On a recent visit to Australia and New Zealand, Pakistan President Musharraf acknowledged his 'dubious' distinction of having fought the Indians in armed conflicts and now seeing himself as 'eminently qualified' to play the 'peacemaker' in the ongoing Indo-Pakistan peace process. On dealing with terrorism and 'disputes' he elucidated that, "(Whilst) one prong is the Muslim world rejecting terrorism. The other prong...(to be) executed by the West, especially the United States - (to) resolve all political disputes, the indirect strategy to counter al-Qaeda, to pacify Iraq or Afghanistan, the solution of the Palestinian dispute and the Kashmiri dispute, as far as we are concerned. This is the strategy of enlightened moderation which we in Pakistan are trying to project to the world." Musharraf's definition of enlightened moderation on various other occasions has been consistent with the definition mentioned above.

Enlightened moderation was Musharraf's strategic move to cooperate with the West in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, and his decision to pull the rug under the feet of Taliban and Al Qaeda was a part of this process. Thus, 'enlightenment' was not a conscious self-drawn process, but it 'dawned' on Pakistan as a pre-requisite to it being in the good books of the United States. While it is evident that enlightened moderation is primarily aimed against terrorism, can the attached rider of resolution of 'political disputes' be tackled in this conceptual framework?

An evaluation of enlightened moderation vis-à-vis Kashmir, with Musharraf's self-proclaimed two-pronged strategy reveals that Pakistan's commitment to curbing terrorist activities aimed at India has been successful to a degree as indicated by the relative drop in the death toll in the Kashmir Valley.

In the first part of the two-pronged Musharraf advocated strategy, although he exhorts the Islamic world to reject terrorism, holding them accountable to their actions is far from certain. The latter part of this two-pronged strategy has its share of problems when applied to Kashmir. This strategy places an overwhelming onus on the West and USA in particular to solve disputes. Although the role of the US has increased in South Asia over the past decade, India has always been uncomfortable with this position and would want the peace process to be bilateral in nature, with little or no 'mediation' or 'facilitation' from any quarter.

The strategy of enlightened moderation was formulated as a 'result' and as a 'reaction' to global events. This 'reactionary' stratagem is limited in its scope since it only seeks to address the 'cause' that brought about its formulation. Musharraf's enlightened moderation was not due to Kashmir, but the forced reworking of Pakistan's foreign policy, both in its neighbourhood and in the global arena. Thus, this policy can not address the unique context in which the Kashmir issue has to be handled. Here, enlightened moderation should be aimed at reconciliation of Pakistan's policies against terrorism elsewhere e.g. cracking down on terrorists in Afghanistan, in its own backyard, in NWFP and Baluchisatan on the one hand and lending support (overt or covert) to an armed struggle for Kashmir. This dichotomy does not bode well for an amicable resolution.

Off late, the need for "moving beyond stated positions", "flexibility" and "making borders irrelevant" have become buzz words in the peace process. The Kashmir-Muzaffarabad bus service is an example of this flexibility demonstrated by both sides to assuage the aggrieved sections of Jammu and Kashmir. This has been hailed as a step in the right direction. To uphold the momentum of the current swell of good-will on both sides, more innovative and flexible approaches have to be evolved. Viewed with these objectives, this enlightened moderation seems inadequate to deal with the task. It is straight-jacketed in the mould of a strategy that was crafted in 'hindsight' and in response to rectify previously followed state policy i.e. support to Taliban and dealing with terrorists. In its current mould, this strategy is adequate only to curb militancy and terrorism in Kashmir, but falls short in quality in 'innovative and flexible ideas' being touted as the way forward in Kashmir.

The ongoing India-Pakistan peace process was set forth into motion by the January 6 Islamabad Declaration laying the foundations for the composite dialogue between the two countries. Kashmir is just one among the many issues that was on the negotiating table. In the wider context of the composite dialogue between the countries, the strategy of enlightened moderation may help only partially but is incapable of tackling the India-Pakistan peace process. A strategy suited to the unique India and Pakistan situation needs to be formulated, not just by Pakistan but also by India to secure an amicable solution to Kashmir and the other issue besotting the relations between the two countries.