Panelists: PR Chari, Arundhati Ghose & G Balachandran
Chair: Gopi Arora

Gopi Arora

How historical is the Indo-US agreement signed by Manmohan Singh and US President Bush in July 2005? What are its implications of this understanding, especially its nuclear aspects? Does it affect the autonomy of India's nuclear decision-making? The deal on nuclear energy - is that all that India wanted? Even if this was wanted, was this the right way to obtain it? Are there any unwritten understandings between the two countries, especially vis-?-vis China? These are important questions.

PR Chari

The American compulsions underlying the Indo-US agreement are: First, the US wishes to remould the political architecture of Asia; China is an important state for the US to balance against Japan and India. Second, India is the future third largest economy in the world and the US would like to access this huge market. Third, India is the largest credible democracy in the world. Condoleezza Rice had stated that the US would like to see India as a 'major world power'.

India's compulsions are as follows: First, India understands that the US occupies the apex of world power in its political, military, economic and cultural dimensions. Second, India needs the US to access high technology, especially relating to defence and nuclear energy.

The Indo-US agreement states that India is a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, an euphemism for a nuclear weapon state, which could be equally applied to Israel, but, hopefully, not to Pakistan. However, the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) do not consider India as a NWS or a non-NWS. Moreover, there are many "ifs" in the understanding.

Many, both inside and outside the government have reasoned that this understanding gets India out of its present international isolation. One needs to examine how India got into this state of isolation in the first place. India's nuclear programme has been limping along for the last four decades due to confusion in objectives. Since the civilian programme was used to achieve military objectives, there is no separate military programme; hence the difficulty today in separating civilian from military activities. India's efforts to disguise its military programme within its civilian started this confusion.

India's peaceful nuclear explosions were premature; India fudged and argued that PNEs were permitted under the NPT; Raja Ramanna confessed at a later stage that there is no technical difference between a nuclear explosion for civilian or military purposes. Pokharan I was a pointless exercise. Whether the 1998 tests were necessary for strategic reasons is arguable.

What are the present problems? First, plutonium from power reactors can be used for nuclear devices, but is required in larger quantities to make them. Greater skill is also required to construct nuclear devices out of reactor grade plutonium; therefore all three plutonium reprocessing plants in Tarapur, Trombay and Kalpakkam would need to be kept out of safeguards. Similarly, CIRUS and Dhruva, capable of producing weapons grade plutonium, would also need to be kept out of the safeguards regime. Second, developing a triad is visualized by the nuclear doctrine that would require newer design warheads and their miniaturization. The sea-based deterrent cannot be credibly developed without testing. Otherwise, India would have to scale down its nuclear ambitions to target Pakistan, but not emulate China. Third, natural uranium is being rapidly depleted as the Jharuguda mines only had around 10,000 tonnes of workable ores. Commercially viable mines in India's northeast and Andhra Pradesh have not been exploited due to local opposition. Lack of natural uranium will slow down India's nuclear power programme, based on pressurized heavy water reactors. The prototype fast breeder reactor in Kalpakkam would require highly enriched uranium. Little is known about India's enrichment programme, which has been kept under wraps by the Atomic Energy Commission.

Finally, would Dr Manmohan Singh be able to deliver on his promises in the light of opposition from the Left parties? Would Mr Bush be able to deliver, as the anti-proliferation lobby in the US is gearing itself up for battle in Congress? Other NSG countries would also have domestic problems in helping India, which is hoping that Russia and France would break ranks and supply the needed uranium.

Arundhati Ghose

Many in India are taken aback with the Bush administration, which has always wanted to uphold the non-proliferation regime, but has now decided to reach an understanding with India on nuclear energy. This dialogue has been going for some time, and Dr Singh commented this agreement has undoubtedly been the most important on his 'watch'. The agreement is indeed historic, because the US administration is cooperating with India for the first time on nuclear issues. India has been fighting the nuclear denial regimes for the past many decades.

India is a nuclear weapon state, whether the other countries including the NSG recognize it or not. Would the NPT recognize India as a NWS? Would India recognize the NPT? Irrespective of not being a member of the NPT, India has been following its norms. On the distinction between the civilian and military programmes - none of the NWS have made this distinction.

What would be the implications of this understanding on China? Should India be sensitive to China? China, without any doubt, is a powerful country. But, who has criticized its nuclear weapons? Who has criticized its proliferation? Why should India then be sensitive to China? Surprisingly this question has been raised in the Indian Parliament? Did China ever discuss Indian sensitivity when its firms succeeded in ensuring India's ouster from Angola or Myanmar?

The nuclear aspects of the understanding make it historic. Without it, the agreement would only have resulted in maintaining the status quo. The military requirements for fissile materials have always been shared with the civilian requirements. With this agreement, the civilian programme would be able to access materials abroad; hence the military programme would achieve what it wants. About opening the nuclear installations for inspections, only the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) would know how much plutonium is needed to produce the deterrent; hence only it can decide which installations can be opened for inspection.

The US is moving faster on the terms of its understanding with India. This should be emulated by India, which may lag behind since it has to carry everyone onboard. Finally, India should realize that not much help would be received from external sources in developing its nuclear programme, which it has to manage on its own. There would be no point in letting foreigners come and inspect its civilian and military programmes.

