Speaker: Richard Fisher
Chair: Dipankar Banerjee

Dipankar Banerjee

The question of China's defence industry and weapons capability is related to the budgetary support. The defence establishment in China is massive and has developed enormously in recent years. This expanding capability is what is significant. Related to China's rise is its technological development. China is not only the 'factory of the world' but a significant R&D player for the future as well.

Richard Fisher

Pure analysis of hardware directions and developments does not tell us the complete picture of Chinese intentions or capabilities. There are many other factors that are required to complete the picture, but in analysis of hardware capabilities are certainly very useful. An airplane, a ship and a missile are usually a very definable commodity. We can attach a certain value or even a certain potential to that system. It does not tell us the whole story and we can talk about the development of software, doctrine, operational methods after the tremendous gift the PLA received in last week's military exercise with Russia. Nevertheless, our focus shall be the broad outcome of this exercise in the entire process of China's military modernisation.

Last week's show was another indication that China remains very serious about its ambition to develop aircraft carriers. Two sources indicated that China was interested in purchasing Russia's current carrier platform, the Variag Sukoi 33 unit and another source made clear that China is very interested in incorporating a thrust vectoring system into the AL31FM engines that it is purchasing to enable the production of the J10 multi-role fighter. This source said that the thrust vectoring was required specifically to enable the carrier capable version of the J10.

There is a great debate about whether China is indeed going to build aircraft carriers. There is a tremendous lobby within the PLA promoting this school. To date, we have not been able to decipher whether the Chinese government has actually put aside money for this production. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of activity, study, purchase of former Soviet aircraft carriers, analysis, plans, investment in aircraft concepts. This offers another layer for us to consider when we look at how China will proceed with the question of whether it will build aircraft carriers.

The Indian Air Force has invested a great deal in the development of its Sukoi 30 platforms, and has gone to great lengths to secure the most modern sub-systems for the Sukoi in the hope of maintaining a technological lead. An interesting conversation with an engineer with the design bureau that equips the radar for the Sukoi said that they had a consulting contract with a Chinese design institute to build a passive phased array radar technology. The individual stated that the contract was signed several years ago. It was not his opinion that the Chinese were trying to produce a passive phased array radar kit, but one can legitimately ask what the Chinese intentions were in entering into this contract. It cannot be assumed that Chinese intentions were friendly, especially with regard to current Indian capabilities.

Another flashpoint was the normally tight-lipped Novator company (that manufactures the Club naval anti-ship, anti-submarine missile complex) was ready to admit that all current customers of the Club to include the Indian and the Chinese Navy was going to purchase the new land attack variant of the Club 3M-14. This is useful data, not an unexpected development, but it is good to keep in mind that these systems could be lurking in this neighbourhood some day.

Looking at PLA modernisation in the last 15 years more broadly, it is evident that the PLA is a clear major pillar of the CCP to be able to maintain its monopoly power position. Broadly, the PLA has been engaged in a very significant modernisation of the entire way it approaches and prosecutes military conflict. The latest white paper on defence repeatedly uses the term "Informatization" or "Informationalisation". Informationalisation is essentially a new code word describing doctrinal goals that is roughly defined as the incorporation of all manner of information technologies to enable reform, reorganisation and modern integrated operations. This evolution was recently reflected in the promotion of the commanders of the Air Force and the Navy into the Central Military Commission - the highest level of PLA command.

For the Chinese leadership and the PLA, forcing the reunification of Taiwan through military or non-military efforts remains a top national goal. Taiwan is important from a strategic view because it provides the only immediate access to very deep water ports for the future patrols of new nuclear propelled ballistic missiles submarines. This is one of many reasons why Taiwan is such a focus strategically and politically for China.

Moving into progress in Informatization, Chinese posters at the recent IDEX shows represent the degree of progress they have attained in integrating a vast array of sensors, shooters, command and control systems to be able to prosecute a range of targets. This on a micro level shows how Informationalisation, is proceeding. Chinese posters show a PLA female with a digital eye monitor and a small palm top designed to control UAVs, modern computer command control integration. Some new signs of Informationalisation are recruits learning infantry tactics with aid of video games, Russian artillery fuse jamming systems incorporated on a Chinese chassis, tracking systems similar to the modern low lying infrared tracking, targeting devices.

