Introduction

Dr Mansourov began by stating that these would be his personal views, and not those of his institution or the US Department of Defence.

The "great powers" in Asia are the US, China, Russia, Japan, and India. Strategic relations between great powers in Asia can be understood in terms of three features:

• "strategic resets," which include the rise of China;

• "strategic ripples," which include the effects of 9/11; and

• "prevailing features," which include the "triple rise" of China, India, and Russia; the transformation of Japan into a "normal country"; the predominance of bilateralism, despite the multilateralist mantra; and the increasing talk of pre-emption, where Russia, China, and Japan are all making references to "offensive defence," etc.

Strategic Drivers

Three strategic drivers shape relations between the powers:

• Internal developments: concerns over political, economic, and social development, governance, and national identity, will all set each power's agenda and dominate their strategies.

• Security problems: territorial disputes inherited from history - such as those between China and Japan, and Russia and Japan - persist, despite political caution and growing economic and trade links.

• US supremacy: remains "the critical variable" and "the welcome variable" - many regional states welcome it, in their self-interest.

Bilateral Relationships

Dr Mansourov then briefly outlined the state of key great power dyads:

• China's bilateral relations with the US, Japan, and India are largely relations of "strategic competition" (though not rivalry), despite the warmer rhetoric.

• China-Russia relations, publicly called a "strategic partnership," are actually more of a "tactical accommodation," as Russia cautiously takes a long-term view of its strategic relations.

• Russia-US relations can be characterised as "conditional accommodation."

• Russia-Japan relations remain "deadlocked."

• Japan-US relations are characterised by a "gap of perceptions," as Japan seeks more strategic autonomy and the US wants the two powers to exercise "joint stewardship" of the international system.

• India-Russia relations are cordial, but it remains uncertain how deep the partnership is.

• India-US relations can be characterised as "measured engagement."

• India-Japan relations are increasingly friendly, based largely on fears of China.

Triangulation strategies between great powers in Asia, such as those between Russia-China-India or US-Japan-India, have a poor record - they have generally been characterised more by competition than cooperation within the putative triangles. This applies to all types of triangles, whether they are based on ideology or economic links or fear of China or liberal-democratic market economies.

Global Trends

Some global trends have a similar effect on all powers. These include the globalisation of economics, technology, and democracy, the shift from traditional state-centric security to human security, and the growth of multipolarity. But the effect of these trends is inconclusive - the future international system may approximate one of the four visions:

• Fukuyama's "end of history" - victory of liberal-democratic market economies;

• Huntington's "clash of civilisations";

• Mearsheimer's "tragedy of great power politics," where the future repeats past patterns of competition; or

• Kaplan's "coming anarchy" of failed states and global disorder.

Four Scenarios

More specifically, great power relations in Asia may evolve according to four scenarios:

• Maintenance of a weak unipolar system: The US remains the predominant military power, but the rise of all other powers will constrain its freedom of action. The regional security system remains relatively stable, with a continued nuclear balance. Great powers will seek economic maximisation, while remaining cautious in security relations. Chinese hegemony would be unlikely here.

• Regional bipolarity between US and China: Other regional states may be forced to choose sides, amid an escalating arms race. The US would try to reunify the Korean peninsula, on its terms, and would seek to develop an Asian quasi-NATO to counter China's rise.

• "Uni-multipolarity": In the final phase of unipolarity, with the US superpower declining and the other powers competing for influence. Conventional and nuclear arms races are intense, and regional institutions like the ARF and APEC fail to emerge as reliable guarantors of security. Relations between Asian powers will be characterised by hedging and balancing strategies.

• Wild card scenarios: The region may still descend into fragmentation and chaos as a result of an unforeseeable cataclysm, such as a regional pandemic, the spread of a revolutionary new weapons system, or global economic collapse. The results would be unpredictable.

Conclusion

Dr Mansourov concluded by stating he is "a hard-core realist" and, as a result, he believes great powers do play a zero-sum game, where one power's gain is necessarily another power's loss. Each power's fortunes may change, but the essential competitive nature of the system will remain constant.

