Chair        : Amb A N Ram

Panelists  : Amb Arundhati Ghose
                  Prof PR Chari
                  Rear Adml Raja Menon
                  Dr Santhanam

Opening Remarks

Amb A N Ram highlighted the contemporary importance of bio-terrorism considering the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has expanded beyond nuclear weapons. Appropriately, the 10 chapters presented and compiled in the book, Bioterrorism and Biodefence edited by P R Chari and Suba Chandran (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2005) canvas a number of issues, as well as pinpoint current problems and juxtapose them with past challenges.

P R Chari

Prof Chari pointed out that the book was the third in a series of publications on biological weapons (the two earlier books being Working Towards a Verification Protocol for Biological Weapons and Bioweapons: Issues and Threats), by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) with project support from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. He drew attention to the fact that in Delhi, discussions on WMD tend to be nuclear in nature, and discussions on biological weapons did not draw much of a crowd. Moreover, IPCS remains the only institute outside Europe and US working on this issue; the threat from biological weapons is neglected in India and the world in general.

The 9/11 attacks galvanized the attention of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on bio-terrorism, but the Indian Home Ministry was not as coordinated despite efforts by the Civil Defence Organisation & Disaster Management cell. While the Indian Council on Medical Research (ICMR) perhaps had some links to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the public health industry is yet to grapple with issues relating to bio-defence. The manner and extent of informing the public requires a balanced approach: on the one hand lies the danger of creating a "nation of psychotics" and, on the other hand, a lack of sufficient public awareness amounts to criminal neglect. Prof Chari suggested two examples of disease outbreaks that should be examined for lessons learned: the marburg virus (a variant of the ebola strain) in Angola and the gas tragedy in Bhopal. With the marburg virus, there was a dire need for public awareness - the death rate was nearly 100 percent and infections spreading through human secretions. Similarly, in the Bhopal gas tragedy, later investigations revealed that certain preventative measures could have saved many lives. For example, the chemical released in the air, methyl isocyanide, being water-soluble would not have caused serious harm if people had placed wet handkerchiefs over their mouths. On the contrary, people ran causing them to inhale more oxygen, and ingest more of the poisonous gas.

Use of disease epidemics as biological weapons is not new; historically, feuding parties used decaying carcasses to contaminate sources of water (e.g. wells) and in recent memory, US, UK, and Japan have engaged in biological warfare. Nevertheless, the publication of this volume is timely and of contemporary relevance due to the following factors:

• Several countries are maintaining bio-defence programs and many states in areas of conflict (Middle East & Northeast Asia) are known to be pursuing biological weapons programs.

• The Indian security establishment does not believe that biological weapons are a major WMD threat.

• The possibility of 'catastrophic terrorism' (for example, the anthrax attacks in the US) and its capacity to create panic and disruption.

• The neglect of study on effect of WMD on environment which can act as catalysts for new diseases.

• There are several potential actions.

• The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) still does not have a verification protocol.

• Finally, there is an absence of credible and coordinated strategies to prevent an attack from biological weapons.

Raja Menon

Rear Adml Raja Menon provided a historical context to the threat from bio-terrorism: the collapse of Soviet Union created unipolar world, with US as the only superpower. Subsequently, international relations theory shifted to the study of unilateralism and the rise of asymmetric warfare to evaluate a state's options against a larger power; therefore the proliferation of activities relating to WMD. In an effort to deal with consequences of actions taken abroad, the US created the Department of Counter-proliferation, whereas India only had to deal with the subcontinent, or the "near abroad."

To echo Prof. Chari's comments about creating a "nation of psychotics," Raja Menon opined that both too little and too much information could create fear. There was a need to focus on eliminating the threat and analyze state support for biological weapons programs. Most states have the infrastructure and technical expertise to produce and develop biological and chemical weaponry. While detection of a chemical weapons program is eased by monitoring a state's departure from its industrial acquisition and production patterns, detection of a biological weapons program is more challenging. However, a biological weapons program involves a small infrastructure and small group of people with very advanced knowledge - neither of which are likely to succumb to the persuasions of non-state actors interested in acquiring these asymmetric weapons. Regardless of who might be using the weapons, the target is unlikely to be the military, but society itself.

Several potential actions can be taken to counter the threat:

Involving the government and legislation

• create joint parliamentary committee to decide role of government;

• involve representative from National Security Adviser's office;

• coordinate among ministries (especially Home Ministry);

• establish national command post & national logistical plan (from IMCR);

• form intra-governmental coordination agency.

Extending current organizations and their operations

• efficacy of National Disaster Management System currently depends on the last link, the deputy collector, which is quite weak;

• develop "surge" medical capability;

• National Institute of Communicable Disease (NICD) needs national lab plan.

Enhancing technical capability & backup

• upgrade labs' capabilities;

• linking labs, perhaps through access to government email programs;

• build up medical depots.

Focusing the role of lead organizations

• do not look at the US as a model - different system (DHS, executive branch, etc.);

• instead, look to the UK, where there is a Director of Biological and Chemical Policy;

• advise government on state-to-state exchanges and interactions;

• provide technical background for disaster management;

• plan national manufacturing of antidotes;

• IMCR and NICD should increase coordination with Centre for Disease Control;

• National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Some questions persist: Should there be a separate organization for the military? Should the Ministry for the Environment cover a situation such as Bhopal? And, what is/should be the national hierarchy?

