Speaker: Zhang Guihong, Deputy Director of Institute of International Studies, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

Chair: Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea

The seminar opened with a remark from the chair that in China study on India was picking up, which bodes well for the relationship between the two countries. Dr. Zhang Guihong began his discussion with an assessment that India and China are both rising, with implications for the region. The world and the region are likely to have their own interpretations and responses to this "dual rise", therefore, it becomes imperative for bilateral relations to be dealt with by both sides. Though there might be a sense within the academia that the two countries are competing in political, strategic and economic terms in the Asian sub-regional level, India and China unite; it's just that the situations are different. At the same time Zhang stated that "How China and India deal with their bilateral relations in these sub-regions is still an open question."

Being two rising powers and transitional societies, China and India, according to Zhang, could play a major role in the Asian region. He grouped China and India with countries like Pakistan (nuclear), Japan (economic), Russia (multipolar), and United States (strategic) to form respective triangles, to basically affirm the two countries' important place in the world. Later Zhang also grouped the two with ASEAN and Central Asia respectively to discuss the benefits of a triangular relationship.

The basic purpose of Zhang's presentation was "to find the opportunity of cooperation, the potentiality of competition, and possibility of conflict between China and India in Asian sub-regions, South, Southeast and Central Asia in particular."

South Asia

Post-9/11, South Asia has become a 'hot area' owing to issues of nuclear proliferation, Kargil conflict and terrorism and which attracted American attention. He also listed non-traditional security threats.

He began by stating how China is South Asia's biggest neighbour, sharing more than 4000 km common border; thus making it an "inalienable part of the strategic environment for South Asian countries, India in particular and vice versa." India has a "unique geographical position, social diversity, economy, and the largest democracy." Zhang said that the competition between the two emanates from India as it sees China as trying to enter into its sphere of influence in issues like - China's relation with Pakistan; China's deepening of relations with its small eastern neighbours, Bangladesh and Myanmar; and Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. He stated that China's military relations with the South Asian region were only defensive and economic in nature. Finally, though the two countries in the past saw each other as competitors, both are now more confident and there is opportunity for more convergences than divergences.

Southeast Asia

Zhang noted that unlike South Asia, there is no Tibet issue in this region. However, Zhang said, "If India has deep suspicion of China's intention in South Asia, then China has more concerns about India's activities in Southeast Asia. China worries about the implications of India's activities in Southeast Asia for South China Seas territorial dispute and for the Taiwan issue and Japan. Fortunately, there is no fundamental strategic conflict between China and India in Southeast Asia.

In relations with Southeast Asia, India assumes the third place and China the second because India has been more of a follower of the trends that China has set in building relations with the region. "China stands closer than India with ASEAN in economic integration and security cooperation." Sure, India is showing a growing interest in expanding its ties with Southeast Asian countries, especially with Vietnam driven by desire to prevent Southeast Asia from becoming an exclusive Chinese sphere of influence. Finally, Zhang noted that he hopes that the competition here is healthy.

Central Asia

Central Asia attracts attentions for its geo-strategic location and rich natural resource, and also for counter-terrorism campaign. As India's regional strategic concern extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to near the equator in the south, Central Asia is the 'immediate and strategic neighborhood.' Meanwhile, Zhang noted, in the new "Great Game", China is a major player in Central Asia as is evident in the role it plays in the SCO which is "China's first effort to institutionalize regional cooperation and implement the cooperative security concept."

He opined that China and India's "interests in Central Asia is not critical but limited" given the fact that Russia is recovering its "backyard" and US is expanding its influence there. Finally he stated that the "possibility of joint effort to build an "oil highway" connecting Central Asia with Western China and Northern India" makes it likely that there will be more cooperation than competition between China and India in this region. In addition, he said that, there are "similar attitudes" between the two on the issue of terrorism, separatism and extremism and that India may agree with China (and Russia) that there are no good or bad terrorists.

The likely divergences in the region according to Zhang could be: China's multilateral cooperation and India's bilateral cooperation with the region; China is concerned about US military presence in the region, whereas India is willing to have close security relations with US. On India's entry into the SCO, Zhang noted that the SCO is most likely to strengthen its internal institution and cooperation rather that enlarge its membership; there are different views between China and Russia on who, India or Pakistan, should be first considered. In the meanwhile, Zhang suggested a "wait and see" policy for India. Zhang's "basic conclusion is that: there are more opportunity for cooperation than potentiality of competition and possibility of conflict between China and India in Central, Southeast, and South Asia."
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DISCUSSION

Questions

• Could you comment on the "lack of reciprocity" from China on the issue of India's bid for entry into the UN. Should not China "go beyond semantics"?

