Suicide attacks now are becoming frequent in Afghanistan, which has been embattling insurgency since the US military operations in 2001. The first warning of suicide attacks came in the form of an audiotape message in February 2003, allegedly recorded by Osama bin Laden. In June 2003, an explosive-laden taxi slammed into a bus carrying German International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, killing four soldiers and an Afghan national. This attack heralded a new wave in Afghan insurgency.

The suicide attacks have been ascribed to the Taliban, reinforcing threats of its resurgence and signifying a change in its strategy. Suicide attacks are being strategically used by the Taliban to counter the US and NATO-led ISAF troops in the ongoing asymmetric conflict. The Taliban's survival is contingent upon suicide campaigns and other guerrilla tactics as it can never match up to the conventional superiority and military stealth of international troops. This technique of "not fighting fair" has been a hallmark of Iraqi insurgents, which has levelled the playing field and reversed US' conventional superiority. Urban warfare characterized 'Operation Iraqi Freedom', where the insurgents forced the US into close quarter combat on the streets of Baghdad and Fallujah.

Secondly, even though suicide attacks have achieved limited success, it has nonetheless augmented and strengthened the Taliban's resolve to recapture power in Afghanistan. Clearly, the Taliban intends to intensify insurgency to scuttle the reconstruction process of the state by driving away potential investors. This may prove critical for Afghanistan's survival and stability, which receives approximately 90 per cent of its income from aid donations. Similar tactics were employed by Hamas that carried out suicide attacks during critical junctures in the negotiation period of Oslo Accords.

Thirdly, suicide attacks have managed to create fear and scepticism in states contributing troops to the ISAF as majority of attacks have been carried out against NATO and US-led troops. The reluctance of the Dutch to send troops to Uruzgan stemmed from the dangers of suicide and IED attacks by the Taliban. It was only recently that it agreed to send 1,400 troops to assume responsibility for the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) based in Tarin Kot, currently under US command.

Interestingly, unlike Palestine and Iraq, suicide attacks do not have mass support in Afghanistan. This may prove to be a possible bulwark against suicide attacks in the future. The suicide attacks are now also being aimed at soft targets. In the worst ever attack on 16 January 2006, twenty people were killed and 25 injured when a motorcycle bomb exploded in a playground in Spin Boldak. Such indiscriminate use of suicide terrorism is alienating potential domestic supporters.

The Taliban has failed to elevate the status of its suicide bombers to 'martyrs' and 'freedom fighters' as is the case in Iraq, Palestine or even the LTTE-controlled areas in Sri Lanka. Demonstrations denouncing suicide attacks have been staged at Herat, Ghazni, Kandahar and Spin Boldak in Afghanistan. This is testimony that the general population does not identify with the ideological and religious orientations of the suicide bombers.

Also, unlike the 1987 intifada and Al Aqsa Intifada, the insurgency in Afghanistan will never take the form of a 'movement'. The former was a political act of resistance and a revolution informed by nationalism, whereas the latter has a politico-religious orientation in defiance of Afghanistan's 'occupation' by the United States and its allies. Moreover, the suicide attacks in Palestine and Iraq are executed by indigenous people unlike in Afghanistan where the bombers are suspected to be foreigners. The needle of suspicion has been repeatedly pointed at Pakistan which shares a 1,500 mile long border with Afghanistan and allegedly harbouring Al Qaeda terrorists and members of the Taliban.

As NATO unveils the third stage of its Afghan plan, extending its area of operation to the troubled southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan; an amplification of insurgency can be expected. NATO has an onerous task ahead due to the proposed reduction of US troops. NATO's mandate is restricted to peacekeeping, thus leaving counter-terrorism operations outside the ambit of its designated role. The primary task of the 3,300 British combat troops who arrived recently is to protect British army and air force engineers who are building a base in Helmand's capital, Lashkar Gar, and though Helmand is Taliban's stronghold, the peacekeeping force is limited in its capacity.

Incidents of suicide attacks are on an upward swing, with 2005 being the bloodiest year since the commencement of 'Operation Enduring Freedom'. Last year, nearly 1,500 people died in various incidents of violence in Afghanistan. The death toll of US troops almost doubled from 51 deaths in 2004 to 99 in 2005. There will be more suicide attacks in the future in Afghanistan. However, the sustainability and success of suicide attacks will depend upon the Taliban's ability to reorganize itself in the face of the growing presence of NATO-led ISAF troops. The US 'War on terror' is far from over.