A country's nuclear deterrence capability depends on the precision and consistency of its delivery capabilities. No defence force in the world would want to rely upon an untried and untested delivery system, particularly when its strategic doctrine is committed to the twin principles of "minimum credible nuclear deterrence" and a "no-first-use principle." India's defence and scientific establishment have gone on record to say that Agni-III is operationally ready and it is for the government to give a go-ahead for its testing.

However, the government has put a self-imposed moratorium on the testing of the over 3,000 kilometre range Agni-III after a thoughtful analysis of the consequences of such a move, factoring in systemic and regional responses. As the missile tests have been postponed at least a couple of times in the last two years, there appear to be no logic why India should go ahead with the testing of the Agni missile at this juncture.

If the goal of foreign policy is to maximise state security, this is what India's current policy of self-restraint is precisely attempting to attain. India's bilateral relations with both Pakistan and more so with China are shaping up well and any move, perceived as offensive, will enhance the "security dilemma" in the region and step up Sino-Pakistan missile technology collusion. South Asia is already seen as a region where missile testing adds to regional tensions. Pakistan tested its 2,500 km Shaheen-II in April 2006, apparently to match India's Agni-II and thus testing of Agni-III close on its heels might act serve an alibi to prompt a near failed state to give velocity to its missile related programme - a thing which India can ill afford at this stage.

In any case Prithvi, Agni-I and Agni-II are designed to carry conventional as well as nuclear payloads, keeping the sub-regional security dynamics into consideration. At its current state of development, Indian capabilities are sufficient to attain credible second-strike capabilities in South Asia and it does not need overkill capabilities to achieve a minimum nuclear deterrence in the region.

Agni-III is basically designed by keeping in sight the larger Sino-Indian strategic environment. However, even an Agni-III with a nuclear payload might not be able reach deep into China and strike either Beijing or Shanghai. India can anyway strike the fringes of China with its Agni-II missile. China's muted reaction to both Agni-II and Agni-III missile programmes has already blunted the psychological aspect of India's deterrence. China's defence modernisation plans, ICBMs with GPS-guided warheads and a vision to catch up with the US in RMA, together with its great power ambitions has given it a strategic and technological advantage which has left India miles behind. By stating Pakistan's missile and India's Agni programme would lead to South Asian instability and that Islamabad might be worried about New Delhi's Agni missile, Beijing may attempt to "water down" Agni's psychological edge. By this manoeuvre China will attempt to contain the Agni-III's impact to within the confines of South Asia.

In addition to these offence-defence considerations, in the backdrop of Iran and North Korea's nuclear violations, Agni-III should not be tested now as India would be giving a chance to its critics to project India as being on the same boat as authoritarian, lawless countries. International public opinion acts as a great moral force in determining the foreign policy of nations. This is more so as the Indo-US nuclear deal is being hotly debated not only in Washington but also across European capitals. The pro-Indian lobby has justifiably pushed forth the argument that India is a responsible nuclear state committed to the principles of democracy. Any deterioration in the strategic stability in Asia remotely linked to India's actions might result in opposition to the civilian nuclear deal in the US Congress. This might deny India access to critical dual-use technologies.

However, this is not to suggest that India abandon either testing of the Agni-III nor does it necessitate shunning our Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Like a great power in the making India should think big. With an aim to possessing ICBM's that can provide strategic depth in Asia and the Indian Ocean, India should use the technological insights of Agni-III and move ahead to develop the 5,000 km and beyond Surya range of missiles. As and when the strategic environment is conducive, India should test Agni-III and build upon this experience to attain precision in the ICBM range of missiles. An ill-timed move might endanger India's strategic missile programme and derail India's ultimate aim of possessing longer-range missiles. The Agni-III is a point in a long journey and not the destination.

(Views expressed are personal)