The Biological Weapons Convention held its experts' meet on 'Code of Conducts' in June, 2005. Along with India, countries like Australia, Argentina, Canada, United Kingdom, Iran, Germany, Japan, China, South Africa, etc. presented working papers on 'code of conduct' and 'ethics' for scientists. There is no doubt that the experts' meeting will enhance promotion of arriving at a common set of nationally enforceable norms. However, failure in implementation of national measures in existence or absence of any such mechanism poses a threat to that individual country and endangers its neighbours and the world. The latest bout of the avian flu epidemic spreading across Asia, Eurasia and Europe is a parallel example that raises questions about efficacy of national safeguards. Are national safeguards 'safe' enough?

Focus from international safeguards shifted onto national safeguards after the Fifth Review Conference (RevCon) of the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001/2002. The impasse at the fifth RevCon negotiations for a verification protocol caved despite expansive efforts of state parties since 1995. The emphasis on national safeguards initially began with the US proposal to implement national legislations and utilisation of existing UN measures to strengthen BWC rather than negotiate a multilateral agreement and later, its demand to replace the Ad Hoc Group with annual meetings of member-states. The final document of the fifth RevCon's recommended focus on national safeguards &legislations; code of ethics for scientists; "enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease"; and "strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants." Primacy to measures emanating from the respective 'national' realms is clearly discernible here.

As mentioned earlier, India has actively participated in all the experts' meetings. The statement delivered by Jayant Prasad, India's representative at the Conference of Disarmament in December 2004 serves as an apt reference point to chart the future course of the BWC. He opined that, "The purpose of the present process is to promote common understanding and effective action and not to seek or agree upon or arrive at any new common understandings. Since both aspects are interconnected and we are treading a fine line here…Promoting effective action does indeed imply making the implementation of BWC more precise, effective and operational. One way of so doing would be to assist States Parties to undertake full and effective implementation of their obligations under the Convention, including in relation to the two agenda items before us, but it must be left to their own national decision-making processes."

The transformation of 'common understanding' into 'effective action' on an international scale is indeed the need of the hour. The fine line that Prasad mentioned is the main contentious issue, with many state parties, including India, favouring national safeguards. He acknowledged the importance of the BWC's mandate to approach the UN to "appropriate international procedures, including investigation of the allegations and provision of assistance in such cases…" The fact that this option to investigate an erring party (sanctioned under VI and VII Article of the BWC) has not been exercised lead him to question the efficacy of hereto-untested "international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreak of diseases." The contradictions that the BWC faces today and that India faces too are reflected in Prasad's statement. The argument that, "...in the present circumstances, common understanding and effective action can best be promoted through an exchange of views and learning from each others national experiences and best practices" accords a consultative role to the international community and emasculates the evolution of the BWC. If this rationale is accepted then it must be based on the most broad based of platforms for the collection, analysis and sharing of information. Is this an option that can be operationalised?

A study of recent initiatives in the field of non-proliferation in the form of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and climate change (New Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate) indicate the fragmentation of the monolith of a common international effort addressing these respective issues at the level of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts and the Kyoto Protocol. While India debates the prospect of joining the PSI, it is already a part of the New Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. Similarly, a fragmentation in the biological weapons discourse is a distinct possibility and may further paralyse the effectiveness of the BWC. The bottom line therefore is the 'fine line' prevalent in a different context. It is the political will to strengthen the BWC, and it seems to be at its lowest ebb in its 30-year history.