The deepening crisis in Nepal poses a serious, and multiple threats to Indian security. Inadequate number of troops, training and military capability makes the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) incapable of countering the Maoists. The Maoists have successfully managed to gain control over 75-80 per cent of Nepal, and operate clandestinely inside the security envelopes established by the RNA.

The persistent crisis in Nepal creates a situation that adversely affects Indian interests in Nepal. China has stepped up its initiatives in Nepal in the last few years and is expanding its foothold. Recently, China announced a slew of economic and trade measures with Nepal, including a direct bus service from Kathmandu to Lhasa and expanded transport links. China is building a second road link that will pass through the Koshi-Kimathanka corridor and Western Nepal via the Jomson-Lumanthang link to augment access between the two sides. King Mahendra constructed the first link in the 1960s between Kathmandu and Tibet. Beijing also plans to enhance connectivity between Nepal and Tibet through fibre optic links and energy pipelines and bring the strategic China-Tibet railway closer to the Himalayan Kingdom.

If we read between the lines of Chinese policy, it reflects clearly that Chinese intervention in Nepal is strategic. Increasing influence of Maoist forces in Nepal is likely to change the buffer line between the two great Asian powers. It must not be forgotten that there were two layers of buffer zones operational between India and China during the British regime. China breached the first layer when it forcefully occupied Tibet in the 1950s. The Himalayan states are the second layer.

Nehru was fully aware of China's intrusive policy and ignored Tibet for the sake Sino-Indian friendship. As the Chinese communists neared their revolutionary victory, Nehru was rushing through a series of defence treaties with Bhutan (8 August 1949), Nepal (31 July 1950) and Sikkim (15 December 1950). These countries constituted Nehru's definition of a security zone in which India would tolerate no foreign interference.

Chinese policy towards India is based on a judicious mixture of 'deep strategy' and 'surface diplomacy'. China's deep strategy, observable from the pattern of its actions, is to gain a strategic edge over India in inner Asia by courting Indian acquiescence in the Chinese occupation of Tibet. At the same time, China seeks to use its informal strategic alliance with Pakistan to deny India's regional supremacy in South Asia.

China has tried to confine Indian influence in South Asia. India asserted its power in the 1971 war that led to the formation of and Bangladesh. In 1974, India carried out its first series of nuclear test explosions. In 1974-75, the Nepalese-dominated Sikkim state became an integral part of the Indian Union. All these factors disturbed the hegemonic strategy of China in South Asia. Taking into account the expanding influence of India, China persuaded Nepal to throw in another card. King Birendra proposed Nepal be declared a zone of peace in order to ensure security and non-interference.

The recent acceptance of India as a responsible nuclear power by the US has proved to be a lump in China's throat. China has been always apprehensive about the joint venture between America and India. China believes that this arrangement could create new problems in Tibet. Therefore, China is all set to lure Nepal in its deep strategy. The fragile monarchy seems obliged to serve China. Recently, the Nepalese regime closed down two Tibetan Refugee Welfare Offices in Kathmandu to placate China. The welfare offices had functioned for decades, catering to the interests of more than 20,000 Tibetan refugees who followed the Dalai Lama out of Tibet in 1959.

The Maoist insurgency has a spill over effect on India. Over the past six months, India's own Maoist insurgency, which has spread from 125 districts to around 170 of the country's 602 districts, across 15 of the 28 states. Ultimately, the target of Maoist groups is not a particular state of India, but the nation as a whole. In the present condition, Nepal is not willing to go ahead with any strategy mapped out by India. China is also worried about American intervention in Nepal. India has never had a viable security policy for the Himalayan states after the 1950s. Indian foreign policy is a victim of its own agenda. It failed to weigh the impact of China's lingering shadow over Nepal. India needs to construct a long-term strategy to counter Chinese strategy.