Can Musharraf be Trusted? - He is Bidding his Time to Strike
27 Apr, 2005 · 1717
Wilson John enumerates the reasons as to why Musharraf cannot be trusted
The decision to trust President Musharraf should rest on facts. He is the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan that has been targeting India since 1947; has engaged in bloody conflicts with India; and continues to anchor his strategic doctrine and training to counter India's military superiority in the region. Despite the present truce between the two nuclear neighbours, there is no visible change in the mindset or attitude of the Generals in Pakistan. Not even the staunchest supporter of the cricket and bus diplomacy can vouch that the Pakistan Army is friendlier today towards India than before. A new theory is being floated that the rulers on both sides of the border have no choice but to respect the bourgeoning popular opinion for friendship and peace. This argument sounds too good to be true. The flaw here is that Pakistan, unlike India, has no recognised popular opinion. It is shaped and dictated by the Pakistan Army. If the Army wants the people in Pakistan to believe that democracy is a new military concept and only GHQ Rawalpindi is capable of making the rules and running the show, the people will believe it. This is what is happening today. Even the most liberal of opinion makers in Pakistan have forgotten the reality of history and have started believing that the Pakistan Army is a messiah for the country. In a way, the intelligentsia in Pakistan is suffering from a collective 'Stockholm Syndrome'.
Second, the existence of terrorist groups and training infrastructure in Pakistan, in most cases founded and supported by the Pakistan Army and its affiliate Inter-Services Intelligence agency, cannot be ignored. The religious extremist, sectarian groups and terrorist groups were created by the ISI to launch a proxy war in Kashmir and have become rogue elements. This is why President Musharraf has been sketching scare scenarios about the jihadis taking over if something happened to him. This is a candid confession that there are terrorist groups within Pakistan, although the world is not informed that most of these groups are the creation of his army. There are two ways of looking at the terrorist phenomenon in Pakistan. One, believe the Washington version of the truth. Two, look at facts. Despite the hype generated after the War on Terrorism, and crackdown ordered by President Musharraf in 2001 there is no visible destruction of the terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan. In fact, uprooted Taliban and Al Qaeda elements from Afghanistan have found shelter in Pakistan. The indigenous terrorist groups are dormant, but not dead. The terrorist leadership is only lying low. The case of the Lashkar-e-Toiba clearly proves the General and Washington wrong. Lashkar chief Hafiz Sayeed was jailed for a short period before the courts dismissed the case against him and set him free. In fact, he was not charged under the anti-terrorist laws but was detained for disturbing the peace and making incendiary speeches. His group changed its name and remains impervious to harm. In fact, Lashkar has expanded its activities, set up new training camps in Sindh (near Hyderabad) and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, collected huge donations within Pakistan and abroad and taken the first step towards opening overseas branches in the US and Australia. The recent discovery of several Lashkar cells in India only proves that Pakistan has quietly launched the second phase of its proxy war, by targeting metros and big cities across the country. There is evidence of Lashkar terrorists using bases in Bangladesh to train and regroup.
The third fact is President Musharraf himself. He is a commando by training and believed in taking chances. The Kargil operations were a gamble. The October 1999 coup was another gamble he took and won. The Kandahar hijacking was yet another gamble to consolidate his position within the mullah-military combine and humiliate India as revenge against the Kargil defeat. The presidential referendum, the cobbling together of the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-e-Azam) and Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, and the decision to aid the US in its war against the September 11 perpetrators can all be labeled gambles on the part of the General. The current peace process is also a gamble. He has decided to take it in the hope that he can, at some point of time, win by default. Like a good commando, he will wait for the right time to strike.