Chair: P R Chari
Speaker: C Raja Mohan

P R Chari:

The Prime Minister's visit to New York in September against the backdrop of the Indo-US nuclear deal was the most important event in September, and has led to acceleration in this process. Several events have taken place since the signing of the deal on 18 July. They include India's vote against Iran in the IAEA, Nicholas Burns' recent visit to India, and Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's statement on 24 October at an IDSA seminar, which is being seen as a "major policy statement". It was probably intended as a 'trial balloon' placed in the public realm for further debate. These issues provide the backdrop for this meeting.

C Raja Mohan:

In retrospect, the complexity of the Indo-US nuclear deal was on display in New York. Apart from the nuclear deal, three issues took centre stage. They are Iran, India-Pakistan relations and India's stance on the UN Democracy Fund, which constitutes a step forward in India's foreign policy. These four issues would be dealt with in detail.

Historically, Indian Prime Ministers at the UN have stressed multilateral diplomacy and the virtues of non-alignment. However, since 1996 (with the exception of 1998 when India conducted Pokhran-II), the UN has served as a sideshow for bilateral meetings with other countries, especially the US and Pakistan. These meetings also reflected the importance of South Asia in US strategic calculus. UN meets always held the possibility of an Indian and Pakistani leaders' meeting. In the absence of an institutional mechanism for bilateral meetings, multilateral fora became the focus of media interest to see whether one-on-one meetings took place. The Millennium Development Goals, the ostensible reason for the UN meeting, was sidelined in this process.

The New York setting and what followed confirms that it was one more event in the accelerating development of Indo-US relations, discernible after 1998, when a clean break was made with the past. Ever since, the Indian government has been in the lead to change Indo-US relations. The academic world and think tanks were caught unawares and are laggards in anticipating, predicting or putting forth ideas. They have been playing 'catch up' ever since. The Iran vote is an example of the disconnect between what the "chattering class" think and what has actually "happened" by the churning of ideas effected by the government.

A careful study of Shyam Saran's statement at the IDSA seminar and the statements on nuclear issues made over the past few years shows that the Iran vote is not a break with the past. Instead, they indicate a rapid evolution and adaptation in India's position starting with the CTBT debate, statements about missile defence and non-proliferation over the past few years. Saran's speech details the 5-6 major changes in India's nuclear diplomacy since 1998. There is a lack of public knowledge and debate about these aspects.

The Four Main Issues

Manmohan Singh's visit to New York was made against the backdrop of a breakthrough nuclear deal and its successful defence in the Indian Parliament. As he left for the UN, the Iran issue crept up with its potential to complicate the situation. Hence, the PM made a statement in Paris that India was with the Europeans on the Iran issue. This clear shift away from the 'third world' was overshadowed by news about the Scorpene and Airbus deals with the French. India had positioned itself in a manner that gave it enough room to play both sides and navigate between the defiant mood of the Iranians, confrontationist mood of the Americans who did not expect any diplomatic breakthrough, and the route of diplomatic engagement that the Europeans advocated.

Once in New York, the media campaign launched also came into play articulating the voices of the respective governments, highlighting the synergy between the Fourth Estate and the government when it comes to foreign policy. A media campaign was launched by the US on the Iran issue that took the Indians by surprise. India was taken to task for shielding Iran. It was clear that India's stand on Iran was a serious domestic issue in the US for various political considerations. This was seen during the 8 September House International Relations Committee hearing when Bush administration officials were grilled using two sets of arguments that had the potential to undermine the deal.

The first set of reasons were based on technical questions. The N-deal, premised on India's status as a 'responsible' nuclear power, came under attack with questions cropping up over why India defended Iran. The second set of reasons were political, with questions being raised as to why India, the US' potential partner, was siding with Iran. The Iran issue permitted all major contending groups within the US Congress to come together, albeit for different reasons. Musharraf also played a brilliant diplomatic card by meeting Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. This pleased the anti-Iran Jewish lobby, among whom India is in good standing. This move by Pakistan muted their support for India.

Therefore, the message at the highest political level delivered by Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, et al. was loud and clear; the US signalled willingness to enforce the deal with a caveat that it was not a done deal and problems might arise in future. It was in this atmosphere that a decision had to be taken. Rumours of Natwar Singh being out of the decision-making loop are baseless. The fact is that he stayed back after the PM returned to for parleys with the Europeans over Iran, which reveals that diplomatic manoeuvring went on until the last minute.

