Pakistan's Security Perceptions & Indo-Pak Relations
24 Dec, 2005 · 1911
Report of Interaction with Hussain Haqqani ( Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) at the IPCS Conference Room on 19 December 2005
Hussain Haqqani is an intellectual with strong academic background and firmly rooted in the politics and executive decision-making structure of Pakistan. He has held senior positions with both the democratic political parties during their governance in the 1990s. Since the imposition of military rule in Pakistan, he is settled in the United States, first at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and from now on at the Boston University both as a Professor and as Head of the South Asia Institute, a think tank of the University. His writings reflect fresh thinking on Pakistan and its policies and his ideas present numerous possibilities for India-Pakistan relations.
Hussain Haqqani:
India-Pakistan relations are similar to that between a divorced couple in which one side was keen on divorce but the other was not and the one who was opposed to it took a long time to reconcile to the reality of divorce. In 1947, Pakistan had a literacy rate of 16 per cent and whereas it was 18 per cent in the case of India. Today it is 65 per cent in India and 35 per cent in Pakistan. The situation has reversed in the field of agriculture too. Per acre yield in Pakistani Punjab was higher in 1947, whereas today it is much less than eastern Punjab.
The economic cost of competing with India has made Pakistan even less competitive. Pakistan's biggest problems has been its inability to come to terms with the circumstances of its birth as it did not get the advantages that India got in 1947. The advantage of 5,000 years of history went solely to India and not to Pakistan despite being part of the same entity. Secondly, Pakistan is a nation born out of an 'idea' whose justification is a constant psychological preoccupation. A security issue in Pakistan becomes a psycho-political issue rather than a substantive issue. Thirdly, the strongest proponents of the idea of Pakistan came from territories that did not eventually become part of Pakistan. This is one of the biggest contradictions in the circumstances that Pakistan was born in 1947. In addition, the election results of 1945-46 have never been properly analyzed. Only 15 per cent of the total population of undivided India was allowed to vote out of which only 51 per cent voted; among which, the Muslims in the minority provinces voted overwhelmingly for the Muslim League whereas the Muslims in the majority provinces did not do so. Thus, the idea of Pakistan was not supported by a large majority of people living in what is today Pakistan. Besides, the Indian National Congress did not give any support or assurances to help set-up Pakistan.
The 'Pakistan Paradigm' was born during its early history and was meant primarily to ensure that Pakistan emerges as a nation with an identity distinct and separate from India. There are three important elements of that paradigm:
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Emphasis on religion since it connected everyone. The corollary to that was an attempt to make Pakistan a West Asian rather than a South Asian state.
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It was feared that India would dilute the identity of Pakistan; therefore, an attempt was made to create a historic justification of Pakistan to prevent that. Even now in Grade V or VI, Pakistani children learn that Pakistan was born the day Mohammad Bin Qasim set foot in Asia.
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Pakistan ended up with 33 per cent of the British India Army but only 17 per cent of a united India's revenue sources. This discrepancy was attempted to be made up with the help of the United States, thereby making Pakistan its strong ally. Thus, American ambitions snared Pakistan and resulted in Pakistan becoming the eastern anchor of America's West Asian policy. This gave Pakistan an opportunity to escape South Asia.
In 1947, Mr. Jinnah's response to a question by the first US ambassador to Pakistan on the future of India-Pakistan relations was that he hoped these relations will settle down in future like the relations between Canada and the United States. A little known fact is that there are still at least nine territorial disputes between Canada and the US. Despite that, both states share soft borders and are important trading partners. The US makes sure that the identity of Canadians remains intact and unharmed and both have strong defence arrangements that are very detailed in nature. There is still a long way to go for India and Pakistan to reach that stage. Both need to do the following to facilitate that process:
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Evolution of a Pakistan's political system into a fledgling democracy.
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India has to make a concerted effort to assure the safety of identity and sovereignty of an average Pakistani. India will have to accept Pakistan as a separate independent state.
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Pakistan will greatly benefit from India in a Canada-US type relationship. This idea needs to be propagated in Pakistan.
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India has to be aware that its policies and conduct internally as well as externally affect Pakistan. It is similar to sleeping with the elephant where no matter how friendly the elephant might be, every time it twitches it causes discomfort to whoever is sleeping with it. Indians should try to reduce that twitching.
