In the first week of August 2005, India and Pakistan held talks for two days on nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs). Unlike the previous two meetings held in 2004, both countries have succeeded in reaching an agreement at least on two issues. Firstly, to pre-notify the flight-testing of ballistic missiles in a "structured format", with the objective of "enhancing mutual confidence and engendering predictability and transparency of intent." Secondly, to operationalize the hotline between the foreign secretaries so as "to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues." India also handed over the draft of a proposed agreement aiming at reducing the "risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and their respective control."

Immediately after the understanding on missile notification, Pakistan tested Hatf IV Babur - a cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear warhead. Ironically, the missile CBM focuses only on pre-notification of ballistic and not cruise missiles. In the December 2004 round of negotiations on n-CBMs, it was believed that it was on exclusion of cruise missiles, both countries failed to bring out a joint statement on pre-notification of missile flights. Does the exclusion of pre-notification of cruise missiles and the testing of Babur make the recent pre-notification less relevant? Will India and Pakistan take more steps in achieving nuclear stability? A casual look at the latest agreement would reveal that there is not much difference with what was agreed in Lahore in 1999. Why has it taken so much time to formalize agreements reached six years ago?

There are at least two major reasons as to why progress on n-CBMs has been slow and painful. Firstly, the official faith, especially amongst the civilian and military bureaucracies on deterrence makes them believe that n-CBMs are not high priority. Both countries believe nuclear deterrence exists and view the Kargil conflict and the 2002 border confrontation as a proof of this. Besides, the belief in deterrence, reports and statements from highest political leadership on both sides over the use of nuclear weapons have been dismissed by the other side as political rhetoric aimed at the internal audience. Sharif, Musharraf and Fernandes - all have spoken about the use of nuclear weapons, only to be dismissed by the other side as rhetoric.

Secondly, Track-I attempts on building nuclear confidence has kept pace with Track-II initiatives. Numerous meetings, conferences and workshops in the recent years over n-CBMs between the two countries have produced a massive literature with numerous options and alternatives. Unfortunately, Track-I does not take into account what is happening at Track-II level and at times even dismiss it as unrealistic and unreasonable.

Given these contradictions, movement on n-CBMs is likely to be slow. How can these efforts be fastened? Are there alternatives and options that could be worked along with the present limitations? Firstly, it would be better and easier to reach an understanding at the political level between leaders rather than at bureaucratic levels on a nuclear agreement on broad parameters. When compared to the civilian and military bureaucracies of India and Pakistan, the political leadership at the highest level is less rigid, at least on select issues such as n-CBMs. Instead of asking the civilian bureaucracies to work first leading to signing of an agreement or treaty, both countries could sign an agreement or treaty at the highest political level. Such an agreement could include moratorium on nuclear testing, which both countries have agreed at different periods; establishing institutions to build confidence and reduce risks; and a promise to work towards a common nuclear doctrine.

Secondly, political leadership in both countries could continue to work through its trusted emissaries engaging in silent and back channel diplomacy. The role played by Brajesh Mishra and Tariq Aziz in reaching a consensus during the Islamabad Summit in January 2004 and the later role played by J N Dixit and Tariq Aziz during September 2004 are important. To a large extent, it was the first interaction that made the breakthrough and second interaction kept the momentum going when the peace process was threatened and believed to be falling apart. A leading commentator even mentioned that the 'traditional opponents' leaked these back channel meetings as they were kept out of the decision making loop!

Finally, nuclear CBMs need to be institutionalized; both countries could consider establishing nuclear confidence building centres (NCBCs) on the models of nuclear risk reduction centres (NRRCs) which were established between the US and the former Soviet Union. These institutions could play multiple roles including policymaking, monitoring and implementing. Institutionalizing nuclear CBMs would not only insulate it from the progress or lack of it in other issues such as Kashmir, but would also enable it to perform better, leading to stable nuclear relations. From an Indian perspective, given the jihadi threat to Pakistan, it is essential that its nuclear arsenals remain safe and secure, during normal and crisis periods. Exclusive institutions to share this concern would prove beneficial. Besides, such institutions would also address international concerns of South Asia being a nuclear flashpoint and reduce external pressure to reach an understanding on other issues. It would be in India's interests that nuclear CBMs are institutionalized and carried further.