The question that Indians have to ask themselves is whether India can afford to jeopardize the deal over ideological reasons like non-alignment. Plain national interest must kick into action when a choice is to be made between the US and Iran. India has been a pariah state since it first conducted nuclear tests in 1974; therefore, the stakes are high in this high-value deal.

Abstaining from the vote was an option, but would have signalled India's continued traditional posture. A pro-Iran stand like that of Hugo Chavez was impossible, as Indian foreign policy does not have a maverick streak in it. The vote changed the fundamental tenor of the debate. Following Russia and China by abstaining was not feasible for two reasons; firstly, they do not have similar stakes being nuclear powers whose position is not being challenged. Secondly, they have more cards to play with their membership in the UNSC, than India - in its greatest diplomatic manoeuvre since the NPT came into force -supported the vote to transform itself from a nuclear pariah to a nuclear weapon power.

The American tactic of exerting public pressure was overplayed. Unfortunately, India's position in Paris was not read. Politically, this deal is important because it was believed that the UPA government that hinges on the Left's support did not possess the political will to sustain or nourish this deal. An analysis of India's decision reflects that national self-interests remained the driving force. Saran's speech is also a classic crafting of diplomatese wherein a safe, dignified exit strategy was in place if things went awry before the November vote.

Domestically, anti-Americanism dominates the Left's position on the issue more than Iran. Similarly, domestic politics in Iran will determine the position it takes before the 24 November vote. Bravado of the power dispensation in Iran is already under criticism by the all-powerful Guardian Council, of which the avowed critic Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani is the chairman. Therefore, Iran's diplomacy in the coming days is also important.

While in India, Nicholas Burns stated that domestic constituencies in the US and the NSG had been sounded out and progress would be made as and when India lives up to its part of the deal by separating its civilian and military facilities.

Moving on, the triangular relations between India-Pakistan-US caused problems in New York. India was agreeable to move forward on talks regarding troop's reduction in Kashmir, Siachen, etc. But, the emphasis laid by the US on concessions to Musharraf and his provocative speech in the UNGA demanding troop withdrawals highlighted that back-channel diplomacy could have yielded results but that were thwarted by public diplomacy. Further, India had also to factor in the F-16 deal that Pakistan had secured and calibrate its response to this situation, which had caused much consternation in the past.

India's active association with the UN Democracy Fund is a milestone that did not receive due credit. India has undertaken a paradigmatic shift in its worldview by moving away from its traditional position of 'Democratisation of the World Order' to the 'Spread of Democracy' in the world. The former position was used to promote self-serving campaigns. The latter position amounts to 'standing up to what India believes in'. It also marks a shift away from conceptual positions like "anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and espousing the needs and demands of the third-world' while highlighting India's USP, i.e. democracy. India did not provide troops to usher 'democracy' into Iraq. But India has helped to set up democratic institutions in countries like Afghanistan. India is now ready to stand up for this ideal as an active component of its foreign policy.

Comments:

• There is a dichotomy in application of the principle of 'democratising' other societies like Afghanistan and Burma. India has a 'set of adjectives' that are used to describe the nature of its democracy. It has never been 'exported'. India followed the French principle in believing that democracy must be developed within societies and cannot be imposed.

• The media's coverage of the PM's visit focused on its glamorous aspects but not on multilateral efforts like the Millennium Development Goals.

• The nuclear deal has bridged 30-years of distrust between the countries. It is hard to fathom this major change. One needs to examine if any 'pre-conditions' attach to this deal with great care.

• India's vote at the IAEA is disturbing as it was a consequence of 'what we expect from the US Congress' and not on 'what we believe.' On the other hand, a genuine concern against proliferation might have driven India into the European camp.

• Information about our lack of uranium is exaggerated, as India has not fully mined the Jaduguda mines or the uranium mines in Meghalaya and Andhra Pradesh.

• Talk of Bush's visit to India has parallels to another visit by an American President to India in 1978. Then, Carter made "a determination" to secure fuel for the Tarapur plant and this statement was received with much jubilation in the Indian Parliament. However, it turned out that the final decision had to be made by the US Congress, which did not work out.

• India is in desperate need for this deal to come through. However, critical information is not available. Questions relating to separation of military and civilian nuclear facilities, credible deterrence requirements for India access and availability of quality uranium ores, etc, need more clarity for a truly informed debate on these issues.

Questions:

• On the nuclear deal, is India negotiating from a position of weakness (as we have limited access to uranium)?

• Will the Iran vote in November be a new ball game?

• The term 'pre-condition' has never been used to qualify this deal until the recent statement made by a Bush administration spokesperson recently. What are the implications of this pre-condition for India?

