Chair:

Lt Gen AM Vohra (Retd)

Speakers:

Ambassador KV Rajan
(Former Indian Ambassador to Nepal)
KP Singh
(Former Director General Intelligence Bureau, India)
Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee (Retd)
Director, IPCS

KV Rajan

The ambassador pointed out that a number of seminars and discussions have been held in the last few weeks analyzing the developments in Nepal, but few have examined objectively India's interests and options. Where do India's interests lie and where do we go from here?

India and Nepal are today locked in an eye ball to eye ball confrontation. India's position is generally supported by the US and the UK. The key Indian demand remains the restoration of democracy. In Rajan's opinion, the King of Nepal has always displayed a certain personal ambition. The present crisis had its origin in the October 2002 dismissal of the Sher Bahadur Deuba government which was compounded by the 1 February 2005 action. The recent step by the King in effect dismantled the facade of democracy that was maintained since October 2002. By his action the King has removed the buffer and brought the Maoists in direct confrontation with the monarchy. It was important for the King to carry the political parties with him. The step doesn't augur well for democracy or for Nepal.

The Indian position is that it will not be blackmailed by the King who hopes that India will come around due to the perceived Maoists threat to the entire region. This reasoning of the King appears flawed as India does not agree with the dismissal of the government and the resolve of the Indian government is visible in cutting off of arms supplies to the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). The King has been portraying this Indian move as benefiting only the Maoists and in turn wants to use this position to pressurize India.

Examining the position of China and Pakistan, Rajan said that the Chinese have so far not encouraged any ulterior assumption and have refrained from fishing in troubled waters. The developments in Nepal have been described as an internal matter. The Chinese see the Maoists as a threat to peace and stability in Nepal which borders Tibet. Pakistan too has described the developments as an internal affair of Nepal. However, the loan of US $ 5 million that Pakistan had earlier offered can also be used by Nepal to purchase military supplies. The Nepalese have chosen not to do so till now.

The King remains largely isolated and faces tremendous pressure from the international community. The pressures are wide ranging and include arbitrary dismissal of the government, declaration of emergency, censorship of the press, human rights violations and imprisonment of political leaders. However, it appears the King is yet to blink. As for the Maoists, they appear to be reorganizing themselves and have not yet undertaken any major offensive. It appears that the Maoists are consciously not trying to take on the RNA or put too much pressure on the Kathmandu valley. In the rest of the country the Maoists activities continue as usual.

The King and the royalist government have launched a coordinated misinformation campaign to discredit the Maoists saying that there has been a split in the movement. The political unrest that was expected hasn't really taken off as was expected. This is due to two crucial factors. One is the draconian measures put in place by the King as well the threat of corruption charges against politicians who are terrified. The other reason being that the younger and mid level political leaders as well as the rest of the population seems to be disillusioned with the experience of political instability and the internecine squabble among parties. They feel that the politicians have let the country and democracy down.

But the King has support of the business community and a sizeable number of intellectuals, which gives him a lot of confidence. He has packed the new government with old timers from the Panchayat Raj era and seriously believes that a strong monarchy alone can save Nepal from chaos. The King's game plan appears to be to militarily and ideologically break the back of the Maoists movement and through this victory ultimately win support from India and the US. He also expects to regain popular acceptance through a mixture of intimidation and incentives.

In the current situation, the political and the international stalemate is likely to persist and it is difficult to visualize any breakthrough. The Indian position is abundantly clear, but to no effect as the King still refuses to see the Indian ambassador. There is real prospect of anti-Indianism raising its ugly head in the coming days. The special relation between India and Nepal built since the 1950's can be said to be in danger and the relationship between the two armies will be seriously affected. The next few weeks are crucial for the future of Nepal.

The Indian role in Nepal is extremely crucial. There is likely to be demands in the near future by sections in India to revisit the Indian posture. This would necessitate a close look at what India's short term and long term interests in Nepal are. How long will it take for the arms freeze to the RNA to tilt the scales in favour of the Maoists? In event of a Maoists take over, what are the perceived threats to India? Are the cross-border connections between the Maoists in Nepal and Indian Naxalites an exaggeration? What is the importance of the institution of monarchy especially given the extra constitutional powers that the monarch wields? How effective will be a restored democratic order with a passive King? What affect will this have on security and stability in Nepal? Will the Maoists come to the negotiating table to join the mainstream? Is a compromise possible? Will it be sustainable?

