Has the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) met the objectives it set out to achieve? The emergence of amorphous entities and 'private' nuclear networks and their links to the nuclear programmes in Iran, Libya and North Korea have raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of the NPT and its stated aims. Moreover, as stipulated in the NPT, legitimate nuclear commerce remains restricted only amongst the 'few' due to the technology control regimes organized around the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines (NSG) and the NPT. The verification regime also seems to have lost its effectiveness if not completely failed.

However, as the debates for the first week of the NPT Review Conference have evolved, it is clear from the positions of various states that there is a limited choice available for states to effectively tackle proliferation challenges while balancing it with the issue of civil nuclear cooperation.

There are two approaches that appear to have emerged. First, from the US point of view, is the major concern to deal effectively with states like North Korea and Iran which, it believes, is a violation of the NPT. Towards this end, Washington's approach, as enunciated by its Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Stephen Rademaker, before the US House of Representatives, is two-fold. First, is the demand to strengthen Article III of the NPT which stipulates that States should provide nuclear equipments and materials only under strict safeguards. To implement this, Washington will insist upon all NPT signatories for a mandatory acceptance of IAEA's Additional Protocol as a complimentary step to the existing 'full-scope' or the NPT-type of safeguards. The acceptance of the IAEA's Additional Protocol is expected to enhance inspection rights and make them more intrusive than the existing one. Washington has also made it clear that Article IV that deals with civilian nuclear cooperation will remain subordinate to Article III dealing with safeguards. Therefore, civilian nuclear cooperation could take place only under the condition that States subscribe to the Additional Protocol. Moreover, there is also a foreboding that the NSG states, which are the principle transhippers of nuclear materials and equipments, are also contemplating in terms of making the acceptance of Additional Protocol by states a necessary condition to civilian nuclear trade.

There is then the question of the non-nuclear weapon States' 'right' to access civilian nuclear technology under Article IV. And towards this extent, Article III, Para 2 of the NPT clearly states that the implementation of safeguards should be so designed as to avoid hampering the economic and technological development.

The second set of approach - the 'nuclear disarmament' approach - is promoted by the previously non-aligned (NAM) countries as well as some non-nuclear weapons states comprising of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. These groups of states along with Iran, Austria, Sweden and Ukraine are now insisting upon the nuclear weapon states to fundamentally review and reverse their nuclear weapons policy. Clearly, the assumption seems to be that 'proliferation begets proliferation', and any attempt to deal with it would eventually mean de-emphasizing the utility of nuclear weapons as 'deterrents'. Towards this end, these states may insist upon the implementation of '13 practical steps' adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which may, among other things, include the early implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations towards banning of fissile materials (FMCT) and eventually negotiations towards nuclear disarmament.

The two approaches, therefore, are not only contradictory but indeed in confrontation with each other. This is because there are inherent contradictions in the NPT structure since its very inception. The unfortunate truth, however, is that NPT Reviews could not play a constructive role towards harmonizing the various conflicting positions of the states since 1975.

With the changing security perceptions in the post-9/11 world, the ability  of States to translate their security interests through the framework of the NPT has undergone a serious change. As a result of this, states are seeking to promote their nonproliferation interests through instruments outside the NPT framework. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed towards interdicting naval vessels supposedly carrying weapons of mass destruction, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 criminalizing proliferation, and the G-8 Global Partnership are such 'unilateral' measures. The challenge, therefore, is to ensure that these instruments do not fall into the hands of only 'few'.