Chair: Maj Gen D Banerjee (Retd)
Panelists: PR Chari, C Raja Mohan, Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (Retd), Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy (Retd) and BG Verghese

Gen Banerjee: Introduction

The objective of the discussion is to explore possibilities towards a resolution of the Siachen issue and not to go through the history of the conflict. With the help of a few maps, he explained the terrain in question which naturally has an important bearing on the situation and is not very well known even among serious analysts. It was explained that the area of Siachen falls within the Ladakh region, and not Baltistan, as Pakistan claims.

PR Chari: Historical Background

The problem with providing a historical background to any current issue is how far back one goes. In the case of Siachen, do we go back to the 1980s or to 1971 or further back to 1947? Do we talk about the earlier Ceasefire Line (CFL) or the Line of Control (LoC)? The central problem is that the area in the map beyond grid point NJ 9842 is not demarcated.

Siachen became a dispute with Pakistan starting a 'cartographic' aggression owing to erroneous American maps, and then by the Pakistan government permitting mountaineering and trekking expeditions into this region from its side. There were reasons to believe that later in 1984 they would have moved into Siachen and presented India with a fait accompli. This is what led the Government of India to authorise Operation Meghdoot and the Army occupying the Saltoro Ridge.

The Pakistani view is based on several factors. First, Siachen is a part of the Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK). The Pakistanis base their view on American maps. Second, the mountaineering and trekking expeditions sought permission from Pakistan, not India. Third, the Owen Dixon report (1950) submitted to the UN located Siachen in the Northern Areas. The last two reasons are the Karachi Agreement (1949), where the ceasefire line beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated and the Simla Agreement (1972), when it was agreed that the LoC would not be unilaterally altered. Even during the Suchetgarh meetings between the two militaries in 1972, the LoC beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated.

The crucial aspect of these two agreements and more importantly the Simla Agreement is that in his personal opinion no one can unilaterally claim the Siachen Glacier and that it has to be negotiated, which, of course, is a legal assessment, and not a political or military view.

C Raja Mohan: External Issues

His presentation focused on the political aspects of the Siachen issue. There are three issues to be considered: the sense of the negotiations on Siachen and their prospects, the linkage between Siachen and the Indo-Pak peace process, and finally policy implications.

In the same manner that Jammu & Kashmir is a left over issue from partition, Siachen is an unresolved component of the Kashmir problem. The Indian Army occupied the post in 1984; what is interesting is that negotiations to resolve it began soon after in 1985. The two governments have been near an agreement twice, in 1989 and 1992. These agreements involved redeployment of forces, a joint commission to adjudicate on the area beyond NJ 9842 and negotiate a settlement, and finally establish a verification mechanism. The Siachen negotiations have been about these three issues. The 1989 agreement did not fructify due to domestic political compulsions in both India and Pakistan. In 1992, the negotiations worked out the same formulation, but an agreement was not possible as Prime Minister Narasimha Rao decided it was not the right time to do so. Therefore, the lack of political will negated the agreements reached after talks on the two occasions.

In January 2004, when the Indo-Pak peace process was initiated, the leadership in both countries recognised the importance of Siachen and agreed that negotiators would meet more frequently. There were two complications in the current phase of peace talks on Siachen; one is the assertion of the Indian Army that the Indian ground position must be authenticated, which, in principle, is difficult for the Pakistanis to accept as they believe it would legitimize Indian aggression. The second complication relates to confusion in objectives. Why is the Army insistent on authenticating the claim line? Is it to prevent Pakistan from occupying Siachen or to lay claim to the Siachen Glacier?

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Siachen, the first by an Indian Prime Minister, was intended to change the atmosphere. The Siachen talks feed into the peace process, and any settlement on Siachen would help to move the Jammu & Kashmir talks forward. The Siachen talks should be seen in sequential terms, where a softening of the borders would provide dynamism to the overall peace process. The last aspect is the civil-military relationship over this issue in India. In the current set up, the civilian government has the final say, and the decision should be political. But, in the past 15 years, the civilian leadership has been avoiding a decision, and the military has been used as an excuse to escape from taking the decisions that the political leadership should take.

Gen Vijay Oberoi: Strategic Aspects

The strategic importance of the Siachen glacier is self evident. It is located in the state of Jammu & Kashmir which originally shared borders with China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. As stated earlier, the problem started with US maps showing Siachen as part of Pakistan. The first Pakistani map to show Siachen within its borders was issued in the 1970s, prior to which they were two expeditions that Pakistan permitted, but the Indian government did not object to.

There is a difference between the CFL (1948) and the LoC (1971). While there is no change in the map beyond NJ 9842, there are differences in the line below it. No change beyond NJ 9842 is due to the fact that there was never any fighting in the area and due to the ruggedness of terrain.

What kind of an end state do we want? Should India alone give up territory? Jammu & Kashmir had acceded to India and all of Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir belongs to India. The envisaged Siachen peace park as a solution is an extremely dangerous idea as it would permit China and Pakistan to meet at the strategically important Karakoram Pass.

For demilitarization to occur and the area to go under joint commission authority, there are four necessary steps. The first is to map the ground position; the second is to move out artillery from both sides. The third and fourth are to thin out the respective forward positions, move out of the rest, and occupy only key passes. The dumps of ammunition and equipment lying in the area could either be brought back or destroyed.

Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy: Strategic Aspects

The Siachen issue should be seen in a broader perspective; it relates to the question that India and Pakistan do not trust each other. A military regime in Pakistan is not conducive to any settlement. The attitudinal differences in India-Pakistan relations contrast vividly with what obtains in Europe and the rest of the world, which are driven by economics. Why do we talk about a resolution? What is the big hurry? It would also be wrong to characterize the Indian Army as having occupied Siachen. It was the Indian government which occupied Siachen. India being a democratic country, there is a division of labour, and tasks are divided. The Government of India ordered the occupation of Siachen, and the Indian Army implemented this decision.

India is in a comfortable position and in a militarily stronger position than Pakistan, so why pull back? So that the Pakistan government allows the bus to travel to Muzaffarabad? What about the Chinese sitting tight in Aksai Chin. The government has not shown any anxiety or hurry to talk to China about Aksai Chin. Is it because they are a stronger country? We should not forget that we are a regional power and we are a strong country ourselves.

BG Verghese: Towards A Resolution

The authentication of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) at Siachen is very important. The whole issue of Jammu & Kashmir is one of falsification of history and the process appears to have no end. The authentication is important, but is not the primary task; it is an important secondary task. The whole problem is that of maps. The government of India is so secretive that no one has any knowledge about maps, except for the concerned experts in government. The CFL/LoC beyond grid point 9842 was not demarcated, but it had been delineated. In 1956, the Geological Survey of India sent a team, which spent two years in the area around the glacier exploring and conducted studies in the region. There were no protests from Pakistan. The study of the GSI was also shared internationally. The amazing aspect of this matter is that the government of India does not follow up on these maps issue, which would go a long way in building up our case, making the Pakistani claims ridiculous.

The weakness of the 1989 and 1992 agreements is that nobody had any knowledge of where the line of control beyond the grid point NJ 9842 lay or that there is a disagreement regarding this line between India and Pakistan. Unless the two sides agree where the line lies, only then is any redeployment possible. In trying to see an end point for the resolution of the issue by side stepping the issue, the peace park proposal which has been mooted should include the area west of the glacier and upto Mount K2 as well as areas to the east. To buttress the Jammu & Kashmir controversy, India should additionally link the Shaksgam Valley to the peace park for geological and other studies. Any violation of the agreement by the contracting parties should invite harsh action by the other party and the international community.

Gen Banerjee

It is important to use the political impulse towards peace that is currently prevalent in both countries and the present state of ceasefire, to solve the Siachen dispute. Through its resolution it should be possible to move forward on other issues between our two countries. The costs of maintaining and keeping alive this issue remains very high, not just in financial terms but also in overall opportunity costs. The problem lies in Pakistan's unwillingness to affirm the AGPL and India's position on not resorting to mediation or arbitration of the dispute. Once vacated, the recapture of the Saltoro Ridge is not possible. The key could be to hold important passes to secure the Saltoro, which would make logistics easier and also reduce costs. However, the danger of 'high hill syndrome' (the next high hill is considered a better defensible position by military commanders) and the dangers of Pakistan occupying any vacated posts still exist.

Other options may be a unilateral vacation of the glacier region, after authentication of present positions by international authorities and neutral observers. Or a negotiated settlement and demilitarization of the region by developing this region as a high altitude peace or nature park or a joint scientific research centre. The latter approach has received much attention in recent years.

Discussion

Most past and present participants have been part of the civil decision making process or in the armed forces and the discussion notes the points they made.

The first point raised was about the military being a hurdle to a settlement of the Siachen issue. The question of civil-military relations was raised, but there was general agreement that the civilian supremacy in India has not been challenged by the armed forces. However, in the recent past the political leadership has passed the buck to the military to escape taking a stand.

The second point raised was about how times have altered perceptions of respective governments on the Siachen dispute. During the foreign secretary talks held in 1997 at the time of the Gujral government, India wanted to raise the Siachen issue but the Pakistan government was not interested. They wanted only Kashmir on the agenda.

The third and important aspect of the issue is the terrain, and what is possible and what is not possible with regard to a solution of the dispute. In taking care of the strategic aspects, it is important to note that a meeting point between China and Pakistan should not be allowed under any circumstances. The discussion also focused on the status of the Shaksgam Valley, a chunk of territory that was originally a part of the state of Jammu & Kashmir which Pakistan ceded to China in terms of the 1963 border agreement. The agreement has a clause that, owing to the nature of the disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir, a final resolution would be made with the paramount power only when the dispute is settled.

A number of participants raised questions about the fact that as J&K had legally acceded to India, why then did India not claim the territory beyond point NJ 9842? A number of participants raised the issue that, since it was Indian territory, why move back. They were of the opinion that Pakistan is not trustworthy. While the Indian positions on the Saltoro are militarily superior to Pakistan's positions; from a logistical point of view Pakistan has an advantage and has to incur much lower expenditures in maintaining its positions.

Concluding Remarks

PR Chari

The discussion appears to have polarized along predictable lines, which is probably the case in the decision-making process within the government.

Oberoi

There appears to be a belief that only India should give concessions and not Pakistan. Whenever in the past, for example 1965 and 1971, the military has been kept out of the decision making loop, the result has been adverse. Since the discussion is regarding the end state, we have to be clear about what we want.

Krishnaswamy

It is important to continue the tradition of civil-military interaction on issues of national interest. For the Siachen case, of course there is no simple solution. But it is important to remember that we are a regional power and we are located in a region which is volatile. Powerful states have to tolerate being getting kicked in the shins.

BG Verghese

Arbitration or mediation is not suggested for the Siachen dispute as we have had a bad experience with them. We need to be aware of the end state and work backwards.