asian security considerations.