G Balachandran

The nuclear aspects of the understating are important. Do we need external support for our nuclear programmes? Only the DAE would be able to provide the correct picture.

Why did the US not insist on India agreeing for a fissile materials moratorium? Would such an understanding have affected India's strategic programme or its R&D needs? What are India's needs in terms of minimum deterrence? How much fissile materials would India need to build this deterrent? The answer is that no one knows. Niger and Namibia are two countries that have uranium ores; but India has never approached them so far. China was willing to provide enriched uranium to India in 1993, but for some strange reason India went to Russia. China was not a part of the NSG then.

For executing the Indo-US agreement, especially its nuclear aspects, the US has to change no domestic laws. It is the NSG that will have to change its rules? What is essential here is that the US should not oppose any such changes by the NSG. If the US Congress refuses to provide India's nuclear energy needs, India could always go to either Russia or France. The NSG needs no support from the US Congress to provide or change its rules. Suppose the NSG changes its rules and the US Congress is not willing to do so, what would be India's position? India should keep a low profile on this issue, and not make any unnecessary comment linking the US Congress to the NSG.

There is no need for India to strive to attain NWS status. The IAEA already recognize India as having advanced nuclear technology. India's attempt to gain global recognition as a NWS is meant for its domestic audience. What is the main objective of India? Is it to get technological support from the NSG? Or get nuclear weapons state status from the US? India should not try for the second.

How would China react to the Indo-US understanding? No doubt, the US wants India to become a major power. China could create problems for India in the NSG. It could delay taking decisions.

Rajaraman

The agreement is historic and should be welcomed. It is a triumph of Indian diplomacy. What would the NSG provide? Whatever is provided would be a gain for India. The real problem now is drawing a fence between the civilian and military programmes. Would this affect India's national security? All civilian and military programmes starts with uranium and its availability is a problem for India. Getting uranium from outside would be essential for India.

Converting thorium to uranium through fast breeder reactors would become controversial. Since India could have the access to uranium, there may be questions about why India needs fast breeder reactors? Many questioned Iran why it wants nuclear energy, when its needs could be met by gas?

It is not difficult to conclude what India wants. What Dhruva and Cyrus have produced is enough. They are already producing enough to make ten weapons in a year, and in the next ten years India could have more than 100 weapons. What India needs to do is define its needs and objectives.

Comments

• The Indo-US agreement is a win-win for both countries, though many fear that it would cap India's nuclear programme. India should not worry about China; the US is building India as a balancer to China.

• The US has agreed to work with India on nuclear issues, because India is a country that is easy to work with, besides being a responsible state and a democracy. The US President is determined to work the agreement and has always been able to get what he wants from the US Congress.

• The nuclear aspects of the understanding mean that the impediments to the civilian programme are being removed. However there are dangers of nuclear safety and security, which should not be under estimated.

• The US as the big brother has decided to help India; this would help France and Russia to help India on nuclear energy.

• NSG and MTCR are not multilateral agreements but they are plurilateral. In Libya and North Korea, what the world is witnessing is plurilateral and not multilateral engagement. Security Council has always been bypassed on such crucial matters.

• Why should India not gang up against China? China has always ganged up against India along with Pakistan.

• Separation of civilian and military programmes will enhance India's deterrence capability. This would also help India to increase transparency and heighten the interaction between the military and civilian structures in India.

• There have been remarkable shifts relating to Indo-US relations taking place during the Bush administration. Though there are chances of a breach in its international obligations this suits Indian interests. Certainly are domestic laws that the US would have to adjust, but the Bush administration has the ability to do this. There would not be many problems with the NSG. Russia and France would help India in any eventuality. India needs to be clear and transparent about what it wants.

• India's Leftist parties cannot be underestimated. The young communist leaders are a force to be reckoned with.

Questions and Answers

Question: Why is China silent? Is it because it feels it could handle this situation at the NSG level?
Answer: If the Chinese are going to oppose in the NSG, it would be difficult for India.

Question: Suppose there is a problem with the agreement, what would be its impact on nuclear assistance, India's position on nuclear energy and finally Indo-US relations in general?
Answer: If the deal does not go through, one can expect France and Russia to help.

Question: How safe and secure is the nuclear programme?
Answer: Nuclear safety is an important issue. If a nuclear reactor cannot be used, what is to be done with it? How to dispose it would be a greater problem.

Final Comments: Gopi Arora

In 1998, India declared that its atomic energy programme did not need any external support and that it could do on its own. Even in 1974, there were such beliefs. But now, the time has come to take new decisions. There is an energy crisis looming ahead of India. There is also a realization now that the US is the pre-eminent power and has the nuclear technology, as if it was not before. India wanted to be a great power, through nuclear weapons.

During Nehru's period, there was not much of nationalization. India let the private firms to operate; but then it was not sufficient to meet India's energy requirements. India then went to Russia. It was during the same time, India wanted to be a great technological power. India then also wanted to become a nuclear weapons power, so that the international community could and ask India to be a part of the UNSC. It was during this period, India lost its vision, only to realize now that it needs energy. Why did India suddenly realize that we need nuclear energy? The US seems to have taken India into its objectives. India has not sold itself, but seems to have been observed by the US and the former is getting adjusted to it. Perhaps, Pakistan would also do the same thing in the near future.