Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's visit to Washington has set the stage for implementing the civil nuclear agreement signed by Manmohan Singh and George Bush in July 2005. The latter is to visit India in early March 2006, and both countries would like to see the agreement well on its way by then. Saran's visit was to set a positive forward movement. Undoubtedly, this is a landmark agreement. However, outside the two governments, there are many doubts and suspicions.

Saran's visit laid out the first draft of the separation plan of civil and nuclear facilities, which places a large number of Indian nuclear facilities under international safeguards. This reflects on India's commitment in taking the agreement further and sets the agenda for third meeting of the Joint Working Group (JWG) to be held in Delhi in January 2006, which will be working on the implementation of this agreement. India's commitment to strengthen its export control regime and non-transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technology would further underscore its faith in non-proliferation. India has insisted on a "phased, sequenced and reciprocal" arrangement, which is already in the process.

On the other side, India still awaits the necessary amendment in US non-proliferation laws that prohibit India's access to fuel and technology. In keeping with the principle of reciprocity, it is not clear whether Saran received a draft legislation that the US will present to the Congress for approval. Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made it clear immediately before Saran's visit that Indian efficacy would be judged on the basis of three criterion; compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, non-assistance to India's nuclear weapons programme, and transparencies.

In India there is a (mis)perception that adherence to the above criteria would affect its nuclear weapons programme. Despite clear division between civil and military nuclear facilities, India is likely to retain the option of removing facilities from the list it would eventually submit to the IAEA. It would also retain the option of withdrawing nuclear material, if national security so demands, from the facilities on which it voluntarily accepts IAEA safeguards. India will be negotiating with the IAEA under the 'additional protocol' arrangement not under the category of states that have given up nuclear weapons, but under the category of nuclear weapon states. All the five nuclear weapon states have similar and conveniently worded agreements. In 1998, the US signed an agreement with IAEA and agreed for safeguards only on those facilities, which were without 'direct national security significance'. The US is yet to pass a legislation to enable implementation of the additional protocol signed in 2004.

The non-proliferation lobby in US should appreciate India's unsoiled record on non-proliferation and recognize the double standards shown by its NPT partners. China has been helping Pakistan and the latter's role in nuclear proliferation requires no narration. Can the US ensure that the AQ Khan network is shut down and China stops supplying nuclear technology to North Korea and Pakistan? Has the US imposed any verifiable restrictions on Pakistan to prevent a repeat of the AQ Khan episode? How does the US verify Chinese and Pakistani compliance to non-proliferation commitments? Russia is still helping Iran in building its nuclear research reactor in Bushehr. Half of Russia's nuclear materials are unaccounted and must be a matter of concern for all. The US non-proliferation lobby should also appreciate that India - despite being a non-signatory to NPT - is firmly rooted with the norms and practices of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, rather than signatories like China and Russia.

India's participation in the global nuclear regime will only strengthen international non-proliferation. India can play a significant role in containing if not stop the rising graph of proliferation. India's vote against Iran in the UN Security Council was not against Iran or to please the US, but it was for the cause of non-proliferation. The anti-nuclear deal lobby in US should look into larger perspectives.

The present deal, if worked out, will be a win-win situation for India, the US and the international community. For India, it means sufficient energy for the ever-increasing energy deficit and recognition as a responsible nuclear power. For the US, it opens more business opportunities and a strong, stable partner in Asia who shares the same apprehensions on proliferation and terrorism and is the largest democracy in the world. It is a chance for the international community to engage India and assign it more responsibility towards proliferation and terrorism. It is said in the US that Bush is persuasive and if he decides on something, he moves forcefully; perhaps this could be the most sensible decision that he can animatedly implement.