Shri KP Singh

Singh started his presentation by questioning Ambassador Rajan's assumptions that the intelligence community may exaggerate the links between the Maoists and the Indian Naxals. Singh said he will not answer the question directly but rather put facts on the table and then the house can decide if there is exaggeration. The Maoists problem in Singh's view was not a socio-economic problem but that of terrorism. Citing the dictionary meaning of terrorism - indiscriminate violence for political ends - Singh gave the background and delineated the history and the origins of Naxal violence in India. The Naxal movement was a result of the disenchantment with the CPI's handling of peasants and workers issues. The CPI's parliamentary route, rather the revolutionary route, was responsible for the rise of Naxalism in India. The Maoists believe only in armed struggle to capture political power. The Maoists do not claim to be a socio-economic movement and have never denied violence, so why give them the benefit of doubt. Of course there is no military solution but in the comprehensive solution that has to be worked out, the military component should be the most important dimension. The terrorists, according to Singh, only see reason when you show military resolve else a Andhra-Naxal talks situation can be expected.

The Indian Naxal groups in the year 2000 affected 75 districts and according to current estimates, 125 districts are affected. Their area of operations continue to expand and more districts are targeted every year. The area over which the Naxal's operate is home to over one third of India's population. The total number of battle hardened Naxal cadres is around 10,000. The Indian Naxals are equipped with modern fire arms and have over 225 AK-47 rifles. Additionally, there are over 15,000 personnel backing the armed force. They also have facilities for the development, production and repair of fire arms.

The violence potential of the Naxals has been increasing with time and they committed over 1500 acts of violence last year. These attacks are targeted at "class enemies" who are carefully chosen. This has an enormous impact on the electoral polity as the general population is intimidated. What kind of representatives can you expect to be elected in this environment. Therefore, try to imagine the situation prevailing in Nepal. Even compared to the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, the Naxals appear to be a bigger threat taking into consideration, the number of militants involved, the area affected and the resilience of the movement. The budget of these Naxal groups is over 150-200 crores of Rupees per year which is largely collected through extortion. The groups pay a stipend of Indian Rs.1500-2000 per cadre and with this they can sustain and raise an army of 20,000 cadres and thus the vicious cycle of more money, more cadres. This sort of disturbance leaves a wide impact on electoral polity and is beginning to do so in Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand. The Naxals are also said to target activities of certain political parties and thereby vitiate the political process just like the mafia does. The problem may be manageable today but in the years to come this could take on epic proportions.

The link between Indian Maoists and the Nepalese Maoists are quite extensive which also involves joint training. A couple of years ago a joint meeting was held in Calcutta, where it was decided to set up a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) stretching from Nepal along the Indian heartland to Andhra Pradesh. Over 75 top to mid level Maoist leaders of Nepal have been arrested in India in the past three years. The Indian Naxal groups have adopted a similar nomenclature to that of the CPN (Maoists) and now call themselves CPI (Maoists). Then there is the CCOMPOSA, a grouping of 16 Maoist organisations from all the South Asian countries barring Pakistan. The organization is not of great relevance today but in the future its coordinating potential can be immense. Moreover the People's War (PW) links the Naxal groups to ULFA which in turns links it to the ISI. While their influence may be an exaggeration today, future predictions are dire.

India has to handle Nepal with care and not take sides in what is essentially a domestic affair. For example in the case of Bangladesh, where India took sides with a power centre, the consequences were disastrous for the country's security. If Nepal becomes another Bangaldesh, the special relationship will be a thing of the past. The revival of democracy in Nepal is necessary but it is Nepal's concern not India's. Here, Singh cited the case of Myanmar as an example. Moreover if we can deal with a number of other military regimes, why cannot Delhi deal with the King in Nepal?

