Speaker: C Raja Mohan
Discussant: Ambassador Lalit Mansingh

Ambassador Lalit Mansingh

C Raja Mohan's book, Impossible Allies..., is a fascinating account of recent Indo-US relations, as it is both descriptive and analytical. The book also looks into the strategic decision-making process in India. In particular, the book dwells explicitly into the various structures of decision-making, which is a welcoming trend.

C Raja Mohan

One of the major drawbacks in India's strategic thinking has been the lack of comprehensive documentation of contemporary history written by people who have been associated with the decision-making process. In the US, invariably every official produces a memoir or an account of his or her experiences. Even the journalists, for example, those who have been covering the Iraq war, pen down their day-to-day interactions, producing adequate first hand information or recorded contemporary history. Traditionally, India lacked such documentation of contemporary history. Perhaps the late former foreign secretary, JN Dixit, is an exception.

Impossible Allies... is a diplomatic history. Being a journalist, the author had access to those in the decision-making loop. Even the academic community has access, but it is a long process involving interviews and related research tools. This book is an event-by-event account of what happened in the last one year between India and the US. At times, the events were so fast paced and were so close, that the narration may lack perspective.

The book covers events in Indo-US relations between US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice's visit to New Delhi in March 2005 and US President, George Bush's visit in March 2006. This period is also important for two other factors: there was a paradigm shift in the Indo-US relations and the Indian foreign policy underwent significant changes. During this period, India's nuclear policy also witnessed dramatic acceleration. The book also looks into how the nuclear deal was conceived during this period? What were the problems inside the establishment in India and the US? How did the events unfold between 16-18 July 2005, at which point in time the deal was almost dead? However, by 18 July 2005, both countries were able to reach an understanding to sign a historic agreement, which called for substantive nuclear cooperation from the US, and India willing to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities. Immediately after the agreement, there was widespread uproar against it. It was led by the non-proliferation lobbyists in the US and the BJP and others in India.

The book discusses as to what happened in Indo-US relations during Bush's first term as the President. During this time, both India and the US certainly went beyond what was achieved during the Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks. Though Talbott has published his version of the proceedings, Jaswant Singh has not revealed the focus of these meetings. However, it is believed that their talks did not move ahead as both countries were sticking to the policy of "no-give-no-take." After Bush took over, there was a change in the Indian side; Brajesh Mishra held a series of meetings with Rice. The book also discusses the unfolding of events from the NSSP to the 18 July 2005 deal. Before the nuclear agreement, the US insisted on nuclear cooperation with India, but within its existing framework and regulations. In turn, it expected India to move forward in its position relating to international treaties such as the NPT and FMCT. However, the developments during this period could be defined as a "half-way house."

During Bush's second term, the focus changed. The book details the reasons behind this change. Rice came to New Delhi in March 2005. She informed India about the sale of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan and also discussed nuclear energy to India. When the US made its decision public on F-16s, for the first time, India did not react negatively by linking it to arming the region. It was during this meeting that the US presented a comprehensive plan for a substantial change in Indo-US relations, especially in the nuclear area. Just before Rice's visit to India, there was an important discussion in the US administration regarding South Asia and India. The changing global order, the rise of China and India, and the need to accommodate India were the major issues discussed. During this meeting it was decided that if nuclear cooperation was essential for the US to improve its relations with India, then the US should go ahead.

There have been many criticisms inside India, especially on which and how many reactors should be placed under the civilian and military lists. The US is more interested in building a strategic relationship with India and is not worried about minute details. From the Indian side, it has never signed an agreement like this with any other country before. The agreement with the former Soviet Union was a friendship treaty and not a comprehensive defence agreement like this.

The critical commentaries on the nuclear deal were more out of prejudices rather than out of a through reading of the agreement. The book looks into the merits and lack of these in the arguments. India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was convinced that the US would never sell any nuclear reactors to India, hence it wanted to solely focus on nuclear fuel. Thus, the DAE focus was narrow, and it was not willing to discuss anything beyond this. This narrow focus in the initial period only delayed the Indo-US nuclear negotiations. When Bush made that political decision on 18 July 205, many inside the Indian establishment were surprised. A significant part of it was not willing to accept the deal and was sceptical even after the deal was signed. The system failed to respond in total.

It was during this time that India had to pay a political price on Iran. When Manmohan Singh visited the US in September 2005, the US Congress made it clear that if India votes for Iran, the nuclear deal would be dead. It was a brave decision when India voted along with the EU against Iran. India could have abstained, but it was not an option.

Finally, why is the book is titled Impossible Allies? India, as mentioned earlier, has never signed such an agreement with any other country. Though, India had close relations and had security treaties with Nepal, the nature of the deal was different. Unlike UK and Japan, India cannot be a secondary or junior partner to the US. India believes in non alignment and cannot align with any country. Besides, India has its own security interest, which would be its primary concerns. For these reasons, India and the US would remain impossible allies.

Questions, Answers & Comments

• It is unfortunate that Indian strategic thinking has never been explicitly defined, while the American strategic thinking is clearly expounded. Neither Vajpayee nor Jaswant Singh decided to bring out their memoirs. Manmohan Singh has made efforts to fill this void, but it remains inadequate.

• The Indo-US nuclear agreement brought the fascinating interplay between the NSA and DAE in one camp, and the MEA on the other side, with the PMO joining the latter.

• India had problems in defining its treaty relationship with the former Soviet Union in 1971 also. It was considered a 'core relation' and a friendship treaty.

• There has been an over statement on nuclear energy. In India, nuclear energy contributes only three per cent of the total energy output, while wind energy stands at an impressive four per cent. The nuclear energy argument is an exaggerated one.

• From the scientific point of view, why were the breeder reactors kept under the military list? This should have been under the civilian list.

• There has been more focus on the nuclear agreement and not so much on the defence agreement. "Joint Operations" outside the US clearly refers to the PSI.

• During the Indo-US nuclear negotiation process, the media and the people at large also became a part of the process and gave the impression as if they were the ones who were negotiating. In this debate, those who did not agree or had differences were targeted as if they belonged to another country. The DAE statements countered the MEA, thus making the departmental differences public. This did damage the negotiations.

• There has been a slow change in Indian strategic thinking. India's foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, used the phrase 'balance of power' for the first time in a positive sense. On nuclear proliferation, India's criticisms have undergone a change. India does not speak any more for everyone. Its current position is more on removing the discrimination against India and not that the nuclear regime as a whole is a discriminatory one. Thus, there is a clear change in policy.

• The change in foreign policy did not come over night. It evolved slowly over a period of time in recent months. In the last ten months, there have been dramatic innovations. There were controversies regarding the decision-making process; nevertheless, there is a change and it is moving forward.

• The present Congress-led government is weaker than the previous BJP government, yet it has taken bolder steps. In fact, Brajesh Mishra slowed down the process in the last few months under the NDA government. JN Dixit took the initial steps under the new government and fastened the process. There were all round improvisations by the MEA and PMO and was it not limited to one particular arm of the government.

• The debate in the DAE is not due to its strength, but rather due to the weakness of the PMO. Brajesh Mishra would have simply asked the DAE to toe the government line.

• As India grows, it would be willing to use force outside the UN. It always used force outside the UN, in case of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In the post-tsunami period, for the first time, India worked with three navies. The will to use force symbolises an emerging India.