Everyone knows China is an authoritarian country, but a recent White Paper published by China defending its socialist democracy has cheered Sinologists. Not because they accept China's democratic pretensions, but because they realize China's defence is half-baked and the situation is getting out of the government's control. There was no immediate reason for bringing out this White Paper. Yet, it seems a response to Condoleezza Rice's campaign on democracy since joining the US State Department. In all her speeches, interviews and news conferences, Rice has been promoting democracy, both as an idea and an institution. China, the largest communist state, is naturally on the defensive.

The White Paper reiterates China's earlier position on democracy that it should evolve out of local conditions, have local characteristics, and cater to local needs. These are the justifications for what the Chinese call 'socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics'. Yet the same White Paper lavishes praise for grassroot elections based (partly) on the Western model and regrets that 'the democratic system is not yet perfect, people's right to manage state and social affairs, economic and cultural undertakings as masters of the country are not yet fully realized'. The paper accepts that 'the concept of democracy need to be further enhanced, and the political participation of the citizen in an orderly way should be expanded'. This may sound like music to Western ears.

China's rise has engendered many debates. This White Paper fuels the debate on China's future polity. While optimists like Bruce Gilley (China's Democratic Future, 2004) believe that a democratic China is inevitable, the opposite view is that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will retain absolute control. A majority of scholars are, however, still undecided. To them, the political future of China is uncertain, open and complex.

Developments within China, however, are optimistic. As the White Paper notes, post-Mao China has seen the end of cultism, reformed legal-political system, increased differentiation between state and party and the rise of a rational state. There are no more purges and persecutions. Rather, a political conception of tolerance has emerged. Rising economic prosperity has led to expectations for political empowerment. The success of local elections and the presence of 'two systems within one country' (Hong Kong) are inducing vertical as well as lateral pressure on the government for enlarging political liberties.

Externally, China's political socialization is rising. It has joined many global institutions, accepted global norms, and global regimes, except for those on democracy. But, for how long? The global spread of democracy has come to China's doors. Apart from Russia, South Korea, and Mongolia; even Taiwan has become a democracy. Together, they mock 'socialist democracy' in China. The swelling mobile phone and Internet population in China, coupled with growing numbers of Western educated young Chinese have eroded the barriers between the Han civilization and the rest of the world. China seems preparing for the rise of democracy.

However, much depends on the governing elite within the CCP. The choices before them are limited. China can either emerge as a totalitarian superpower or transform itself into a benign democratic regime. Certainly, the future of 130 crores would be secure only within a democracy. Unfortunately, institutional development has not followed economic development in China. The central government is losing control over the rich provincial governments. To overcome a possible crisis, the Chinese leadership has favoured reforms in the state and the party. Thus, while the electoral machinery at the local level is being strengthened and a 'rule of law' regime (through campaigns against corruption and crime) is being ensured, attempts are also afoot to make the CCP more relevant. New productive forces are being welcomed into the party. There is increasing tolerance of intra-party democracy. The overall emphasis is on 'democratization without politicization'.

It is too early to conclude that the Chinese elite want full-fledged democracy as their ultimate objective. Hu Jintao and his team would like to leave behind a legacy. The 'incremental democracy' model offers them a way out. There is no space for any 'paramount leader'. Future politics in China is expected to be more fragmented and competitive, forcing the party leaders to adopt democratic methods. Ultimately, China could adopt the East Asian model of democracy as practiced in its neighbourhood.

The White Paper, therefore, is not an exercise on governance in China, but a road map for political civilization in the country. Grassroot democracy in China has just begun. Like the 'four modernizations', there is a likelihood that China will expand this experiment. We will have to wait for some more time to be certain.