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee (Retd)

Gen Banerjee began his presentation by complimenting the previous presentations which reflected the issues of current concern. He called the 1 February action of the King as a breach of trust between India-Nepal which destroyed the confidence earlier achieved between the two sides in recent years. What are India's interests in Nepal and how do we safeguard them? Gen Banerjee's presentation was divided into three main sections: Why is Nepal important? What is the essence of the current situation? What are the policy challenges for India?

Nepal is important to India for a number of reasons. It has a total population of 24 million with an additional 10 million Nepalese living in India. Nepal borders four important and most populous Indian states which are located in its heartland. Apart from a large number of Nepalese living and working in India, a large number also serve in the Indian armed forces. The situation in Nepal has the potential to lead to regional instability. Nepal is, therefore, both a foreign and security policy challenge for India with a potential to affect Indian domestic situation. There is an urgent need to analyse the current situation dispassionately and from the point of Indian national interest. Relations between sovereign states cannot be based on sentiments or depend on coercion, which can be counter productive. There are both constraints and limitations that exist and sovereign nations have alternate options. A relationship should be based on a broader base of trust and cooperation reinforcing each other's national interests. Above all in India we must carefully weigh our own strategic and national interests and pursue this relentlessly.

Gen Banerjee mentioned his January visit to Nepal and the impasse in Nepal immediately prior to the King's coup. He met important political functionaries, leaders and army officers. India had clearly conveyed to all quarters its concerns and anxieties and had advised caution and cooperation among all parties to deal with the critical situation facing the country. It is a pity that His Majesty refused to heed this friendly constructive suggestions. It was apparent that there was a stalemate with no movement on any front. The best option under the circumstance was for the King to retain his constitutional authority and play a balancing role with the elected political leaders acting together in national interest. This was the best option to deal with the serious Maoist insurgency. However, there was no attempt in Kathmandu to find a compromise. In these circumstances, an ambitious ruler with vested interests in finding a raison d'etre for the continuation of the monarchy claimed a stronger role for himself. The world is looking towards India to provide leadership on the Nepal issue. It is very likely that the rest will follow. Even China has shown due constraint and no overt interference can be discerned. Essentially the international order provides good space for India to deal with the evolving situation.

Nepal is an important strategic neighbour for India with which it has had a long history of constructive, cooperative relations. Yet, in the past, relations have also suddenly turned hostile to India. There remains a latent anti-India sentiment among a small population, which can be exploited by unscrupulous elements. The reasons are complex and has much to do with the small country syndrome that prevails among India's neighbours, such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The only exception to this rule is Bhutan with which India has had no problems whatsoever since independence. The issues of mutual cooperation with Nepal concern issues of economic development, ecological, environmental and water resources. Policy should take care and work towards removing all potential hostile actions from Nepali soil. The short term goals of India can be said to be a stable government in Kathmandu which will allow cooperation on all these areas and bring peace. The kind of government Nepal has should be of only general concern to India. While always preferring democracy in tune with India's own tradition and beliefs, Nepal should be allowed to decide within reasonable bounds what government it should have and for what duration. Any posturing on moral, ideological or political grounds needlessly imposes constraints on policy that is detrimental to national interests.

In terms of counter insurgency, the Maoists threat to South Asia is real and wide spread and which already has vast areas under its influence including vital parts of India. India should not procrastinate in dealing with this situation realistically, holistically and comprehensively. Else the proportions that this situation might assume can be disastrous for the entire region in the future. The solution lies not merely in military terms but in evolving a comprehensive package of dealing with insurgency encompassing all its various facets. The solution lies in the socio-economic upliftment of the region. But in this overall response, military force is an important component particularly in the early stages to demonstrate that the state's interests cannot be challenged by violence. The capability of the RNA is limited. It was a negligible ceremonial force a few decades ago. It is not yet a fully effective combat force. At current levels and with freeze of arms aid, the RNA can sustain themselves only for three-six months at the maximum. Therefore time is clearly not on the side of the RNA. For India, it is important to re-examine current policy towards Nepal in the light of its own vital national interests.

DISCUSSION

Questions

• Is there enough time for India to wait and watch the situation in Nepal? Wouldn't it be too late to wait for the Maoists to gain an upper hand in the situation before India bails the King out? What is Nepal's future going to be like? India has much responsibility for the way this relationship develops? Is India going all alone on the Nepal front or is there some kind of contact group with the US and UK?

