The Siachen Conundrum

19 May, 2006    ·   2015

Vijay Oberoi questions the efficacy of India reneging its position of 'no authentication-no withdrawal'


The next round of official level discussions between India and Pakistan is scheduled for late this month. Perhaps the biggest issue exercising the minds of political pundits, defence analysts and the media is the 'Siachen issue' because it is feared that there may be a sell-out merely to show forward movement of the peace process. Many opinions about the pros and cons of this issue have been expressed, but some major aspects have been glossed over. Three important issues need to be highlighted. These relate to the assertion of India's sovereignty; the China connection; and the question as to why Siachen is being de-linked from the larger and more important issue of a settlement of the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

The Siachen Glacier and more importantly the Saltoro Ridge are an integral part of the Nubra tehsil of Ladakh and have been so for a long time. In fact, this entire area was part of the erstwhile kingdom of J&K. The Indian Army has been holding the Saltoro Ridge since its occupation in April 1984, pre-empting a similarly planned move by the Pakistani Army. Pakistan's innumerable attempts to dislodge Indian troops from the Saltoro have been unsuccessful. So, why is India giving up these commanding heights, which are an integral part of its territory? What is worse is that it seems that India is even reneging from its long held position that the first step to any demilitarisation is authentication of the current location of troops of both sides.

The China factor needs to be examined at two levels. If the Saltoro had not been occupied by the Indian Army, Pakistan from the west and China from the east (they continue to illegally occupy the Chip Chap Valley, which they had usurped five decades back) would have long since linked up, with the strategic Karakoram Range under their complete control. It is only India's occupation of the Saltoro that has driven a wedge between Pakistan and China. It would be a monumental folly if India now vacates the dominating positions it currently occupies.

The Shaksgam valley is the second level of the China factor. This area of J&K was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963. It lies directly north of the Saltoro and the Siachen glacier. By occupying the Saltoro, India retains the option of negotiating with China about the Shaksgam Valley at an appropriate time. The location of the Shaksgam Valley is such that China has to be a party to any negotiations regarding Siachen.

Lastly, why are Siachen and the AGPL being discussed in isolation when the AGPL is a de facto extension of the LoC - commencing at Point NJ 9842 and going up to Indira Col in the north. It may be recalled that even the current ceasefire, in force for two-and-a-half years, is as much applicable to the LoC as the AGPL.

From the military point of view, there is no tearing hurry to come to a settlement on this issue alone. The Indian Army is well in control of the entire area; terrain or weather-related casualties are more than manageable and India can well afford the additional costs. So why is India thinking of reneging from its well-known position of 'no authentication-no withdrawal'?

India's best stance would be that it would be happy to negotiate the AGPL along with the LoC, whenever it reaches that stage during talks with Pakistan. Till then, if it is forward movement that is needed, other important issues need discussion. They are: why is infiltration by Pakistan-trained terrorists continuing in the J&K? Why has the ISI intensified its terrorist activities in India's hinterland? Why does the Pakistani establishment continue to be the proverbial dog in the manger in all international fora when India is discussed? Why is land access to Afghanistan for trade and commerce continue to be denied to India?

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