Indo-US Nuclear Deal: American Strategic Interests
14 Mar, 2006 · 1964
Swapna Kona attempts to unravel American rationale behind the nuclear deal
The Clinton visit to India in 2000 unfurled a new American world view - one which accommodates Indian ambition and encourages it. The Indo-US nuclear deal displays remarkable policy continuity. What has prompted this initiative by the Americans. Clearly, a culmination of several strands of thought - India's strategic importance, its increasing economic importance, its ever growing energy needs and an altered global balance that must include India.
Much has been said about India's fast growing economic power indicating the contribution of the Indian Diaspora, the Indian service industry and the technological prowess the country produces. A 2003 Goldman Sachs report predicts that by 2050, India will be the third largest economy behind China and the United States. The U.S. economy is already closely intertwined with the Indian service sector, and the growing Indian middle class provides a huge market for American businesses and investors. Thus, opening the economy should be Washington's first priority in India. Mutual cooperation in defense, space, and environmental protection depend on India having the resources to carry out its side of the bargain. India might be a market, which is difficult to ignore but to provide the required safety for FDI to enter, other contingent factors include a stable and conducive economy and infrastructural development, both will take time to achieve.
If economic consideration was the propeller of Indo-US partnership; the US would base it on the intrinsic value of augmenting the political-economic development of democratic India's 1.3 billion people. Instead, the U.S.-Indian strategic framework emphasizes weapons sales, co-production, and military-to-military cooperation and offers little that would significantly augment India's economic prospects. Economic development is the most important determinant of Indian power and stability (as it is of Chinese power). But, strategic priorities are inverted.
In a Wall Street Journal op-ed, Ambassador Robert Blackwill asked the question, "Why should the U.S. want to check India's missile capability in ways that could lead to China's permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?" Indeed, there is every reason to help India to become a friendly strategic partner and for India to possess a deterrent that would inhibit Chinese adventurism in the region.
On July 18 2005, Bush announced that "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states". He would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and "seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies". Four months before this meeting, the US lifted its South Asian arms embargo, selling Pakistan F-16 aircraft, capable of a carrying a wide range of missiles, and India an anti-missile system.
The United States seeks to balance Chinese power by mobilizing states on China's periphery. India is a rising power with intrinsic merits, including its commitment to democracy. To win over India, the United States should change national and international laws and rules that bar technology cooperation with India due to its nuclear-weapons program. Changing these rules is necessary to cement the partnership, and will help India bolster its strategic capabilities, to further balance China's strategic power. India needs nuclear power to fuel its economic programme. Non-aligned India has never been a threat to the United States or the liberal international system, which makes it alternative to make India an active ally by officially declaring it a responsible steward of nuclear technology, material, and know-how. American engagement stems from the recognition that India is not a proliferation threat; rather it is a partner to cultivate in isolating "rogue" states that are proliferation threats.
Thus, it seems logical for the US to try to engage with India and admit it into the nuclear club, despite tampering with this regime to the extent of damaging its legitimacy.