Introductory Remarks

Maj. Gen. Banerjee: The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies welcomes the MIT team and appreciates its efforts to take note of the Indian perspective on the India-US nuclear deal, especially in the larger framework of Indo-US relations instead of merely focussing the technical aspects.

C. Rajamohan

The context of the Indo-US relationship has never been so good. Irrespective of whether the US Congress passes the India-specific legislature, the last one-and-a-half years have been very good for India-US relations. It is paradoxical that a conservative Republican government has started a rethink of the relationship. Except for isolated protests by certain sections of society, urban India has largely approved of Bush's visit to India. In the five years of Bush administration, the US stand in two issues - the Indo-Pak issue and the nuclear issue - have seen significant steps forward. Although Clinton must be credited for his visit in 2000, he could not produce a breakthrough as the Americans were unwilling to undertake a negotiation. It was only after 9/11 that the Bush administration took positions that were never held before by US administrations in the past. This resulted in significant convergence on major policy issues. Broadly, these were three - Pakistan, terrorism and the nuclear issue.

The India-US nuclear deal is based on the assumption of a changing world. Many events have taken place in the one year between Condoleeza Rice testifying on 16 March 2006 and 25 March 2005. The relationship has a new set of parameters. The new defence relationship is also a result of major US companies willing to sell aircraft to India, and this has provided a platform for the new relationship.

The issue of deployment of troops in Iraq in 2003 is an example. How does it fit into the Indo-US defence framework? There have been joint-military operations, although there was strong resistance to the war in India. Last year, during the tsunami, India broke its policy of working only with the UN. Instead it was a non-UN, multilateral coalition of four parties - the US, Japan, India and Australia that took the initial lead in relief operations.

Missile defence is another element that needs to de discussed. The NSSP of 2004 is based on the broad understanding to work together. However, the US pulled back. When Bush visited India, the nuclear deal consumed all the attention, as well as everyone's efforts.

If the nuclear deal is passed in the US Congress, then this partnership will gain momentum. There will be a major shift in strategic premise, followed by a significant defence transfer. The ideological aspect will be influenced by a whole range of elements feeding into a dynamic and forward-looking relationship.

Question & Answer

Subrata Ghoshroy: What is the downside of this paradigm shift? What are the implications for India's role as an independent country?

C. Rajamohan: The politically driven argument is that the US is evil; therefore, a partnership with the US is a departure from India traditional policy. The second argument within the establishment is whether the US is trustworthy? The prevailing question is: Why is India letting go of what it already has? The argument against the US is that it does not have a good track record in this regard. That India can be partners has less to do with strategic details, and this is reflected in part in the arguments of the DAE. It is seen more as a trust building measure. The third point is; India has not been aligned before, as exemplified by its relationship with the Soviet Union. With China and Pakistan on one side, it makes sense for India to align with the US. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan involved costs, but that did not stop India from supporting the USSR. The India-US nuclear deal necessitated the transformation of India's position in the nuclear order and India decided the cost was worth it.

Theodore Postol: As far as sending troops to Iraq is concerned, what is the prevailing view of educated Indians? What about the American claim of Iraq having WMDs?

C. Rajamohan: The Asian reaction was very different from transatlantic arguments. Transatlantic arguments were not in the forefront of the critique, but what was reflected was part of the post-1998 change in Indian policy. Neither India nor China or Japan took philosophical positions. This war was actually used for furthering their respective interests. There was a debate in strategic circles about the intervention and about sending troops to the Gulf as India is experienced in international peacekeeping, etc. The ground situation in Iraq by mid-2003 changed the Indian position. Also, domestic politics in India, along with vote bank politics also played a significant role in India's final decision.

Maj. Gen. Banerjee: India's support to the US after 9/11 was ignored. India has been a victim of terrorism much before 9/11 occurred. On a subsequent visit to the US to discuss issues of cooperating against terrorism, the then deputy Prime Minister, LK Advani, was approached by the US President for India's support in Iraq. Advani responded positively but made no commitments. The issue was debated seriously in the Indian Cabinet and outside, but there was not sufficient support for intervention in Iraq, unless it was under UN mandate and had support within Iraq, and in the neighbourhood. The war in Iraq was seen as a wrongly conceived plan and there was considerable scepticism. However, earlier, India had supported the intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11.

Theodore Postol: Although India's position on cross-border terrorism is understandable, its independent foreign policy would be undermined if it sent troops to Iraq.

C. Rajamohan: Iraq and India had a long history of cordial and friendly relationship. India was far more comfortable with Iraq's socialism. It must be kept in mind that 40 per cent of UN peacekeeping forces today are from South Asia. However, the 1990s saw the continued erosion of Saddam Hussein's power base. Therefore, the issue was Indo-US relationship. Domestic politics held India back from sending troops to Iraq.

Subrata Ghoshroy: Considering that India lives in a dangerous neighbourhood, and going by the rules of realpolitik, how does it become safer to align with the most hated country in the world? Even in Europe, the US and Israel are the most hated states. The US government policies are not popular. How will India's neighbours perceive this relationship?

