The takeover by a Dubai business house of the operations in six key US ports has become the flashpoint in an increasingly contentious relationship between the US President Bush and his party men. Suddenly, the loyalties of Republicans in the US Congress are changing. Senate Republicans tried to fend off a vote on this crucial politically sensitive business deal, and the administration agreed to a 45-day review of this deal. But, this strategy collapsed with the 62-2 vote in the House Appropriations Committee to thwart the sale.

This rift between the Republicans and Bush is of great significance to India because it is depending on Bush to convince his Republican colleagues to steamroll their 'historical' nuclear deal. The 'rendezvous' between Bush and the Republicans is not cozy in his second term in the office.

They have clashed in recent weeks on the President's policies. Bush's candidate to fill a vacant US Supreme Court seat stoked considerable debate and there were problems in deciding the best way forward to address the thorny issue of illegal immigration. Many Republicans also tried to corner the President on his controversial domestic eavesdropping programme, accusing it of breaching rights of privacy. On the economic front Republicans are dissatisfied with the President's fiscal policies with the budget deficit reaching an all-time high.

On the international front Republicans are not happy with the President's Iraq policy. Interestingly, they had supported him for invading Iraq. But now, sensing the American mood they are criticizing the administration for not formulating a clear-cut exit plan strategy. On the Iran issue they have not made any specific comments, but seem to be following a 'wait and watch' approach. Considering these realities it is unclear whether the Congress will support Bush's new nuclear vision for India.

The Bush administration is likely to present a specific programme before Congress to allow the US to commit itself to this nuclear cooperation. Congress is expected to demand answers to some sensitive questions. First, how complete are India's declarations of civilian facilities? Second, what are India's plans for its nuclear weapons programme. Would they have any hidden agenda of covertly using the US help in the nuclear energy arena to strengthen their weapons programme? And lastly, what impact will nuclear safeguards on civilian facilities have on India's relations with Pakistan?

This nuclear deal has generated great euphoria in India though segments in the US establishment, academia and media are disappointed. Some have said this deal is the most benevolent US negotiation since the Lend Lease agreement in 1941, when FDR helped Great Britain to fight the Nazis. Congress has also raised concerns about nuclear terrorism and Congress may try to corner Bush by raising his pet agenda about WMD terrorism. It would be of interest to see what they offer to link nuclear terrorism with India's nuclear energy requirements! Also, there is a view that the US nuclear industry is not likely to gain much from this deal because of its inherent limitations.

The export of nuclear material, reactors, and their major components from the US would require a Section 123 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act. Technically, India is a nonnuclear weapon state and does not have full-scope safeguards. Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act, Congress would have to approve an agreement for cooperation and needs to pass a joint resolution of approval. The Administration, alternatively, may seek to amend certain portions of the Atomic Energy Act, in particular Sections 128 and 129, both of which include nonproliferation criteria.

Currently, Bush cronies are evolving the exact procedures to get this agreement passed by Congress. Going by the US newspaper reports and statements made in many Internet discussion forums it becomes clear that many Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals, are outraged by the Indo-US nuclear agreement. For them the NPT is one of the most successful international agreements. They are not ready to accept concessions being made to India particularly with the present situation vis-a-vis Iran and North Korea. Many Indians are confident that Bush's assertive nature will see this deal through, but Capitol Hill observers say he is facing an uphill battle. Finally, nuclear convictions of the Congressmen will not decide the fate of the deal, but local and global politics, economic realities, anti-Bush feelings etc. will also play their role.