The Indo-US nuclear deal represents the successful culmination and acceptance of India's quest to achieve a rightful place in contemporary international politics in accordance with its existing and potential power capabilities. It could be analysed using Realism as the investigative paradigm. Realism focuses on the inevitability of conflict between states and propounds that how such conflicts proceed is conditioned by the realities of power. Realism identifies three paths to achieve a state's security and maximize its power: acquisition of military power; formation of alliances, formal or informal; and managing security through arms control and/or disarmament. If one analyses the nuclear deal, there is a striking approach governing it.

The nuclear deal, firstly, accords acceptance to the military component of the Indian nuclear program and its security content by the sole superpower and torchbearer of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the US. The post-Second World war nuclear order, reflecting the then power realities, envisaged a world of nuclear haves (P-5) and the nuclear have-nots (the rest), which was embodied in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The latter state's nuclear weapons program was deemed illegal and a threat to international peace and security. A range of policies were initiated to thwart the emergence of such nuclear capabilities. The end of the Cold War saw renewed efforts to roll back the nascent capabilities of emerging nuclear powers like India. A consensus emerged in the US-led international community that nuclear proliferation remained the major threat to international peace and security. The UN Security Council passed a resolution to this effect in 1992 itself. The US resorted to arm-twisting by starting negotiations on the CTBT and the proposed FMCT. The Indo-US deal makes India's nuclear weapons program acceptable, legitimate and non-threatening to the existing nuclear order unlike those of Iraq, North Korea and Iran. India, since its Independence, wanted to keep its nuclear option open to tackle any unforeseen security contingencies. And it had strongly resisted any attempt by the nonproliferation regime to curtail its nuclear ambitions. After India finally crossed the nuclear Rubicon in May 1998, its nuclear diplomacy sought to persuade the great powers, including the US, that its nuclear weapons are designed to address India's legitimate security concerns and are not a threat to that order.

Secondly, the nuclear deal envisages an alliance, albeit informal, between the US and India deriving from a real convergence of mutual security interests. During the Cold War, despite being democracies, there was little convergence of Indo-US interests as both were preoccupied with furthering their narrow security objectives, while showing insensitivity towards the other's security concerns. But, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and emergence of the US as the sole superpower, successive Indian governments sought a rapprochement with the US. These attempts proved futile with the US according the nuclear issue and Kashmir, both having grave implications for India's security and territorial integrity, priority in its relations with India. India's rejection of the CTBT and its later nuclear defiance in 1998 further strained bilateral relations. India's nuclear diplomacy after Pokhran II attempted to persuade the US that its security interests were not fundamentally inimical to the US. The dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott sought to develop a mutual understanding of each other's security perspectives. Both came to realize their common security interests especially regarding terrorism post-9/11, the spread of WMDs, and the rise of China with its implications for Asian security. The nuclear deal reaffirms this convergence of interests and consolidates their strategic partnership, albeit informally, to deal with current and emerging challenges to international peace and security.

Finally, the nuclear deal also seeks to enhance India's nuclear security via nuclear arms control. By agreeing to separate its large civilian and small military nuclear programs, India has acknowledged its commitment to minimum nuclear deterrence that provides for its nuclear security interests vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. India has readily agreed to continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and agreed to participate in future negotiations on the FMCT. India also committed to prevent the spread of nuclear technologies by strict export control laws, which are in place.

The signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal represents one of the most important international security developments in the post-Cold war era. It should not be seen through the narrow lens of ideology, but rather a part of the larger strategic vision espoused by India since independence.