The strategic alliance between Pakistan and China has withstood the test of time and this relationship was further enhanced during General Musharraf's visit to Beijing between 20-25 February this year. His visit assumes importance for both countries as it took place against a changing global and regional scenario that requires consequent adaptations in Pakistan's outlook. What is the significance of the visit for Sino-Pak relaions? How do Islamabad's strategic interests in South Asia influence the nature and extent of its involvement with China? What are the impediments to strengthening this strong historic association?

Pakistan's defence ties with China have been growing and Beijing has engaged Islamabad in a number of key projects. China, which has been the most steadfast and economical supplier of military hardware to Pakistan, has signed signed 13 agreements and memorandums of understanding (MoU) on wide areas including energy, trade, defence, energy and communications. Joint production of JF-17 Thunder fighter and probable sales of hi-tech F-10 aircraft showed by China during Musharraf's visit, along with a host of other avenues for cooperation in the military arena will further cement defence ties, which form the foundation of the Sino-Pak relations. The agreements cover cooperation in the areas of healthcare, pesticides and earthquake and meteorological studies, healthcare and family planning and in upgrading the Karakorum Highway.

Following the much-hyped Indo-US nuclear energy cooperation agreement, there were high expectations that Pakistan's quest for similar cooperation on lines would fructify in Beijing. China is assisting Pakistan in setting up the Chashma II, a second 300 MW nuclear reactor, where the major components for the reactor, the first uranium core, and three reloads will be supplied by China. The 300 MW nuclear reactor at Chashma was built with Chinese assistance, despite de facto international supply embargo. Earlier, heavy water for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) and technical assistance in uranium enrichment was provided by China. Laying down the basis for a nuclear deal seems to have been one of the top priorities on Musharraf's schema during the visit. However, no dramatic shifts in China's overt nuclear policy emerged during these talks, which concluded in an agreement to continue cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

On the economic front, Pakistan and China have agreed to launch a five-year programme to promote bilateral trade and economic cooperation. China, which is heavily involved in building Pakistan's infrastructure of roads, provides hundreds of millions of dollars of development finance to Islamabad. A general loan agreement signed on the use of preferential buyers' credit augers well for bilateral trade.

Trepidation that instances of targeted violence against Chinese citizens, including the recent killings of Chinese engineers at Hub in Balochistan could dampen the nature of their engagement were proved wrong. However, these acts reflect a deeper malaise in Pakistan's centre-province relations viz frustration with economic deprivation that is being vented against Chinese personnel involved in these Balochistan projects.

Pakistan is now aiming for its observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, to be promoted into full membership that would raise its economic tie-up with China to a higher plane. Supporting China's entry into SAARC is another attempt by Pakistan to restructure the regional balance of power, which is significant in the geopolitical context of South Asia. Musharraf could not get China to take a stand on Kashmir and the reference to Kashmir was limited to stating that Beijing hoped for a 'negotiated settlement'. China's considerble economic engagement with India and the US places limitations on unqualified political support to Pakistan on crucial issues.

The diplomatic tight rope had to be walked by Islamabad and Beijing keeping in mind their respective regional and global interests and commitments to safeguard them. Pakistan's role as the frontline state in the 'US war on terror' in South Asia is naturally a matter of disquiet for China, since Pakistan has thereafter heeded to American dictums. Though China has declared its support for the international crackdown on terrorist networks and shares common concern on Islamic fundamentalism, its apprehensions over the increased US engagement with India and Pakistan is understandable in the light of the much-debated move to balance the rise of China. Reassuring Beijing to the contrary was also one of the objectives aimed at by Musharraf, which has ostensibly been achieved.

Musharraf's visit was a reaffirmation of the alliance and a celebration of the fifty-five years of diplomatic recognition of each other: its symbolic connotations override the actual achievements of the visit.