Indo US Relations Under the New Administration

13 Jan, 2005    ·   1614

Report of the Seminar held at IPCS on 7 January 2004 (Speaker: Prof Sumit Ganguly)


Introduction

Gen. Banerjee welcomed the guests and wished them a Happy New Year. Shri Gopi Arora opened the session by thanking Prof. Ganguly.

Professor Sumit Ganguly

Prof. Ganguly began his lecture with an anecdote which framed the topic. He mentioned an article by Condoleezza Rice in January 2000 in Foreign Affairs where she laid out the parameters of the first George W. Bush administration's Foreign Policy. The article in Ganguly's opinion remarkably devoted one whole paragraph to India. This was unprecedented as earlier administrations never mentioned India at all. While specifically mentioning India and not South Asia, the article also spoke of India as a regional power and its potential.

Prof. Ganguly's talk was divided into three segments. The first segment laid out the continuity in US India policy from the second Clinton regime to the first George W. Bush regime. The second segment dealt with the deepening of India-US relations in various sectors. The third and the final segment dealt with the possible and potential irritants that while not being able to wreck the relationship, had the power to throw it off course.

The Curious Continuity

Professor Ganguly pointed out that despite the avowed effort of the incoming Bush administration to an entirely different agenda as opposed to the Clinton administration; the India policy has seen more continuity than change. Ganguly calls this continuity in the India policy as 'curious continuity', given the dramatic changes that the Bush administration has put in place in its security and in its foreign policy.

This continuity furthered the already growing ties between the two democracies. In Ganguly's opinion, the 9/11 strikes did hold back Indo-US ties as the US needed Pakistan to provide access to Afghanistan. Thereby, the events of September 11 worked like the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and transformed US-Pak relations. Ganguly then said that Pakistan is what can be called a "geo-strategic rentier" (a term which he credits to Hussain Haqqani). Had it not been for 9/11, Ganguly believes Pakistan would have remained in the backwaters in American policy. The expedient reasons of US policy towards Pakistan are what can be held responsible for a number of disclosures that have been recently ignored by the United States. In Ganguly's opinion, Musharraf has been a parsimonious ally and not as staunch as the US would like him to be or as he portrays himself to be.

However, despite the above developments, the Bush administration remains very warm towards India. This, according to Ganguly, is due to New Delhi's change in attitude towards the changes in US-Pak ties. Earlier India always responded in a hysterical manner to any closeness in US-Pak ties. Thus, the 'curious continuity' that the Bush administration exhibited has continued. This was due to efforts of both New Delhi and Washington.

The Deepening of Indo-US Relations

The deepening of Indo-US relations can be traced to the Kargil war and the Clinton visit in March 2000. The Kargil episode created much sympathy and Pakistan was branded as 'aggressor' and American statements spoke of 'the sanctity of the LOC' as well as 'no redrawing of borders in blood'. The American stand was welcomed by India especially in the background of the sanctions after the nuclear tests in 1998. These were the advantages that the Bush regime had when it took over the administration. It was also during Clinton's second term that Strobe Talbott- Jaswant Singh talks helped the Americans understand Indian security concerns. Thus, despite non-proliferation concerns of the US, after Talbott and Jaswant Singh talks, the Americans realized that there was no question of a roll back of the nuclear program and so the two sides worked on tightening export-controls. However, Ganguly mentioned that there is a lobby which believes that India will have to denuclearize. This group's influence is clearly on the wane as we have seen that Bush's policy towards India has been marked by pragmatism.

As has been mentioned earlier, the growth in relations have been mutual and the Bush administration got its reward when the National Democratic Alliance government in New Delhi, offered its support to the dumping of the Anti ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and also by welcoming the Missile Defence Program. Indian support came at a time when even long time allies didn't stick out their necks for the Americans. The Indian stand is said to have baffled the Americans as this was definitely a 'fundamental' shift in India's arms control and disarmament policy.

In terms of trade, the opening of the Indian economy after the end of the cold war and the American search for markets, provides a symbiosis to help ties grow. Prof. Ganguly pointed out that the absolute value of American investment in India should not be of much importance. He says that the kind of investment in India by American firms is what needs to be assessed such as GE's R&D centre in Bangalore. Touching the outsourcing issue which were raised in the US elections, Ganguly, citing data provided by TN Srinivasan, said that the number of jobs being outsourced to India were really miniscule. There was one important difference in that this is probably the first time that white collar jobs were being exported from the United States and therefore the disproportionate attention on the issue.

The Professor then, identified the possibilities in the relationship. He first examined India as an investment destination. In the current year, India has received over $ 7 billion American investment and more firms are going to move in as further sections of the economy are liberalized. The second is the possibility of arms sales to India which has been irregular since 1965 as India did not consider US a reliable supplier. However, in recent time the two governments are negotiating on the P-3c Orion, and the Hercules aircraft. When these deals go through it would add another important dimension in the growing military-military relations. The current level of military to military ties was unthinkable ten years back and has seen a dramatic growth. This segment offers a major opportunity for deepening relations, given the dominating role of the Pentagon in the current administration. However, none of these changes are going to be dramatic and is likely to take place in small steps.

Prof. Ganguly then mentioned that, India merits just sub-cabinet level attention on a routine basis. It is only in crisis situations that the US cabinet looks at India. In his opinion this should change and the goal should be to move India, even during routine issues, to cabinet level attention.

The Pitfalls

Ganguly mapped four issues as possible pitfalls.

  • Indian view of Iran: Given the controversy over the Iranian nuclear quest, the US takes a dim view of India-Iran ties. However, at the moment Delhi does not feel the same concern as the US. This could be a cause of concern in the future.