Question & Answers:
Question:
How much influence do fundamentalists and militants have on the Pakistani
Army?
Answer: General Musharraf has made considerable effort to root out the influence
of fundamentalists and religious groups on the Pakistani Armed forces and restore
the 'pucca sahib" tradition inherited from the British. Musharraf's efforts
have been deliberate but the effectiveness of his actions cannot be ascertained
at this stage. The influence has been ideological in nature and is not quantifiable.
Therefore, it is important that the political discourse in Pakistan changes
from ideological to being functional in nature and until this happens, the pre-eminence
of fundamentalists will remain in Pakistani politics and society.
Question:
Thinking logically, should Kashmir have been with Pakistan?
Answer: Logically, I do think that Kashmir should have been with Pakistan,
but at present the reality of the situation demands Pakistan to review and rethink
its desire to have Kashmir. However, no constituency in Pakistan is willing
to relinquish any moral or political right over Kashmir. In this scenario, Pakistan
cannot be expected to give up all claims on Kashmir and such a scenario would
be highly unsustainable.
Question:
What role have political leaders played in promoting militancy and
religious groups in Pakistan?
Answer: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was responsible for letting the Islamists enhance
their influence. He appointed Zia ul Haq as the Army Chief, which was a major
error of judgment as it cost him his life. The Benazir Bhutto government is
lot less to blame for promoting Islamists and fundamentalists as even before
assuming office, she was made to strike a deal with the military establishment.
She surrendered four critical areas to the establishment: (1) Kashmir Policy,
(2) Afghanistan Policy, (3) Macro-economic policies in relation to the World
Bank and IMF, and (4) Military decisions including nuclear policy. When she
did try to influence the Afghan and the nuclear policy she was booted out within
18 months of being in power. General Naseerullah Babar, member of the Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) was more a man of the military establishment and was used
by the establishment and Pakistan's covert agencies to shift blame on to government
policies. Militancy has always been managed by Pakistan's security apparatus
and aided by Jammat-e-Islami and now by Al Hadid groups. Mr. Nawaz Sharif is
also to be blamed for encouraging militancy until 1998, when he consciously
changed his policy. The root of the mistakes in Pakistan is the control of politics
by the permanent Pakistani establishment comprising security agencies, military
establishment and a section of Pakistani bureaucracy. Militancy will be wiped
out only if a civilian democratic government comes to power.
Question:
The Pakistan establishment consists of 60 odd families. To what extent
are these elites guiding the political process in Pakistan?
Answer: The electorate of the elections in 1945-46, which determined the decision
to partition India in 1947, had to have one of the following qualifications:
(1) College graduate, (2) Landed community, (3) Taxpayers, (4) Service in the
British Indian Army and, (5) Service in the British Civil Service. These qualifications
have come to characterize the Pakistan's elite since 1947. The democracy problem
in Pakistan is characterized by the "Elite Consensus Theory", where
democracy is considered a result of the consensus existing between the elites
of the country. Unfortunately, in Pakistan this consensus does not exist.
Question:
When and under what circumstances will a civilian government come
to power in Pakistan? What will be its political orientations?
Answer: The accession to power by a civilian government is only possible under
three conditions:
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Widening of the gulf between civilians and military establishment will make the military revisit its perspective and policies as no army likes to be disliked by its own population. For example, General Baig held elections in 1988 immediately after Zia ul Haq's death fearing the loss of popular support.
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Mobilization of the general population by the civilian politicians and ability to strike a better deal with the military.
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Worsening international circumstances resulting in qualitative decline in US assistance.
However, it is highly unlikely that a democratic government will come to power after 2007 elections. It is also unlikely that Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto will be allowed to return to Pakistani politics in the coming elections.
Question:
If Musharraf relinquishes power after the 2007 elections, will he
be able to carry along the military establishment? How will it affect the ongoing
peace process?
Answer: Unless and until Musharraf is willing to change the overall national
discourse in Pakistan, which he has not done so far, it seems difficult. Changing
the national discourse would entail focusing on social security and developmental
issues. Presently his policies seem to be fixated on Kashmir. Pakistan should
make efforts to move beyond the Kashmir issue and concentrate on trade and commerce.
