The Joint Statement signed by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the US President George Bush in Washington has raised debates more particularly on the possible civilian nuclear cooperation among the academics, scientists and members of strategic community in India. There are conflicting perspectives on the whole debate. Some are of the view that India should not have committed to so much in the joint statement, because it is most likely that such actions, if translated into policy would only maximise risks and minimise benefits. Others view the joint statement as an example of the transformation in the relationship.

The joint statement refers to the US promises and India's commitment in the field of civilian nuclear cooperation. If one reads the joint statement carefully, one can conclude by saying that the US has not agreed to cooperate with India on civilian nuclear issues. The US has just made promises to work towards this objective within their own sets of checks and balances. However, there seem to be media hype and many positive inferences have been drawn. There also seem to be some sort of euphoria as if the US has already taken a decision on this issue. From India's past experiences with the US, one can only say that the US will not do anything unless it is in its interest. India should not be naïve and celebrate.

It is, however, very important to note here that the US had stopped cooperation at all levels immediately after India went nuclear in 1974. The last three decades made India self reliant in developing critical nuclear technologies indigenously. There is no doubt in saying that India did pay a price in terms of time and money. Despite all the stumbling blocs created by the US, India has been able to develop 11 nuclear reactors indigenously.

After India went thermonuclear in 1998, the US was one of the harshest critics and even went one step further in mobilising international opinion against India's nuclear tests. The US again had imposed fresh lease of economic and technological sanctions. India again survived successfully and showed to the world its relevance and importance. For all practical purposes, India is a nuclear weapon state, but due to some rules framed during late 1960s in the form of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it can not be treated as a de jure and acknowledged nuclear weapon state.

How can the US - with whom India had an estranged relationship - conclude that the relationship has transformed and is looking forward for a serious strategic partnership. It is generally believed that a real 'strategic partnership' can only take place in a symmetrical relationship where one develops some sort of parity. No international relations theorist has ever argued in the form of a theoretical construct to prove that the strategic partnership can work in an asymmetric condition. India should be careful in enlarging its scope in the field of strategic partnership, more particularly in nuclear cooperation.

The US had always been averse on the matters of civilian nuclear cooperation in the past. The nuclear reactor at Tarapur in India has always been under IAEA safeguards. There was basically no harm in continuing with the cooperation. But, the US record on cooperation is not impeccable and has always been questionable and doubtful. It has been putting pressure on other countries too, with whom India would have cooperated. The US actions in this regard have always been unwarranted and damaging to India's interests. The US has put pressure on all the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and categorically asked not to provide any cooperation including nuclear fuel to India.

Now, India is caught in the US web and surprisingly has committed to voluntarily place all its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. India has also committed to sign and adhere to an additional protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities. It would be basically an assault on its strategic autonomy, and India in the past had been objecting to this on principled reason that it won't provide indigenous nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards.

The US has too many checks and balances. Hence, many of the promises made may not be translated into reality. There might be a possibility that the American Congress may not decide positively on the grounds that India could not be treated as a special case despite the influence of 'India Caucus'. The past experience also suggests that there has always been a lack of consistency between rhetoric and actions on the part of the US government. Hence, chances of getting civilian nuclear cooperation translated into reality seem very distant.

It seems India had not done sufficient homework on all these vital issues of strategic relevance. One even finds a blunder in the joint statement where WMD (Prevention of Unlawful Activities Act) has been referred as WMD (Prevention of Unlawful Activities Bill). India needs sensible advisors to draft such a document of great relevance and importance.