• On the linkages between the Nepalese Maoists and the Indian Naxal groups, is the government strengthening security along the borders and are the Maoists in India being apprehended?

• Can one apply pressure on the King by not letting the RNA serve in the UN peace keeping operations? Is it possible for India to nuance its response to the events in Nepal? Is there an exist strategy that India should offer the King? What are the calculations of the King?

• The foreign secretary has said that India will deal with any regime in the neighbourhood as they exist, yet we seem to have a problem in dealing with the King in Nepal. Aren't we tying ourselves in knots?

• The Maoists have expressed that they would participate in the mainstream political process if the monarchy is removed. Shouldn't India try to find a way to opening discussions with the Maoists? What is the Maoist strategy?

Responses

• Time is really short and India should reconsider its decision. On the question of contact groups, it was felt that that was not an appropriate thing to do. It appears that the special place India had in Nepal has been lost due to lack of attention to the United States and the United Kingdom. It appears that the American position may be more nuanced than it appears as they have yet to cut off aid to Nepal thereby leaving the door open. A congressional testimony was cited which said that there was a lot of popular support for the King. This was said to be a pressure tactics from the neo-cons and the Tibet lobby. That if Nepal takes care of US interests, the United States cannot make democracy an issue. There aren't enough troops to man the India-Nepal border effectively.

• India's policy in Nepal was premised on the fact that the King will blink. The King talks about a hundred days time frame to show results. For India, Nepal is the number one country due to external security factors. It appears that India does not have a fall back position.

• The King in Nepal should only have a ceremonial position and therefore, monarchy should still remain important. The Palace never accepted the changes brought about in 1989-90. And the democratic experience in Nepal was making a dent on the minds of the voters which may have hurt the monarchy. And so especially since the Birendra massacre, the monarchy was being discredited and for the King this was a 'now or never' time to rebuild the lost credibility of the monarchy. India's concern with the Maoist threat was a ruse to dismiss the government. It can also be said that the Indian government underestimates the King due to lack of serious attention to Nepal. The King appears to be determined to do his own thing. The King appears defiant and refuses to meet the Indian Ambassador. We have dealt with the King before, so why cannot we deal with him now.

• It appears that there is a discrepancy between the leverage that India thinks it has with Nepal and what exactly exists in real terms. As to why India cannot take the same blockade action it took in 1989-90 is because there is the new factor of the Maoists and all political leaders who can be effective are in jail. The leaders who have escaped to India are middle level people who to begin with do not have much credibility. The economic embargo is only going to hurt the people more in these difficult times.

• Before the question of Maoists joining the mainstream can be raised, the key issue is if the Maoists are willing to give up arms. The answer is no. And therein lies the key difference between insurgencies in the North East and the Naxal groups. The insurgents have a particular charter of demands on the basis of which the government can sit down and talk to them. However, for the Naxals as it is with the Maoists in Nepal, there is no clear charter of demands, rather the goal posts keep moving around. The military component to any solution is very important. And if you weaken the RNA, the political solution will be longer in coming.

• The Maoists ideology in Nepal ranges the spectrum from those of Pol Pot in Cambodia to the Communist Party of India which participates in parliamentary elections. The Maoists of course follow Mao as is evident from the name and also the fundamentals of policy they have adopted, which is gaining power through armed revolution. They have very good leadership, which has been able to effectively manipulate the system and are extremely brutal and violent in their methods. The weaknesses of the movement are its 'inevitability' argument, the lack of external support which effectively means less and low quality weapons despite the amount of money that they have.

• In the larger picture, various issues will bring in various factors and everyone will be working strictly according to their national interests. The King has in a sense already blinked, when he tentatively declared a hundred days time frame for action. The King has also assured that India's concerns and interests will be respected.

Concluding Remarks by the Chair

The Chair thanked the speakers for their presentation and for the discussion. Gen. Vohra mentioned that Nepal has to evolve its own form of government. That India should have good relations with Nepal and in such a context India should offer an exit strategy to the King. His final point was that use of military force should be limited only to create circumstances in which political solutions can be found.