Diplomatic manoeuvres by India, China, and the European Union are increasingly seeking wider global connectivity to secure their national demands relating to energy, defence procurement, trade and technology. The aggressive bidding by India and China in August for PetroKazakhstan Inc, Kazakhstan's third largest oil producer, which the Chinese eventually won, exemplifies global connectivity that each country wishes to secure. That India, China and the EU have been relatively successful in harnessing the forces of globalisation has led them to seal economic and financial deals by augmenting political relationships to ensure the viability of global connectivity to meets their demands. An array of partners meets these demands and is the touchstone to analyse their diplomatic skills.

Multilateralism - a concept under severe strain after 9/11 - is being used by these actors to secure their objectives and they are adapting themselves to function under the overarching hegemonic order constructed by the US. Is this adaptation shortsighted, wherein these countries have cast themselves in a subservient role to the hegemon? Is this not detrimental to multilateralism by sustaining the hegemonic power of the US? Alternatively, is it a tactical exercise in realpolitik to subvert the US hegemonic order by launching a concerted 'multilateral' assault? The following recent events will illustrate these conjectures.

Many contend that the recent Indo-US nuclear deal is the pinnacle of India's relations with the US premised on India's impeccable non-proliferation record, which has strengthened the non-proliferation regime. As pointed out by Michael Krepon and George Perkovich, this nuclear deal may encourage countries like Pakistan to push for "special treatment." In fact, Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington, has articulated that it should also accommodate Pakistan, which the US was quick to reject. India's vote against Iran at the IAEA has been linked to the pressure mounted upon it by the US to seek unequivocal compliance from Iran to the demands made by the IAEA and EU. This is an example of India's actions that are weakening the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation system.

On the other hand, China has also been advocating multilateralism as a tool for "harmonious development of international relations." China's commitment to multilateralism can be examined in the light of the recently concluded Sino-Russian joint military exercise under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Here, too, the buzzword, multilateralism, was used to rationalise the activism in Sino-Russian relations. China has identified the aims of this Sino-Russian engagement as "multilateralism and greater democracy in the global arena." China has also increased its engagement with its immediate neighbours and Europe. India and China recently inked a deal to jointly combat terrorism when the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, paid a successful visit to India in April. Before India hosted the EU in September, Jose Manuel Barroso, the European Commission President was in China to firm up ties. A defining character of Chinese diplomacy has been to open multiple levels of engagement that multilateralism offers by recalibrating its future goals. Recently, the Chinese ambassador remarked that India and China must seek to build a partnership for the future. He was responding to the diplomatic row created by Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee's remarks that China was the aggressor in the '62 war.

In September, UK's Prime Minister, Tony Blair, led an EU delegation to India. While political statements and the signing of multi-billion dollar agreements stole the spotlight, the dichotomous nature of Blair's position could not be missed. He was in India in his position as European Union Council chief, a role in direct contrast to his official capacity as the PM of UK. The EU is an amalgam of political and economic interests and is now in the throes of an existential crisis despite being a most successful multilateral arrangement in the comity of nations. While Blair sought greater multilateral linkages between India, EU & UN, his doppelganger is part of the unilateral occupying force in Iraq. However, this dichotomous policy can be resolved in the light of India-EU efforts to further "effective multilateralism." Usage of the word "effective" to qualify "multilateralism" implies that the multilateral effort could be jettisoned whenever its effectiveness does not achieve the results expected. Mention of the UN - the battered edifice of multilateralism - as being central to this global endeavour is also a reminder to the institution about its diminishing mandate to reshape itself to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

These instances can support either of the conjectures posed above. However, it is clear that both the form and substance of multilateralism in International Relations will be influenced by the manner in which state actors conduct themselves to achieve their immediate and long-term goals, and thereby reshape the very concept of multilateralism in this century.