Discussion

The following points of discussion were raised by Dr Mansourov and the participants:

Q: Smaller nations seek US presence to counter Chinese influence. They are apprehensive of building balancing coalition in Asia. An Asian version of NATO seems not practical given the move by China to engage NATO through informal channels. The Tsunami disaster has put the world order upside down.

Dr Alexander Mansourov: While endorsing that smaller nations welcome US presence in the region, any sort of coalition which is not like a formal structure is hard to be visualized as counterweight to US dominance. Tsunami diplomacy/disaster is not going to alter the fundamentals of the present world order.

Q: Visualizes a possible disintegration of USA - wild card scenario. US - China contestations are far fetched since there is a growing relevance of China to US economy. This could pave way for their joint stewardship of the world leading to Japan going nuclear, which could turn up as a challenger - wild card scenario.

Dr Alexander Mansourov: The US has only had a minor setback and is very far from disintegration. The US has inbuilt resilience with regard to fissiparous movements. There has been a trade deficit of US$100 billion annually to China and there is a possibility of a long term fallout in case this trend is not arrested.

Q: Pre-emption as a military solution has started but will fade out given the experience of Iraq hence emphasis in future would be on trade than military, marked by cooperation and competition.

Q: There is a strong resentment brewing all over Asia including in Japan and forums like ASEAN portends that the entire region is exploring the possibility of a multilateral alternative to American hegemony. This is also evident by the adverse opinion being generated in the friendly states after the US adventure in Iraq. While giving a time frame of 5-10 years of US hegemony. China no more needs to rely on military might in the region since the owners of capital in countries like Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia are predominantly Chinese. He also foresees the softening of the dominance of the communist Party on the Chinese political system in next 10-15 years. Given such scenario Japan might depend on China rather then on the US, with the rising adverse domestic opinion.

Q: Terrorism for all practical purpose is not an invasion. The events in West Asia in terms of the so called war on terror will have profound implications on US power structure. Individual/group opinions will make an impact in West/South Asia.

Dr Alexandre Mansourov: Transitional Societies face the situation of modernity being associated with Westernization and thus the east-west polarity in terms of conflict between modernity and tradition is a factor which generates anti Americanism. US also failed to acknowledge the achievement of transitional societies which also generate animosity for example, the rise of South Korea as a major IT power. US policy of intervention are driven by events, the war against terror is for a tactical purpose rather than changing the existing order

Q: There is a possibility of South Korea looking at alternative power structures including Russia to deal with the unification issue.

Dr Alexandre Mansourov: Relations between the US and South Korea are in the process of maturation. South Korea has a moderate stand in respect to the US, and it is marked by a great deal of cooperation, eg, by sending its troops to Iraq. The fundamental goal being unification, US policy hurts as it seems to be impatient on North Korea and continues to perceive it as an evil empire.

Q: There are deep divisions in the US on ideological grounds particularly in the east & west vs heartland. The difference between the regions is reflected in the brinkmanship and religious fundamentalism. On the question of military power, it need not necessarily translate into influence as witnessed in Vietnam and now in Iraq. The relations of US with India was never very deep but was a measured engagement. What would be the future of non-proliferation regime?

Dr Alexandre Mansourov: US will do everything within its means to prevent any countervailing power to its pre-eminence. The internal incentives for the US is to sustain itself on the basis of democratic balance and checks. Any precision strike in North Korea is futile. The year 2007 is important for the North Korean nuclear program, as the centrifuges will be ready for recharging, yielding fissile material for 6-8 bombs.

Q: Terrorism and Islamic radicalism could generate problem for the region. Given the accelerating change in all sphere i.e., biotechnology, progress in the field of Information Technology even without US collaboration could result in a challenge from a host of states to its supremacy.

Dr Alexandre Mansourov: The fundamental belief is that terrorism is a political tool; a bane of religion that it comes as a wrapping for promoting terrorism.

Q: In the realist perception US is seen as an Empire, where expansionism is driven by greed. While the old Roman Empire was guided by a sense of pragmatism, US denies to the rest of the world the dignity which otherwise comes as a camp follower. The US actions weaken the very foundations of an empire. The war on terror is a war for control over natural resources- particularly oil resources to enhance the energy security.

Dr Alexandre Mansourov: US is a young empire qualitatively different from the British. If the costs of control exceed control i.e., spending beyond its ability, then it would be the end of the empire.