How real is the threat of bio-terrorism in South Asia? Are the terrorist groups in the region likely to use bio-weapons? Is there a need to look beyond bio-weapons and bio-terrorism so as to assess the real threats?

If one is to go by history, it could be concluded that the threat of bio-terrorism and the use of biological weapons by terrorist organizations is less likely in South Asia. At least two reasons could be put forward. First, while procuring biological materials may be easier, manufacturing biological weapons are not simpler. Even if the weapons could be manufactured indigenously or procured from outside, they are certainly not easier to safeguard. Second, biological weapons are less likely to fit into the modern strategy of the terrorists in the region. The last few years have been witnessing a refinement in terms of militant targets. State property and officials have become the primary target, taking utmost care in avoiding any collateral damage, so as to avoid popular wrath and disapproval. There is an element of rationality in the irrational terrorist acts and the biological weapons would not totally fit in this militant strategy in South Asia.

Ambassador Arundhati Ghose in a seminar recently stated that the likelihood of militant groups using biological weapons for black mailing the state should not be ruled out. But why would they need biological weapons to do so? Kidnapping a minister's daughter or hijacking of plane is much easier than threatening with biological weapons. The militants in South Asia till today believe in the guns and improvised explosive devices and not on chemical and biological weapons.

Can bio-terrorism then be totally ruled out in South Asia? No. The threat of bio-terrorism exists in South Asia, but it need not be exaggerated. Hundreds of groups are fighting the State all over the region; amongst them the threat of bio-terrorism is likely to emerge only from select groups. Most of the militant groups fighting in India's Northeast for political reasons could be ruled out from using biological weapons. So could be the Naxal groups fighting elsewhere in India and also in Nepal. These groups need an element of popular support hence are least likely to use biological weapons. In Jammu and Kashmir, groups such as the Hizbul Mujahideen could also be ruled out.

Militant groups fighting for non-political purposes are more likely to use biological weapons in South Asia, especially the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Both these organizations are fighting for a religious cause and are not bothered about popular support in India. The radical right wing groups are more likely to use such weapons. The fact that the Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult group, used biological weapons in the past need to be reckoned with. Al Qaeda search for chemical and biological weapons also need to be taken into account from this perspective. Second, groups such as the Lashkar and Jaish are more likely to use such weapons due to their proximity to the al Qaeda, which is believed to have possess such weapons or/and expertise.

What is essential at the moment is to expand the scope of threat both from the perpetrators and also their strategy. A distinction needs to be made between bio-weapons and bio-materials; and between bio-terrorism and bio-crime. While biological weapons are difficult to procure or manufacture, biological materials are comparatively easier to procure. The real threat to South Asia comes from the covert use of biological materials and not biological weapons. Second, those who use biological materials need not necessarily be terrorist groups. The criminal groups, especially the underground mafia need to be taken into account in defining the threat from biological weapons and materials. These attacks would be perpetrated on their own or at the instance of someone else - either a foreign intelligence agency or a trans-national terrorist organization. The criminal underground, unlike the militant groups need no popular support and in the case of India, the external linkages of these individuals and groups have been sufficiently proved. Threat to India may actually emanate from bio-crimes rather than bio-terrorism.

Besides the underground, the threat in South Asia, especially in India, may also emanate from individuals or groups exploiting the strong and well advanced bio-tech infrastructure in the country for evil purposes. The bio-tech industry and expertise in India has been expanding at a faster pace in the recent years. How strong are the measures to safeguard the materials and expertise? Would the expertise be tapped for evil purposes with or without individuals' knowledge by organizations inside and outside the country? Is there a need for a strong legal and ethical code for both the scientists and the bio-tech industry? These are vital questions that India may have to address sooner than later. Second, the State may also have to spread awareness on these new threats without exaggerating them. Third, the State should also take adequate measures in terms of contingency measures in meeting the threat. If there is to be an attack like that of the plague in Surat, are we ready to face it? How strong is our disaster management? These are larger but immediate questions that need to be addressed than focusing narrowly on biological weapons and bio-terrorism.