Arundhati Ghose

Amb Ghose observed that the book relied heavily on US sources, but there were few other options considering the Indian government had shrouded it decision-making process on this issue. While the government could not be expected to make everything public, there was a need for transparency to evaluate the thinking of the organization.

The use of biological weapons necessitates that it has a discernible, communicated intent. Moreover, the "attack" is only known as such if the perpetrators inform their targets. To anticipate such attacks, there is a need to identify both state and non-state actors who have the potential and intent to use these weapons.

The BTWC raises several questions, only some of which have answers. Through what forum should it be implemented? Unilateral implementation will not work considering the convention requires intelligence cooperation and thus a multilateral environment. Being difficult to verify, a protocol appears somewhat futile. The international community will gain little by reviving this process, as the biochemical industry will find CWC inspections too intrusive, and the crucial question is: does it really deter anyone? Unfortunately, while nuclear weapons have come to be seen as a currency of power in international affairs, biological and chemical weapons have gives rise to such "fear and loathing."

Other international efforts are worth considering. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an innovative way of controlling exports. While the World Health Organization (WHO) does not evaluate weapons, it can lend expertise to the Indian government in monitoring outbreaks.

Commenting on the chapter on non-state actors (by Suba Chandran), Amb Ghose pointed out that it was erroneous to conclude that because these groups need local support, they are unlikely to act against institutions and officials in the vicinity. Driven by ideology and being irrational, these groups cannot be precluded from using the threat of a biological attack as blackmail. Also, the discussion excludes groups in the northeast (i.e. ULFA). There was a need to consider these organizations since they had great potential for blackmail.

Santhanam

Dr. Santhanam highlighted the few cases of India-centric discussion of biological options in warfare. For example, document PAC #2000, published in 1975, covers aspects of bio-warfare with India as platform to attack the Soviet Union. The Genetic Control of Mosquitoes Unit had studied ticks on migratory birds. An important work on the subject remains the SIPRI volumes on biological warfare.

Commenting on the book under discussion, Dr Santhanam pointed out that book was high on references and low on inferences - the research was extensive, but there was a need for more analysis.

On the issue of the Bhopal gas crisis, Dr Santhanam pointed out that, the only precaution in case of emergency was to call a number - which was in the United States! Also, since the slums in local area spread after the construction of Union Carbide's factory, did the blame lie squarely on Union Carbide or was it also the fault of the Indian government?

Discussion

Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)

Scientists working in these areas should have a cooling off period, during which they are kept under surveillance. Efforts should be concentrated on prevention than reaction.

Amb Ghose was aghast at the suggestion and pointed out that government surveillance of scientists was unconstitutional and one could not be discriminated simply based on profession. Dr Santhanam argued that it was ineffective to "quarantine" these scientists. For example, a scientist from Hyderabad could pursue a lucrative offer from a Central Asian country with an aspiring biological program under the guise of a university fellowship. According to Rear Adml Raja Menon, there was a greater need for more private-government cooperation (such as the level present in the cybersecurity sector) as the best scientists are outside the government.

Cooperation with other countries

The Indian strategic community has failed to see linkage with US on preventing use of WMD. There is a realm of convergence and shared vulnerability: al Qaeda in Afghanistan could attack a shopping mall, whether it is in Gurgaon or in North Virginia.

How can the US to collaborate with India on biological weapons - beyond simply connecting with the Home Ministry?

According to Amb Ghose, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) provides an opportunity for collaboration with the US, but India must organize itself before it can expect further collaboration. Adml Menon suggested two layers of US-India coordination: managerial (e.g. joint disaster management exercises with bio-vector as the cause) and technical (e.g. developing the quickness of rapid response). Prof Chari extended the debate on cooperation to encompass several relationships: international, national, intra-national (the centre with states), and cross-sectoral (public-private partnerships). Stressing on cooperation, Amb Ram felt there was a need to coordinate the experience of nations, particularly on the subject of potential use by non-state actors.

Non-state actors

It is important to identify which organizations in South Asia (Jaish-e-Mohammed or Lashkar-e-Toiba, for example) are likely to use biological weapons, and secondly how they are likely to use bio-warfare as a part of their overall strategy, not just for terrorism.

What are the linkages between these South Asian organizations and those external groups with capabilities, interests, and strategy involving biological weaponry?

Are terrorists the only non-state actors likely to use biological weapons? What about the criminal mafia?

Amb Ghose suggested that the issue of blackmail by non-state actors merits serious examination. For this very purpose, certain non-state actors cannot be ruled out from the list simply because they have no linkage with external groups that have established interest in biological weapons.

Potential Legislation

It is also important to distinguish between biological materials and biological weapons, and between bio-terrorism and bio-crimes. The biotech industry and infrastructure are neither strong nor well covered; there are systemic loopholes that can be exploited. One possible solution is to create a database of all biological materials as well as legal and/or ethical code.

Amb Ghose pointed out that the secrecy of government prevents evaluation of various measures, for instance, legislation that can restrict sales of pathogens.