On 10th March 2006 David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released a report, co-researched by Susan Basu titled "India's Gas Centrifuge Program: Stopping Illicit Procurement and the Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know-How". The report contends that India's non-proliferations record isn't spotless. Albright alleges that, "a well-developed, active, and secret Indian program to outfit its uranium enrichment program and circumvent other countries' export control efforts" exists in India.

This issue is contentious as various allegations have been denied by India as being "baseless". The report betrays a worrying tendency towards callous research. It does not distinguish between horizontal proliferation (spreading of nuclear technology by a state beyond its national borders) and vertical proliferation (increasing nuclear technology within the national nuclear program).

Regarding horizontal proliferation, the document says, "India is engaged in many export promotion schemes, as its companies seek foreign markets". If India were intent on proliferating it would not have spurned an offer by Libya in 1978 to pay $15 billion in return for nuclear weapons. This was at a time when the NSG/NPT regime was penalizing India and India had incentive to externally subvert the framework.

Regarding vertical proliferation, this report seeks to discourage the ongoing Indo-US co-operation of nuclear technology for fear that technology shared for peaceful purposes will be diverted for military purposes. David Thomson, an arms control expert and author of the book, "A Guide to the Nuclear Arms Control Treaties," suggests a closer reading of the NPT to clarify what is permissible in India's case. "You can't give them weapons, but you can give them nuclear technology," he said.

David Albright and his colleagues have also published a satellite image of a site near Rattehalli, near Mysore, where India is running some gas centrifuges to enrich uranium to contend that hypothetically, this could lead to Indian centrifuge designs falling into the wrong hands. The existence of the Rattehalli uranium enrichment plant has been known for over a decade. It has been variously been suggested that it could produce fuel components for India's civilian nuclear power plants at Tarapore, and also as being used to produce fuel for the nuclear submarines that India is working on. Clearly, the Rattehalli plant is part of India's nuclear programme. But Albright and his team have no facts to prove that this will lead to nuclear proliferation, intentional or accidental.

Given that nuclear technology and fuel is denied to India due to nuclear capable states insisting that India sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, it is hardly surprising that India is using available avenues to procure such technology or develop its own. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Bill and their Delivery System (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill, 2005 passed in the Indian parliament on 13th May 2005 is a comprehensive statutory enactment that makes WMD proliferation a criminal offence.

Horizontal proliferation, alleged by Albright as existing in India, only occurs when a state transfers it to another state without proper authorization. Proliferant states and smuggling networks use such tactics to avoid export controls in supplier states. However, these concerns need not arise vis-à-vis India as the WMD Bill was enacted to bring about political reconciliation in the global community in order to contain the negative impact of the tests to tighten domestic legislation on the spread of nuclear materials and technology. In doing so, the Indian Government is emphasizing its commitment to fulfill its obligations given to the UN Security Council in April 2004. India's non-proliferation record should help it to be viewed without suspicion. The WMD Bill is an important message to the world that India is a responsible nuclear weapon state committed to non-proliferation and global disarmament.

Lastly, Albright proposes that because technology shared by the USA with India could also be shared between states hostile to the USA, "the Congress should also require an additional Executive Branch annual certification that Indian companies or government-controlled entities have not engaged in trade that contributes to nuclear programs in countries which have not joined or have violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or are suspected of having a secret nuclear weapons program". The banality of this suggestion encapsulates the lack of objectivity and the ambiguity of thought invested in this report. For a process of such complexity, Albright's diagnosis is at best, remarkably shallow and at worst, ignorant of the dynamics of nuclear politics and geopolitical strategy.