Logically, India and Pakistan should be biggest trade partners. Though annual
trade has gone up to $600 million dollars, it is still very small. India can
import sugar from Pakistan. Conversely, India can invest in Pakistan, which
is facing an investment deficit presently. Therefore, there is tremendous potential
in India-Pakistan economic relations.
Question:
Indian Muslims have never supported religious parties in the last
50 years. The Muslim League barely got any support in places like Uttar Pradesh
and Bihar. It got some support from Hyderabad and parts of Kerala. Secularism
as a political idea was a majority idea even in 1947 and this explains the reasons
for its success in India. On the other hand, Pakistani elites made a conscious
effort to associate with West Asia. In what sense did this feeling help shape
up the idea of Pakistan?
Answer: There is a difference between an unidentifiable connection and actual
geo-political connection of being part of West Asia. Though many Pakistanis
did talk about ancestral connections with West Asia, they felt very South Asian.
Their religious affiliations were always with a dargah located in their region.
Pakistan was politically conscious at a geo-political level thanks mainly due
to its alliance with the United States. The US has divided the world under various
commands. There is a Central Command that extends from Morocco to Pakistan.
The Pacific Command begins from India. According to President Bush, a greater
West Asia comprises of Central Asia, West Asia and Pakistan. In fact, John Foster
Dallas called Pakistan the 'eastern anchor of United States' Middle Eastern
Policies." The Pakistani elite have imbibed these feelings and made conscious
efforts to affiliate with West Asia.
Question:
Do you think the East Germany-West Germany model works better in
case of India and Pakistan rather than the US-Canada model?
Answer: If India-Pakistan peace process has to move forward, drawing analogies
between India-Pakistan and East Germany-West Germany will have to stop. The
German analogy implies a unified government. India and Pakistan relations can
be based on Canada-US model and have soft borders, low tariffs, free trade,
and absolute permission for citizens to work in each country. Peter Jennings
the, famous media personality was a Canadian and got an American nationality
after 9/11 as a symbolic gesture to show his affection for the US.
Question:
When Mahboob-ul-Haq came up with the idea of Human Development Index
(HDI), Pakistan fared better than India. Now the situation is reversed. How
can one explain that?
Answer: Mahboob-ul-Haq came up with the idea of HDI in 1988. There is a vast
difference between now and then. The HDI is extremely sophisticated and with
each passing year takes into account many more factors than it originally did.
The reforms in India have worked and helped in improving its macro-economic
indicators. Though Pakistan's indicators were better than India in 1988, it
suffered a great deal due to the US economic sanctions. As a result, its macro
economic indicators worsened, investment in human development took a plunge
and educational and healthcare spending decreased substantially.
Question:
Is the US-Pakistan alliance 'unholy'?
Answer: Politics cannot be holy or unholy. However, the Americans have fallen
far too often for the point of view that somebody is a saviour of Pakistan.
In the 1950s and 1960s, John Foster Dallas was thinking of Ayub Khan as the
saviour of Pakistan from Communism, whereas Pakistan never had a threat from
Communism. Zia ul Haq was expected to save Pakistan from populism that would
have made Pakistan fall in the hands of the Soviet Union. Today, Musharraf is
seen as a saviour by the US to protect Pakistan from the Islamists. In Pakistan,
the Islamists and militants work very closely. In the 2002 election, all major
political parties had some of their candidates disqualified from contesting
elections. Islamic parties like the MMA did not have even a single candidate
disqualified. The PPP was barred from holding large public meetings whereas
the MMA was not. Special favours to the MMA such as these resulted in it securing
21 per cent of the seats with only 11 per cent of the votes, thus becoming coalitional
partners in Baluchistan. They also managed to control the North-West Frontier
Province and allowed Musharraf to keep on his uniform until 2004. The Islamists
are a minority and they do not favour democracy.
Question:
What chances does Asif Zardari have of contesting election in 2007?
Answer: Both Benazir and Zardari will be acquitted of all the charges that
they have been accused of as the charges have not been proved so far. Asif Zardari
would like to contest elections in 2007. Musharraf should have cut a deal with
Benazir and Zardari, which would have enabled Musharraf to make a gentle transition
and for them to come in a more gentle way.