The Chinese are investing a great deal into very high next-generation technology. They have developed a hand held laser device for painting targets as well as blinding opponents. A product of China's 863 high technology development programme is a three centimetre micro-helicopter that was revealed roughly four years ago. Now we know that China has developed non-nuclear explosive radio frequency warheads and placed them on ballistic missiles, and according to sources has already exported this technology to Pakistan.

There have been massive investments in outer space, ISR. The Chinese are building two Russian radar electro optical satellites, a new CommSat built with the help of the French, new Predator 1 class UAV that was introduced last year. In addition to using outer space, they are working on the ability to deny outer space. The Chinese have developed the KT1 mobile solid fuel launch vehicle based on the DF21 IRBM, the NS1 nano-satellite that was launched in April 2004. Put these two together and you have a mobile direct anti-satellite capability. The Chinese have not declared that they are developing this but we can safely assume that they are going to do this.

This raises the issue of manned military space missions. One of the real treats of last week's Moscow show was the opportunity to meet former cosmonauts who were trained for outer space combat. In a history released by the company NPO Mashinostroyenia, it was outlined in frank detail the degree to which the former Soviet Union planned for outer space conflict, at almost the inception of the outer space programme. A space plane concept was developed in the 1970s to shoot down American space shuttles. This is significant with regard to China because we know that China's first space mission in 2003 was a military reconnaissance mission. Given the Soviet example of combining military-space with the development of the space programme, it is logical to consider that China would follow the same course. We know this by the very nature of the Chinese regime. They has developed a concept of a small Chinese space station and the Shenyang concept of a air breathing single stage space launch vehicle and a small space shuttle on top.

China has been investing a lot in strategic modernisation. The second generation DF5 that the Pentagon suggests is armed with multiple warheads is now deployed and last year China launched its first second generation SSBM, the first successful launch of their SLBM to go on a submarine was completed in June. New ICBMs include the DF31 as well as a longer-range version, the DF31A that is illustrated by the new space launch vehicle, the KT2A. China may be developing or even deploying a manoeuvrable warhead for its long-range ballistic missiles. An image that appeared earlier this year on CCTV appears to be a manoeuvrable warhead deployment box that can hold decoys on a plate.

In recent weeks we have been learning much more about China's cruise missile programme, especially the degree to which it is very likely a factor in Pakistan's recently tested cruise missile, Babur, which probably contains a great deal of American technology. The Chinese have developed naval anti-ship long-range cruise missile, but the platform is easily transferable to land attack missions. Now that we know that China will be acquiring the Novator land attack Club, Chinese land capabilities are developing apace. According to Taiwanese sources, its cruise missile programme is believed to be assisted by a modified American Boeing aircraft, which is a violation of American law.

There has been a great investment in SRBMs, MRBMs. The number of SRBMs is expected to grow to 800. One new feature that China is incorporating into its MRBMs and SRBMs is an ability to attack moving targets especially warships. Part of a brochure produced by the American naval intelligence office outlines suspicions with regard to Chinese near term capabilities in the area. Should this capability be available to it in the near future, it would be a serious cause for concern to Indian naval officers.

China's Air force modernisation is proceeding apace as well. The big question with regard to the Chinese Russian aircraft relations is whether as the Russians hope, China will buy the upgrade kit for the J11 that they are producing in Shenyang or will the Chinese strong arm the Russians into accepting a Chinese upgrade for the J11 to include Chinese developed radar, Chinese engine and weapons.

China has numerous aircraft combat programs, the J10, J7A, new PL12, the Chinese AmRam, all of which contribute to the creation of a next generation advanced fighter programme. Support systems for these are coming along. T16s are being replaced, AWACS programmes are active - one based on A50 and IL76 platforms and one based on the new version of the Y8 platform. A great deal of focus has been on the development of air defences. Potential purchases of over 900 of the S300 family have been estimated, while great creativity in domestic development has been shown.

