The year-long ceasefire between the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) and the Indian government ends on 31 May 2006, unless it is extended further. During the year that elapsed, the NDFB has remained consistent in its promise to work for a peaceful solution to its armed insurrection that started with the rebel group's formation on 3 October 1986. But, surprisingly, New Delhi has not held even a single round of formal talks with the group and neither has it extended an invitation to the rebels for a dialogue.

This has made the NDFB cadre and leadership restless, resulting in the group threatening to return to the jungles and resuming its armed campaign to push its demand for an independent Bodo homeland. Why has New Delhi ignored the NDFB while negotiating with even smaller militant groups in the region? After all, the government's move in calling upon groups like the NDFB to enter into a truce and subsequently signing ceasefire agreements should normally indicate that the next step will be the initiation of peace talks. That has not happened in this case.

A year after the truce, the NDFB leaders appear to have mellowed after its cadres stayed within three 'designated camps' and other villages in western Assam's Bodo heartland. NDFB spokesperson S Sanjarang, for instance, made the following points during an interview. He said that: a solution is possible within the framework of the Indian Constitution, provided the people and the government were prepared to 'respect the history of the Bodos'; it is possible for the NDFB to work together with its rivals such as members of the former Bodo Liberation Tigers; the NDFB had committed a 'grave mistake' by engaging in fratricidal clashes with the BLT and the All Bodo Students' Union; and unity among the various Bodo forces was the need of the hour.

If the NDFB is indeed talking about the possibility of a solution within the Indian constitutional framework, New Delhi should have seized the initiative and pushed ahead for an 'acceptable' deal. That has not happened primarily because New Delhi has not met the NDFB leaders face-to-face and is perhaps unaware the group's viewpoint. The four rounds of talks held with the joint secretary (Northeast) in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Rajiv Agarwal, centred exclusively on the implementation of the ceasefire ground rules, not on the problem itself or its possible solution. The Union government could be sadly mistaken if it holds the opinion that the NDFB would lose its steam over time after having virtually come out into the open and because of which it would join mainstream Bodo politics.

New Delhi's stand vis-à-vis the NDFB has also sent wrong signals to other militant groups in the region, which could be on the verge of arriving at a truce with the government. After all, this could lead militant groups to think that a ceasefire could well be considered as weakness. In so far as the NDFB is concerned, both the Union government and the Assam government have been maintaining that the group has not put forward its main demands. This is not convincing ground for not inviting the NDFB for formal peace talks considering the fact that the group's demands are well known.

Of course, New Delhi may not be aware about what to discuss or how to discuss peace with the NDFB. This is because it had signed a peace agreement with the BLT as recently as 2003. This agreement led to the creation of a 40-member Bodoland Territorial Council, three new districts, jobs in the paramilitary for former BLT cadres, and an annual budgetary allocation of Rs 100 crore to the council. But, now what? This seems to be the moot question that has the government perplexed. Obviously, if a deal has to be arrived at with the NDFB, it would have to contain more concessions. Further, if the NDFB manages to extract more concessions from New Delhi than what the BLT had managed in 2003, it would obviously mean that the NDFB leaders, and not necessarily the former BLT bosses, will call the shots in Kokrajhar. It is indeed a Catch 22 situation for the government. Yet, a strategy to end this insurgency is urgently required.