Question:
Do you think the PPP, PMLN and PML (Q) will remain united in the
2007 elections?
Answer: The quality of democratic forces depends upon the democratic parties
in a state. The PML (Q) will reunify but it is not a democratic force in the
true sense. It is quasi-democratic in nature. The PPP and PML (N) will cooperate
in the 2007 elections but will still be hard-pressed. The quality of democratic
forces is not going to improve considerably after the 2007 elections.
Question:
The ICG report on Kashmir from Islamabad quoted certain former MPs
from PPP, stating that converting LoC into an international border is acceptable.
What is Pakistan's endgame on Kashmir?
Answer: The Pakistani establishment has never been clear about an endgame on
Kashmir. They still hope to resolve the Kashmir issue in Pakistan's favour.
Alternatively, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto have thought about an endgame
on Kashmir by making some adjustments at the LoC and then settling it permanently.
They have broached this issue at different times but have always been weaker
in comparison to the establishment. However, it is possible to make some adjustments
at the LoC if a stronger civilian government emerges in comparison to the establishment.
Question:
Has Pakistan's foreign policy vis-Ã -vis West Asia, OSC, Southeast
Asia and Israel evolved and become more mature and pragmatic in recent years?
Is the peace process with India part of this pragmatic orientation of Pakistani
foreign policy?
Answer: The conduct of Pakistani foreign policy has always been very mature
but it lacks in substance. Pakistan has an able diplomatic service having very
articulate people but the question is what vision are they working on? Therefore,
one needs to be cautious in assessing Pakistani foreign policy and go beyond
its conduct and gestures to concentrate on the substance. There is a desire
to change the orientation of the foreign policy but it is not translating into
substantive policies.
Question:
Pakistan has strong military relations with China. How is Pakistan
infusing confidence in the peace process while having weapons development programme
with China?
Answer: This is one of the big picture questions. Things will start falling
into place if there is a paradigm shift in India-Pakistan relations. Nevertheless,
normalization of India-Pakistan relations will have its own cost because when
relations normalize between two states, it is difficult to object to actions
of the other state. Having said that, India was not very critical of US-Pakistan
F-16 deal because it did not want to disturb the peace process. A development
of weapon system by one state is not always countered with another weapon system.
Finally, relations between two states are determined a lot less by minutiae
and more by the big picture. The very fact that India and Pakistan are still
concerned with the finer details of their relationship and not looking at the
big picture means that a comfort level has not been achieved about the long-term
future.
Question:
At the conclusion of the SAARC summit, Pakistan PM Shaukat Aziz said
that India-Pakistan peace process should move from conflict management to conflict
resolution. Are these two linear processes or complimentary in nature?
Answer: 'Conflict Resolution' and 'Conflict Management' are mere terms. It
is more important to ascertain whether India and Pakistan are redefining their
relations. It is important to reach a stage when the momentum for peace is based
on mutual respect and recognition. The peace process is not going to be hugely
successful if the paradigm shift in India-Pakistan relations is not achieved.
Question:
Will it be possible to follow the US-Canada model if the MMA in Pakistan
and BJP in India come to power?
Answer: The chance of MMA coming to power is highly unlikely as they got only
11 per cent of the vote in the last elections. They may become coalitional partners,
but it is an unlikely political scenario of their forming the government. But,
the scenario in which the MMA and BJP come to power will be nothing less than
a nightmare as both have ideological agendas. However, the MMA coming to power
seems to be impossibility.
Question:
Is there still a sectarian dimension to Pakistan-Iran relations in
the post-Taliban and 9/11 scenario?
Answer: It has diminished a great deal in the overall Pakistani foreign policy.
However, it can resurge given the fact that at times domestic issues are entangled
with foreign policy. However, Musharraf should be given full credit for rooting
out sectarian violence from Pakistan. Sectarian factor will greatly diminish
in Pakistan-Iran relations in future. There are other factors that will affect
their relationship. Pakistan will continue to remain close to Saudi Arabia and
Iran-Saudi Arabia relations will remain tense. In addition, worsening India-Iran
relations will prompt the Americans to rope in the Arab conservative regimes
to pressurize Iran. If that happens, Pakistan will find it difficult to balance
a close relationship with the conservative Arab regimes and a congenial relationship
with Iran at the same time.