In terms of naval systems, according to sources, the third type of O93 submarine is in production and its design shows some clear Russian influences. Perhaps between 12 to 15 of these submarines are in production or have already been produced. Many more can be expected by the end of the decade. The emergence of the 'YUAN' was last year's surprise and is suspected to be based on the new 'AMUR' being produced by Russia. The latest batches of the 'KILO' submarines have commenced delivery and will be armed with the Club missiles. Two more 'Sovremenny' class ships are on their way and two classes of indigenous destroyers, one with a Ukrainian phased array radar and vertical launch missiles and another based on the same hull but largely Russian missiles and electronics. New stealth frigates have been developed. Two of these have been produced and future versions will carry Russian type vertical launch missiles. A new stealth aircraft based on the Australian Catamaran is being developed. This brings us back to the question of Chinese intentions to build aircraft carriers. A new Variag emerged from a dry dock in Dalian painted in PLA Navy grey. Chinese magazines have carried pictures of what is believed to be a Chinese concept for a naval AWACS. Amphibious lift capability is growing, landing tank ships are being produced and the Chinese are investigating the use of civil roll on and roll off ships for rapid transport. Amphibious army and amphibious marine forces are receiving very significant equipment upgrades, including the most powerful amphibious tank in the world and a new amphibious APC. Recent use by marines of helicopters and small deployable planes seems to suggest future focus on airborne lift. The Chinese already have 220 of the MI17 helicopter family. They will be purchasing more IL76s, and the integration of civil air transport is well underway.

Airborne forces are also receiving significant equipment upgrade. A new airborne tank was built since the Chinese could not afford the Russian VMD; co-production was featured in last week's exercises. An Italian truck co-produced in China is also fit to equip air borne units.

Army modernisation is proceeding apace through Informationalisation, which involves the integration of various weapons and systems capabilities. They have developed a new attack helicopter that is based largely on Italian and French technology, but is believed to contain a reverse engineered engine of the American Blackhawk.

New equipment is also being produced for special operations forces. This includes the co-produced version of the 'Bumblebee' as well at ATVs. Training to confront the enemy in English is also being given. Given these developments, we should be prepared for any scenario.

Comments

• Chinese efforts to modernise ought to be expected, it should hardly be called intimidation. The only answer for nuclear weapons is disarmament not defensive deployment. The US does not need nuclear weapons; its conventional forces are so well developed. India as a smaller player cannot make the first step, it is for the US to lead.

• Indian purchases of nuclear missile defences are required to begin the process of disarmament. Only when a certain parity has been reached in the region will incentives emerge for disarmament. This was the case with the US and the Soviet Union.

• Attention needs to be drawn to the Chinese ability to reverse engineer European technology. EU will provide cutting-edge technology to China rather than Russia, given the limitations of the Russians to provide support. Though the EU arms embargo is in place and it is not yet ready to give up on NATO, the future is unpredictable.

• As far as the matter of ABM development is concerned, India is a subscriber to the idea that China is far from developing competent network centre for warfare capabilities. The matter of real concern is the logistically improved structures of the border regions. The development in Ladakh and Tibet has been disproportionate in comparison to other border regions and has made the Indian government uneasy. While improved Sino-Pak relations are still a matter of concern, India has learnt to deal with these developments, rather than let it affect its bi-lateral ties with either country. The recently concluded Russo-Sino military exercises are, perhaps on all accounts, nothing more than a mere sign of bonhomie between them.

• China poses a serious question strategically. There is a difference in the way the US has aided China and how it has projected China as a threat. While the US did not object to the sale of the 'Spey' engines by the British to the Chinese without demanding full knowledge of their eventual usage, such a scenario in the Indian case would be unthinkable. Intellectual Property Rights, a matter great concern to the US, seem also to have been ignored, for the US is not attempting to deal with Chinese modifications of a Boeing for military purposes. There are commonalities in the American and Indian perspectives over China but these depend on national interests. India is not unduly worried about China but takes care to follow developments closely. It is important to keep track of the dynamics of today.

• There are differences in technology that the Russians provide to China and to India. This is not to judge which country gets better technology but is aimed at drawing attention to the difference; there may well be some rationale for it.

• India has drafted a deliberate policy to engage China. As far as China is concerned, extreme views can be very misleading.

Questions and Answers

Question: The extent of Sino-Russo cooperation is worrisome. Can it be neutralised by US-India cooperation? Has the Xulong 2 been tested? Is it viewed as a threat to America?
Answer: The Xulong and the JL2 have been tested close to each other. The Chinese use political intimidation effectively. Both, US and India will be a target for such blatant intimidation. The best thing to do then is to build one's own defences. Nuclear defences are not threatening but are for one's protection.