• How important is the nuclear deal for India? How badly off would India be without this deal?

• How much of the rhetoric about democracy can be put into practice? India's policy towards the military junta in Burma is a point in reference.

• What are the costs India will have to bear?

• What is Iran's own attitude to the IAEA vote and what are the internal debates in the country?

• Can a working relationship be established with the CPI (M) on foreign policy issues? Can they be convinced about India' foreign policy priorities and are there any signs of learning shown by the Left?

Responses:

• India did not negotiate from a position of weakness, but there are indications that lead us this conclusion. In fact, while India is facing an imminent fuel shortage, the deal provides an opportunity for obtaining an assured supply of fuel. India is being bailed out of its uranium crisis. However, the idealism and morals attached to the Indian nuclear programme has created confusion. This is because Indians are wrapping themselves with the flag and branding their nuclear programme as being for only 'peaceful purposes'. When India found itself in an arms race in the 80s due to Pakistan's activities, it adapted the Kalpakkam Reactors for military purposes. It then found itself covering up its military nuclear programme as it had professed they would only be used for 'peaceful' purposes. India has to make up its mind whether Kalpakkam is a civilian or a military programme. This will raise messy questions that will have to be answered. Instead of sparring with the Americans, self-introspection about Indian motives and illusions are necessary.

• If Iran comes back to the negotiating table there will be no vote. India has two options. It can either stand in the corner or take initiatives to reach a compromise deal. India must be seen as doing something, the fact that Natwar Singh is in Moscow hints at Indian concern and activism.

• When Burns came to India, he was made to understand that India would submit a plan to separate its civilian and military facilities, which the Bush administration would present to Congress and the NSG. Does the plan come before change in the law? Yes. This can be termed a pre-condition.

• India cannot be a proponent for democratic change everywhere. India's own neighbourhood (Burma, Pakistan, and Nepal) exemplifies the need for democracy, but there are competing interests that need to be kept in mind. India is sensitive to the Chinese presence in Burma and must take this factor into account. However, it is significant that, conceptually, this is a paradigmatic shift in Indian policy that has moved adopted a 'pro-democracy' stance. It is a calibration of its internal condition of democracy with its external orientation via its foreign policy. A debate on this issue is welcome and necessary.

• With reference to the allusion to the Carter administration, the non-proliferation proponents of the 70s did not allow the 'exception' Carter wanted to make for India. Therefore, Carter too, was sticking to the line advocated by the liberal multilateralists for enforcement of non-proliferation norms. The same proponents in the Clinton administration reiterated this position. Republican administrations - past and present - have approached and handled this problem differently. What Ronald Reagan did in the case of Tarapur in the 1980s and what Bush is doing now is testimony to this fact. They are changing the rules for India. After the limits of cooperation within the NSSP were explored by the first Bush administration, the second Bush administration is committed to changing the rules to accommodate India.

• The debate about credible deterrence is driven by the exigencies of domestic politics in India. It is clear that this debate will be clarified only after the confusion arising from the moralistic and idealistic hubris surrounding our civilian and military nuclear facilities is cleared.

• The question about the price of the deal must be answered by keeping in mind that in negotiations, the principle of reciprocity is paramount. The value attached to what is bargained can be explained in pure economic terms, but tends to get complicated when it takes on emotional overtones. For example, India paid a price for pursuing its relationship with Russia. India kept quiet despite Russian intransigence in Afghanistan. Prudence and calculation predicated what India did then, and must do now.

• The internal dissensions within Iran must be kept in mind as Iran is in middle of a debate, with the conservationists running into trouble. Changes, if any, in the Iranian position in the coming weeks is the key. One must remember that Iran is also riven by contradictions.

• The Left in India is also riven by contradictions; its positions on how India must deal with Burma, Nepal and Pakistan reflect their contradictions. No organism is immune to change. Similarly, the views of the Left can be synchronized with that of the government. This may take time and its continued association with power at the Centre. Their rhetoric against the US will not subside. The liberal leftists in the Labour Party in Britain were against US actions in Iraq. Did it translate into British policy? This shows that ultimately, over a period of time, the Centre will reconsolidate and the rhetoric from the fringe Right and Left will be ignored. Despite its rhetoric, the Left will not pull the rug under the government over the Iran vote.

Closing Comments:

The separation of the civilian and military nuclear programmes seems to be the crux of the issue. How far back will India go into the programme to separate its fuel cycle? The nature of deterrence, procurement and quality of uranium and the costs and benefits attached to the deal, need further debate to shed more light on the issue.