Speakers:
Michael Krepon
Ved Prakash Malik
P R Chari
B M Kapur
Rajesh Rajagopalan
Gurmeet Kanwal

Chair:
Dipankar Banerjee

Introductory Remarks: Dipankar Banerjee

When nations with deep grievances acquire nuclear weapons, tensions between them increase and the possibility of conflict is enhanced. That is perhaps inevitable. Whether one is a deterrent optimist or a deterrent pessimist, the reality is that escalation in a nuclear environment between adversaries is a matter of serious concern and the danger of its getting out of control is unacceptably high. The situation between India and Pakistan are no different and indeed a case can be made out, that due to the peculiar conditions of geography, the severe nature of religious differences as a core issue between them and the presence of 'jehadists' lend this a frightening urgency. These differences need to be appreciated in the dynamics in South Asia, which are different from what obtained in other parts of the world. While the Cold War and the lessons from it, are perhaps somewhat relevant, India and Pakistan have to together work out an entirely new set of options to ensure that the scourge of a nuclear exchange never occurs in the sub-continent.

Session - I: Limited War and Escalation Control

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Michael Krepon

Krepon's first point was that the nuclear tests of 1998 had initially raised hopes of a period of stabilisation in which the sub-continent's security problems were expected to be addressed through collaboration and deliberation. However, what followed was the classical case of the stability-instability syndrome.

Krepon suggested that the classical literature on 'limited war' and 'escalation control' by eminent authors such as Kissinger, Kahn, Brodie and Schelling developed in the context of the Cold War were not relevant to South Asia and should be junked. Krepon made the argument that such a course of action would benefit South Asia as the assumptions in the above arguments were not relevant to South Asia. Krepon based his argument on the evidences uncovered after the Cold War. For example, the Americans planned their moves and counter moves in the belief that the Soviet Union worked under the same rules as themselves and also assumed that there were rational actors on the other side; that signals being exchanged meant what they were intended to mean and reached the audience for whom they were intended. In hindsight this was seldom true. Krepon's fundamental point was that despite the success of deterrence enforced peace during the Cold War, post-cold war disclosures have shown the limitations of the theorising on limited war and escalation control.

He then referred to two chapters in the book by Rahul Roy Choudhary and Feroze Hasan Khan that examined signaling between India and Pakistan with respect to nuclear weapons. Rahul Roy looked at nuclear signaling while Feroze Khan looked at missile signalling. The conclusion of the study was that that it was very hard to convey messages as the sheer number of messages were very high, they were divergent and the messages by the actors were meant for the consumption of different audiences (for example, domestic, adversary and international) which further complicated the business of signaling. Essentially, Krepon postulates that this was a structural problem and, therefore, the messages were sure to be misread and get mixed resulting in a higher risk between the adversaries.

Krepon then moved onto the essay by Rodney Jones which looked at the growing imbalance between India and Pakistan in the conventional military sector. The piece suggested that Pakistan was playing with fire if it continued toying with proxy wars and that in the same sense India seemed to be doing the same as it pursued the notion of limited war.

Moving onto the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, Krepon stated that India and Pakistan should not repeat the mistakes made by the Soviet Union and the United States. While intended to control escalation these tactical and short range nuclear weapons further complicated the problem of escalation control. In Indian and Pakistani literature, Krepon did not come across any reference to tactical nuclear weapons except in response to focused questions on them. However, this doesn't mean the two countries will not move towards tactical weapons as the option has not been foreclosed. Essentially, Krepon's point was that the dilemmas of escalation control should be respected in South Asia and the hubris of American nuclear theorising should be rejected as they were flawed in many aspects. The adversary may not think like you or play by the same set of rules as there is an element of misperception, intelligence failure, unexpected incidents and accidents which cannot be factored in under most situations.

In conclusion, he put forward the argument that both proxy/unconventional wars and limited wars were an invitation to escalation and both were connected. Hence the most effective strategy of escalation control was peace-making and that the last two years provided some optimism in this regard.

VP Malik

Malik agreed with Krepon that American literature on escalation control did not have much relevance to India, though for different reasons. Malik quoted Clausewitz in saying that each age had its own peculiar forms of war and that comparing the South Asian context with the Cold War experience was not a practical exercise as the realities were different and stated that such theorizing needed to factor in ground realities.

After the nuclear tests in 1998, it was assumed that an era of peace and security would be established; however ground realities saw the intensification of the proxy war in Kashmir. Deterrence was an established and rational idea while proxy wars were not. In case of the proxy war both initiator and affected have the tendency to move towards conventional war, the initiator to take advantage and the affected to get out of this peculiar stage of 'no peace-no war' zone. He asserted that as the Chief of the Indian Army during both the Lahore peace process as well as the Kargil War, he was in a position to comment authoritatively on these events. The Kargil war in 1999 and 'Operation Parakaram' in 2001-02 were no new lessons for the Indian establishment as the CBM's and NRRM's were part of the Memorandum of Understanding that was discussed at Lahore and which were being discussed again in the current India-Pakistan parleys.

Malik stated that nuclear weapons in South Asia were here to stay so chances of any large scale conventional war between India-China and India-Pakistan were ruled out. There existed a negotiable space between proxy-limited-nuclear war stages in that continuum. Posing the question that can such space be exploited and if so how? What is the nature of war within this space? Malik then listed the options available:

• Carefully calibrated political objectives

• Limited political and military objectives

• Synchronization of political and military aims

• Inflicting no heavy damage during war

• Limiting the conflict in geographic spread

• Limiting conflict in time and spreading it out.

Essentially all factors have a bearing on escalation control and domination.