Question: The US is aware of growing Sino-Russo relations, what has it done to curtail it?
Answer: The fact of Sino-Russo cooperation is very worrisome, but complicated everyday decision-making makes clear policy difficult. The US needs Russian support on a variety of other issues from Iran to Afghanistan. The Pentagon is going out of its way to highlight the problem but till such time that alternatives can be found for Russia to fulfil its need for foreign exchange nothing can be done. The important question is one about who is driving the relationship? It is very clear that the relationship is changing from hardware sale to co-development of systems. This is what China wants and it is proceeding very rapidly at an alarming pace. Recent exercises show a transfer of software. The Russians are teaching the PLA how to use the technology that it has. China never had a real airborne capacity but this new capability is important not only vis-à-vis Taiwan but also for preserving post Soviet undemocratic regimes in Central Asia.

Question: One gets the impression that all is well with China's military modernisation. One must take into account the fact that it is probably a top-down approach that is focussed more on buying technology than indigenous R&D. Secondly; the Pentagon seems to equate China's attempts to consolidate its periphery with threats to India. Is this a ploy to emphasise a China threat and encourage India to an alliance with the US? In addition, how far would American policy in Central Asia be deemed responsible for recent Sino-Russo exercises?
Answer: The Chinese are successfully marketizing their defence sector the way that India would probably want to. Private manufacturers are carrying out the independent development of new technology and products in a market fashion where they are available for sale to the state. This cannot be ignored. As far as American policy in Central Asia is concerned, the Americans are not responsible for 'orange revolutions', the people of these states themselves are. American policy is only aimed at encouraging the trend towards democracy and equality. There is felt a keen need for India to develop a proactive policy to support democracy in the region as well.

Question: Software transfers from Russia to China are obvious, how effectively has China been able to integrate technology and software?
Answer: Though software transfers are continuing, it is not clear to what extent the integration of software and technology has been completed. The use of the A50 for example is not clear. Was it used as a data link or as a command unit?

Question: Despite double-digit expenditure on defence, one must consider the double-digit inflation and the fact that most of this budget is used to improve the material conditions of those in service. What sort of budgetary support is there for China's military modernisation? Is there a substantial hidden component to it?
Answer: There are no clear figures for the PLA budget. Official figures can be dismissed as propaganda. It is pegged at about $90 billion a year in the US. There is definitely a substantial hidden component to it and it must be stressed that all investment in upgrading the lifestyles of servicemen has not in the least detracted from investment in systems and technology modernisation, which remains China's primary focus.

Question: China has a natural tendency to guard its soft border i.e. the South China Sea, but to date its blue water capabilities have not developed. What are the prospects of China developing blue water capabilities in the near future?
Answer: The Chinese can develop blue water capabilities very quickly if they so decide. They have the technology to do so. All they need to do is modify it a little. The Variag, with new engines could be a beginning. Investment in this area is vast and is only going to increase. By the end of the decade, the Chinese could have substantial blue water Navy. Others navies will be hard pressed to keep up with it.

Question: Multilateralism is the name of the game, with one only having to look so far as the US to realize that while it is worried about the EU and China, it does not mind having good relations with Japan and Taiwan. With the EU perhaps balancing the United States, there is no need for the South Block to choose between either side of the fence. What is the technical value of missile defence? How effective is it and is it perpetuating an arms race?
Answer: It is not convincing to argue that what we are witnessing is a benign development. The ability of the CCP to hold on to its power is making it look towards 'glorious wars'. The comments of Chinese defectors point towards an East Asian Co-Prosperity Zone, and it does not seem like benign multilateralism. Japan and US are aware and worried about these developments and have visibly moved towards closer relations and ties. In respect to the missile defence system, it is important to note that a naval rail gun has the ability to make an SRBM defunct.

Final concluding remarks: Dipanker Banerjee

China's development in the last decades gives us a sense of what may follow. The youth in China is competent and driven. There have evolved a large number of specialists who are keen to reclaim what is seen as China's position in the world. A position that was denied to it for the last 150 years. It is this section of Chinese society that could provide the impetus for growth as well as uncertainty in Chinese policy in the future.