Conflict resolution in South Asia presents a chequered picture with respect to the role of third-parties. The term 'third-party' has been used deliberately since it broadly encompasses adjectives like 'mediation, facilitation or adjudication'. One reason is that, traditional definition of terms like 'mediation' as being an impartial, neutral actor in charge of the conflict settlement process may not suit the gossamer of South Asia complexities, partly because the region has a shared history, religions and demographic patterns. Role of state and non-state actors 'overlap' in the context of sub-continental conflicts. An impinging factor is the gradual acceptance of some non-state actors as quasi-state actors in the sub-continent (Like LTTE in Sri Lanka and representatives of 'Azad' Kashmir in Pakistan or J&K's elected representatives in India).

This 'overlap' is visible within India and Pakistan over Kashmir conflict, and in LTTE's fight for a separate homeland in Sri Lanka. The separatist voices seeking an independent Kashmiri state, LTTE's demand for a separate Eelam; their respective conflicts with the states of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka represent the interface between quasi-state and a state in these conflicts. Same is true about India's confabulations with LTTE in the 1980s and Pakistan's contacts with separatist and terrorist groups in Kashmir. Alongside, the state-state interface in the form of official state parleys is quite self-evident.

In any negotiation process, there are different levels of interfaces. Firstly at the state - non-state or quasi-state level, and secondly at the state - state level. At the same time, the role of respective domestic constituencies with vested interests also comes into play. Given this scenario, the role of a third-party leads to controversies and murky situations as their inclusion in the interfaces gives rise to anomalies. One such anomaly arises when a legitimate party to a state - state interface may be viewed as an unwanted 'third-party' at the state - quasi state interface. For example, while Pakistan's legitimate place at the table with India is indisputable, its interjection into the dialogue between India with representatives of elected state government of J&K and the Hurriyat for that matter can be termed as 'outside' or 'third-party' interference.

Similarly anomalies arise when an 'accepted third party' in a context becomes 'unaccepted' for having interjected itself in an interface it is not mandated to. For example, while India's mediation to formulate the Sri Lankan Peace Accord was 'accepted', its direct role in the form of IPKF drew it into direct confrontation with the LTTE. This change from a state - state interface to state - quasi state interface led to an embarrassment for India. Its previous encouragement to the LTTE before the accord was also frowned upon by the Lankans. Motivation for such interjections may be to bolster one's own power due to the possible leverage one intends to attain over the other partner(s).

It is in this matrix that third-party role in South Asian conflicts has to be analysed and its capabilities scrutinised. The complex concept of a 'neutral' third-party role needs to be clarified with respect to its effectiveness when placed in the 'interfaces' mentioned above. These 'power interfaces' are clearly the focal points at which all decision making processes take place. Therefore, it is evident that a third-party will have a locus standi in these conflicts only if its interests are based on application of power. The failure of Norwegian mediation in the Sri Lankan peace process is an example. On the contrary, it can also be pointed out that third-party roles of actors with a power interest have also failed, as in the case of the Indian role in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. Truly in this case, the problem was not in the 'form' of the Indian policy as much as it was the faulty 'substance' that led to the tragic events. In the World Bank-mediated Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, the bank's role was of a third-party which managed to resolve a conflict amicably by playing upon the leverage it possessed vis-à-vis India and Pakistan. Its leverage in terms of aid and loans was its 'power-chip'.

Given this scenario, adopting an interest-based approach like facilitation may not be the best available strategy for third-parties. Interest-based approaches aim for win-win situations; something which is less probable, but not impossible in 'power interfaces'. Regional geopolitical considerations and recognition of the afore mentioned assertion has led to a greater American role in the Indo-Pak dialogue, and an increased concern for the Lankan peace process. Similarly, India needs to contemplate adoption of a power-based approach in the Lankan peace process and by the same token must tackle the possibility of an intensive role by US, or any other third-party's in the Kashmir dispute.