  • Arms Transfers to Pakistan: The issue of strategic arms transfers to Pakistan could throw the relationship off track. Lower levels of transfers will not be a big problem as Delhi has the necessary capacity and wherewithal to absorb the change. The issue here would be largely the political fall out of any large scale arms transfers to Pakistan and its significance as the issue could be used by the anti-America lobby to score points which could cause harm to the relationship.

  • Americans are sometimes impatient at the pace of economic reforms in India. However, Delhi is comfortable at the pace with which it is moving to avoid the South East Asian crisis type situation and this is a perennial irritant as the Americans believe that Delhi needs to do a lot in terms of labour laws, banking reforms, infrastructure development, etc.

  • Security Council seat: Indians feel it is their due and it has a better chance than what it had five years ago. The Americans have kept mum on the issue. The Professor made the point that why should second rate declining European powers have such an exalted position. This issue will have some affect on US-India relations but in Ganguly's opinion will not throw it off course; rather it will merely be a pause.

The Discussion

Questions

  • What has been the role of the diaspora in the deepening of the US-India relationship? Has the Congress shown any change in framing policy towards India? Does the effectiveness of the diaspora in shaping foreign policy depend upon the strategic value attached to the country?

  • The issue of dual-use technology has a large role in US-India relations. What is the current situation like and the American government's stand? What effects will the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) have on India-US relations and how far can it be successful?

  • What are the views on South Asia as a high nuclear risk area and the brinkmanship theory? How will the American government view Indian nuclear missile development? Can the Kashmir issue be a pitfall? Is it not true that the pitfalls in Indo-US relations are old and that they are largely structural issues (in the economy or the military) irrespective of individuals in power?

  • What has been the American experience in Iraq? How will this affect American security and foreign policy in the region and more specifically the doctrine of pre-emption? What will their policy be with respect to the Iranian nuclear program and North Korean deterrent?

  • While military-military cooperation between the two countries has reached new heights which may have been unthinkable ten years ago, what is its chance of sustaining itself? How are we to know that the current war on terror is not a strategic shift towards Pakistan but merely a tactical stance?

  • What are the evolving American approaches to multi-lateralism in the background of the Bush government's unilateralism in the past five years, specifically with regard to the United Nations and the Security Council reforms in the offing? Is the issue serious enough to drive a wedge between the two countries?

Responses

  • The political role of the Indian diaspora in recent years has seen a major change. The earlier generations were an insecure group who didn't want to rock the boat by getting involved in politics. However, the new generation believes it is American and that they have a right to influence or at least register their presence in the American electoral scene. Bobby Jindal was an example of the generational transformation in the attitude of the Indians. The Congress hasn't shown much focus on policy towards India as the administration has shown except where the legislators had sizeable Indian constituencies. Professor Ganguly was of the opinion that there has not been any substantial change in the way Capitol Hill views India and termed Indian media reporting from the US lazy and misleading. Ganguly also agreed with the view that effectiveness of the diaspora depends upon the strategic value that the administration attaches to the country.

  • There has been significant progress in dual-use technology negotiations between the two countries. However, export control legislation in the United States could have a restraining impact and that a regime makes better sense than a case by case approach that is presently followed. On the success of the NSSP, much depends on how the NSSP works as it is still in an exploratory stage.

  • The issues of brinkmanship are politically motivated; this is a subterfuge to denuclearize India. If the brinkman school theory people are so worried about the safety, accidental or deliberate war issues, they should provide India with Permissive Action Links (PAL's) and other technology and the available knowledge to avoid war. Ganguly says all the noise about the flash point in South Asia was ignorant of the 1969 Ussuri river clash between the USSR-China, that two countries could disagree and fight and still be responsible. He was of the opinion that if the Indian nuclear missile program progressed without fanfare, the Americans would issue an obligatory condemnation and that is what it would be. There is also no likely chance of American intervention in Kashmir as the issue is complex enough by itself and there is no scope for the US to do anything about it. The growth and opening of the economy whatever its pace has had a good effect on relations between the two countries. The pitfalls in military cooperation have more to do with the mindset of the cold war years and not due to any structural deficit as such. The organizational problems are at worst short term ones and will not last.

  • The situation in Iraq is a disaster and the warning bells are beginning to ring across vast sections of the cheer leaders of the war. The speaker hoped that the administration had the capability to learn from the current experience. The first signs of dissent to the war are appearing. The people who were vociferously demanding that Iran be treated in the Iraqi manner have slowly toned down their opinions or have quietly disappeared. In the North Korean case, the Americans are going to be very slow due to the presence of over 30000 US troops in South Korea and also due to the fact that North Korea has 6-7 nuclear bombs already.

  • The military cooperation has the ability to sustain itself if it develops its own momentum. The fears of the long term rise of China and the China threat theory could be a meeting point for the two sides. On the China 'threat' card, Ganguly said that there are varied views. The Professor mentioned that the current warmth in US-Pakistan relations was not a strategic change and he mentioned the political wilderness that the Pakistanis found themselves in during 1971-79 as also 1989-98. The difference between building a relationship with Pakistan as against India is obvious to the Americans. Pakistan has managed to retain whatever little importance it has due to the cultivation of its relationship with the Pentagon.

  • The New Bush administration is not expected to work towards any kind of democratisation of International Organizations. The UN will be used as a legitimising device at best. The current administration's aim is American Primacy and this hostility to the United Nations is nothing new and has a long history.

Concluding Remarks by the Chair

Shri Gopi Arora thanked Professor Ganguly and described the talk as immensely productive in putting Indo-US relations into a larger perspective. He mentioned the fact that the changes in US foreign and security policy post-Sept 11 had put growing India-US relations in slow motion. According to the chair, the talk by Prof. Ganguly helped demystify the issues of concern between the two countries as also the key problems in international politics.

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