Was Kargil a failure for Pakistan's military? It is widely believed that Kargil war ended in a disaster for Pakistan for several reasons. The international community condemned Pakistan for initiating hostilities; no one believed that those who fought in Kargil were mujahideen and not Pakistani regular troops. Second, there was widespread support by all countries including China and the US that the Line of Control (LoC) should be respected and Pakistan should withdraw its troops; in other words; the status quo should be restored and respected. Third, instead of Kashmir getting internationalized, Kargil and the LoC were internationalized, but in India's favour.

Unlike in India, where there have been numerous studies on Kargil, including an official report prepared by the Subrahmanyam Committee,  there have not been such studies in Pakistan for various reasons. However, two studies by Brigadier Shaukat Qadir and Shireen Mazari, have brought out various issues critical to the understanding of Kargil conflict from Pakistan's military perspective.

Kargil was a failure for Pakistan; but was it a failure for Pakistan's military? In retrospect, it could be argued that while Pakistan may have failed to achieve any significant objectives, this  is certainly not the case with its military. From Pakistani military perspective, at least there were three significant successes.

First, the Kargil conflict revealed the fragile nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan, leading to a military coup and the removal of Nawaz Sharif. Sharif, before the Kargil conflict was inching dangerously close to becoming a democratic dictator after the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Sharif  was also engaged in a direct confrontation with two other institutions of Pakistan, in which he emerged successful before the coup. First, against Pakistan's judiciary, and the second with Pakistan's army itself. General Jehangir Karamat, the then Chief of Army Staff, currently Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, was asked to resign. Clearly, it was not in the interests of Pakistan's military to have any institution getting powerful enough to challenge the others, including itself. The impact of Kargil leading to the coup was significant. In his account, Bruce Riedel described that when Sharif came to meet Bill Clinton in July 1999, he came with his entire family, suggesting that he feared a military takeover at that time itself. The coup, in fact, was a major success for Pakistan's military, which clearly arose from the outcome of the Kargil conflict.

Second, a major success achieved was in terms of Pakistan's military wresting the Indo-Pak negotiations initiative from civilian control. Before Kargil, Indo-Pak relations were getting warmer, which witnessed two crucial developments. First, the Lahore summit, which saw Vajpayee visiting Minar-e-Pakistan, perceived to be a symbolic gesture of the Indian establishment accepted Partition. Second, the secret negotiations between Sharif and Vajpayee through their emissaries Niaz Naik and R K Mishra respectively. In India, these negotiations were welcomed by everyone, but this was not the case in Pakistan, especially by its military. They perceived the Niaz Naik-RK Mishra negotiations as being undertaken to keep them out of in Indo-Pak rapprochement efforts. Kargil derailed this civilian negotiation but also made Pakistani military as the final arbiter and negotiator in deciding Indo-Pak rapprochement. The Agra summit and Post-Coup events proved the Pakistani military can promote or disrupt Indo-Pak relations.

Kargil was also a success from the Pakistan military's perspective, as it revived militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, and also increased terrorist attacks all over India. Before the Kargil conflict, violence has had come down significantly in J&K and there was a widespread support for a political approach. It is in the interests of Pakistan's military to keep militancy alive in J&K, which is a bargaining card with India. Without militancy, India's stance vis-à-vis Pakistan could harden; also the international community would push Kashmir to the back burner. After Kargil, the militant attacks were not only revived but also intensified. The fidayeen attacks are a post-Kargil phenomenon.

It is debatable, whether Pakistan's military had these specific objectives in mind before planning Kargil; however it resulted in strengthening its position inside Pakistan and vis-à-vis India. Only the planners of Kargil would know what specific objectives they had in mind, but the fact remains, it cannot be termed a failure of Pakistan's military. In fact it has achieved more than what it could have asked for: assumed power inside Pakistan; brought Indo-Pak negotiations under its control; revived militancy in J&K; and made it clear to the international community that no compromise can proceed without its explicit participation.