• Since you have listed the possible areas of cooperation between India and China, when do you see China moving in this direction? What about nuclear energy, do you think the two can cooperate in this area?

• Given China's assistance to Pakistan in nuclear as well as economic (eg. Gwadar port where two Chinese engineers were kidnapped), where will China cooperate with Pakistan and how much will this implicate on India? There is a marked decrease of animosity towards India amongst the Chinese youngsters; how much will this translate into policy?

• You mentioned China's cooperation with Myanmar in military field as a result of securing its economy in the area. Likewise, one cannot blame if India sees China as a problem in its east. So, when do you see this cycle of insecurity from either side coming to an end?

• There has been no coverage at all in the Chinese media of the meeting between Prime Ministers Wen Jiabao and Manmohan Singh at Vientiane and whether he was really "keen on India visit" as it was touted in Indian papers?

• Do you see potential for conflict between the two countries given that both have water scarcity, the same sources of energy and also because China has concerns about India's activities in Southeast Asia.

• Why is there a contradiction in China's stands on various issues like military cooperation with Myanmar; not welcoming US influence while at the same time willing to help the US in the development and democratization of Pakistan? Is it not important for China to democratize itself first? As far as CBMs are concerned, is it not that China always does things at its own pace?

• The border issue remains at the backdrop, how do you see it resolved?

• Do you have any information on the effect of the Gobi Desert moving eastwards in northern in Western China on environmental security or even food security?

• The trade-off on the border is fine for India. However. In the last few days of negotiations, the Chinese side has been talking about "substantive adjustments in the eastern side"; irrespective of where this is coming from, the 'ground reality' you mentioned earlier for compromise "seems to be tampered here".

Response

• As far as China is concerned, it has not identified anyone who can and cannot be a member of the UN though it is certain that China does not favour new members to have veto. On the question of semantics, China and India have different political cultures; China definitely pays more attention to deeds than words.

• Though China and Russia may differ on the issue of new entrants into the SCO, it must be noted that China plays a leading role and not the decisive role there. Also bilateral problems between India and Pakistan can bring trouble to SCO; therefore, China and Russia can support one not both.

• On Pakistan, China's attitude has changed considerably on the nuclear issue. China has joined the NSG. China-Pakistan cooperation will continue to be limited to military and economic affairs in the future.

• China has military relations with Myanmar because it sees threat emanating not from countries but from non-traditional sources. The relationship is purely to address these concerns, to protect the transportation of its goods to the Indian Ocean region and is thus economically motivated.

• Certainly, at the ASEAN summit in Vientiane, China-India summit was far better than China-Japan meeting.

• In Central Asia, China and India do not have conflict of interests. Chinese concern in Southeast Asia is related to Taiwan and Japan.

• Democracy is relative. India has more democracy in terms of freedom of expression. In China, at local level, there is democracy.

• China pays more attention to its neighbours.

• On the expansion of Gobi desert and environmental security, one can only say that it is important for China to cultivate all parts of its territory.

Comments

• On UN Security Council seat, India must ask itself, "Why are we not a member?" The answer, evidently, is that India has not made much effort. At the same time, without doubt, India expects greater support from China on its entry.

• If Pakistan factor continues, India-China relations will not change much.

• There is a degree of competition between India and China. If China initiated SCO, India floated BIMSTEC. At the same time, the SCO has become a security organisation that has the potential to develop into a eastern NATO.

• There is no reason why Pakistan should be kept out of SCO. It should be a member alongwith India.

• On the issue of non-proliferation, Pakistan will ultimately have to pay for its lapses; China will also not get away easily.

• On oil and energy cooperation, both need coordination. India has always been deficient of energy sources. China entered the energy market recently but aggressively. India has only just begun. Though this may be an area of future competition, both need to cooperate.

• On river waters we need a constructive approach.

• Tibet issue remains; it is moving in a positive direction, however we need to talk.

• Looking at China's past border negotiations will prove helpful to India in assessing its policies on its negotiations with China. How is it that out of the 13 border problems that China faced with its neighbours, only India has been unsuccessful? "We have to be truthful to history to succeed in our negotiation". The solution is to "think out of the box". Ultimately, in this age of globalization, territory has no value today unless it has economical or religious connotations.

• Finally, one must understand how China has solved all its bilateral entanglements in its neighbourhood so that it is free to deal with global issues (that is where Japan becomes very important to China). Whereas, India has been an entrant only recently. Therefore, when China calls India a competitor, it must think and act along these lines economically and politically.