Theodore Postol: Pakistan is desperate and is making the situation fluid; therefore, it might react accordingly. However, Pakistan is open to solve the Kashmir issue. Pakistanis were openly criticizing Musharraf and the Kargil episode. They held the opinion that solving the Kashmir issue would be of immense benefit to Pakistan's problem of poverty, energy and economy. There was also concern about religious extremism and the perception was that a relatively irresponsible army feeds religious extremism. The time is thus ripe for discussion if it is acceptable within the current Indian political discourse. There were concerns expressed about Indian negotiations, but generous and friendly behaviour can contribute to confidence-building.

Subrata Ghoshroy: The backdrop in Pakistan is one of sadness and bitterness about the Indo-US deal. The official response to the India-US deal was considerably late. It is interesting to note that a statement was issued by Pakistan's foreign minister on 17 March 2006, right after the introduction of the bill in the US Congress. The delay in Pakistan's response is worth pondering over.

Prof. Rajaraman: Pakistan feels betrayed by the US. The anger is not so much towards India. There is great deal of anger and no direction.

C. Rajamohan: The strategic template of South Asia is changing. The geopolitics of the region has changed. There were big changes in all major relationships. The differences between India and the US are not so many. At the conceptual level, the debate is muddled. Much of the critique of the US is balanced by self interest. Just as the US recognized China in the 1990s, it is now recognizing India. Did India benefit from the war on terror? Yes, most definitely. The US has put more pressure on Pakistan in the last five years than ever before. India and the US act together in relation to Nepal and Sri Lanka. Are there more convergence costs or more domestic net gains? The strategic significance of the US is that it is not good to have a hostile US with regard to Kashmir. Pakistan does not have many options. On the other hand, there is a rising China and a strengthening of the Pakistan-China partnership. But, will China play this game? China has to wisely consider before pursuing a containment policy towards India. Pakistan has to factor in the presence of US troops on its western border. China cannot replace the US fundamentally. India's dialogue with Pakistan is on the verge of making some big moves. India can change the region by reaching out. The Indian Prime Minister has spoken about joint institutions in Kashmir. This is a great moment for both countries and there is a need for imaginative policy. India wants to take some risks and go beyond the conservative viewpoint. Due to this fundamental shift, a new range of options are now available.

Maj. Gen. Banerjee: India and the US are not entering into an alliance. It is a partnership, where there will be differences on policy issues, but an overall determination to pursue common interests exists. On the question of China, India will go along with the US. Iran will be in violation of the NPT if it pursues nuclear arms; therefore, there are limits to this relationship.

India-Pakistan relations are based on the nature of the regime in Pakistan. This regime takes its position from being anti-India, not just in rhetoric but through deliberate policy choices. Coexistence and cooperation with India is in Pakistan's interests.

The Bush visit coincided with the controversy over the Danish cartoons. The Left and the Islamic parties made common ground over this. Remarkably, Indian Muslims are much more moderate as they can avail democratic avenues for redressal of grievances and the presence of an established rule of law.

In Kashmir, there are new set of initiatives being put in place and progress is imminent. There are certain boundaries within which the situation has to be discussed. Economic interactions can make substantive contributions. About China, there have been interesting developments and what needs to be focused on is the role of China in Nepal.

Question: Will Pakistan's disappointment with the Indo-US deal lead to the possibility of a Pakistan-China deal?
Response: China might act, but the Chinese might not oppose the rule changes to the NSG. It depends on the NSG vote. China cannot afford to spoil its relationship with India.

Question: Will this deal make India a better candidate for a permanent seat for the UNSC?
Response: "It is a cheque that cannot be cashed." India cannot expect US support on this issue.

Question: Will Pakistan's reservations about the Indo-US deal turn into a veiled aggression leading to cross-border terrorism and diminishing cooperation in the war of terror?
Response: Pakistan has already abandoned the war on terrorism - Musharraf has done everything to advance himself at the cost of Pakistan's interests.

Question: How active is the Indian lobby in the US in terms of campaigning for the nuclear deal?
Response: NRI contribution in the US is growing. The Indian lobby is firmly behind this deal.

Geoffrey Forden: A specific point of view has been accomplished in that the nuclear deal is unilateral and unique for India. India is an anomaly and there is a need to solve this. This could not have happened by consensus as it is running into European objections because of India's uniqueness.

C. Rajamohan: India cannot be accommodated without revising the rules. The pure knights in the Northern Europe will certainly object. The Bush administration has to be given credit for recognizing India's rise. The Chinese are political animals and have already given missiles to Pakistan. We have to deliberate on certain questions - is Pakistan's programme self-reliant?

William Marshall: Although Pakistan was shocked at the deal, it did not behave irrationally. How is it expected to react? Should it develop more nuclear capability? Pakistan knows that it does not have too many choices and it does not have much to gain either. However, the India-US deal problematises the Kashmir problem. The deal is bad for the NPT, but the NPT is one mechanism, and although not perfect - it was helping to cap proliferation. A replacement is necessary. The US, acting unilaterally, is not the cornerstone of a new regime. Russia, France and Germany will be against this arrangement. The US has more in mind with respect to the India-US partnership. India is a pole in itself and having it on board is important while discussing the NPT, or any norms and regimes.

Theodore Postol: A new regime needs to be made to replace the NPT. The US initiative must have a multilateral outcome. The roadmap has to address legitimate concerns.

Maj. Gen. Banerjee: There might be disagreements with the particularities; however, there is a general agreement that the ultimate objective is a more secure world through a multilateral agreement.