On signaling, according to Malik, communication never broke down between India and Pakistan in the past and even during the Kargil War. In fact in that war, the hotlines were functional and contact was never a problem. Malik then stated that limited war was still possible if proxy wars continue and quoted Ashely Tellis, when he stated that limited war results from structural circumstances and not due to the proclivities of the state. War was and has always been risky. Was it obsolete? The Americans believed in pre-emption as in the case of Iraq. They consistently used their own definitions of terrorism and proxy war and talk of escalation and not the proxy war that would lead to limited war. Gen. Malik then said that while he did believe in escalation control, he was against state or non-state terrorism. And that the stability-instability paradox existed due to the proxy war. Limited war had no connection with theories and tactical weapons and avoided escalation to the nuclear level.

Gen. Malik concluded by saying that he believed in CBM's and NRRM's and put forward the point that nuclear tests have indeed ushered in stability in India-China relations while there was instability with Pakistan due to the proxy war. In his opinion sub-continental leaders exercised a great deal of responsibility and principal actors on both sides have consistently taken into consideration collateral damage.

PR Chari

Prof Chari began by complimenting Michael Krepon for his outstanding work. In a lighter vein he stated that the theologies on deterrence and afterlife have one thing in common. They are retrospective in nature. Only when deterrence fails or one dies can one be certain whether they were right or wrong.

The problem with nuclear weapons and escalation control was that the greatest minds have not been able to figure out how limited war can be kept limited and escalation control achieved. The exercise was no more philosophical and has acquired a deadly twist with the entry of nuclear weapons into the equation. South Asia has nuclear weapons armed adversaries in close proximity. Matters were worsened by the long history of conflict between them. They falsify the postulate that nuclear weapon states and democracies do not fight each other. The Kargil war was a leading example.

The possibility of escalation out of advertence or inadvertence was high. The border confrontation crisis of 2002 had proved this adequately. But what prevented the crisis from escalating into a full blown conflict despite India planning offensive on two occasions? Was it good sense that prevailed over the leadership of the two countries? Was Pakistan under international pressure for sponsoring cross border terrorism? Was this a mere politico-diplomatic exercise for India? Was it US pressure or was it an exercise in nuclear deterrence? Or was it all of the above? Whatever be the reason, the fact remained that no conflict - limited or otherwise - occurred, despite provocative statements and missile tests.

Even in the Kargil conflict hostilities were contained due to the restraint shown by both parties. Pakistan on its part foresaw a diplomatic-military disaster had it escalated. The conflict was limited to a discrete geographical theatre. Kargil conflict provided a corollary to the stability-instability paradox. Nuclear weapons permitted Pakistan to undertake intrusions with impunity, but inhibited both India and Pakistan from escalating the ensuing conflict for diverse reasons. For Pakistan, it was fear of adverse international reaction. India on its part, wanted to retain the high moral ground and the international support that it received as a victim of aggression. Then there was US pressure on both sides. Again for various reasons the conflict was contained. Despite this, the speaker shared Michael's skepticism that limited war between nuclear adversaries contains inherent risks of conflict escalation resulting in the crossing of the nuclear threshold.

Attention was drawn to the special circumstances in India-Pakistan case:

• Problem of convincing civilian leadership of the possibilities of limited war in a nuclear environment. But if the conflict intensifies and the military impacts decision-making then the chances increase considerably.

• Problem of ensuring that Pakistan will exercise escalation control and not up the ante for military and political reasons, which is a strong possibility if it is either winning or losing the conflict.

• Problem arising out of Clausewitzian edict that war is institutionalized violence. Escalation control under such circumstances becomes extremely difficult especially in a nuclear charged environment.

• Problem of mismatch of India and Pakistan military doctrines. Will Pakistan become status quoist and give up proxy war as instrument of state policy? Will it accept India's 'No First Use' (NFU) policy? Answers to these questions will have implications on the ensuing arms race as well as other areas of tensions and instabilities.

• Problem of rationality-irrationality paradox which as of today seems to be applicable to India and not Pakistan. Votaries of limited war believe Pakistani leadership is irrational going by the past experiences e.g. 1965 and Kargil (1999). How can we expect it to be rational in limiting conflict, exercising escalation control and preventing a nuclear showdown on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) considerations? The entire logic fails if one of the parties behaves in an irrational manner.

Discussion

Following points were raised during the discussion:

Questions and Comments

• Fear of South Asia as a 'nuclear flashpoint' stem from the mindset of the West and is far from South Asian reality. Much has been said about accident and signaling in a nuclearized South Asia, but we should not forget that both India and Pakistan are responsible nations. Both countries understand the importance of nuclear stability and clarity on nuclear issues. That is why nuclear CBMs were started within a year of nuclear tests. Lot has been said about the nuclear threshold which has little political and military value in South Asia. It is just a theoretical exercise. The expression of tactical nuclear weapon is also just an intellectual exercise as every nuclear weapon is a strategic weapon.

• Both in India and Pakistan, there is a firm belief that war will not solve their problems and that negotiation is the only solution. Though limited war is a fact of life, it will remain limited in objectives because of which the option of negotiations would always remain open.

• Nuclear weapon is a currency of power and India was reluctant to acquire it because of the belief that it was not an instrument of war. That is why nobody thought about the nuclear option during the Kargil crisis. There was a consensus among the participants about the wisdom of two South Asian nuclear powers.

• Some participants took a strong objection to Michael Krepon's argument that most of the western literature from the Cold War era, propounding deterrence should be forgotten as it is irrelevant to the South Asian context. Russian, Chinese and Indians, all started with not believing in the American concept of deterrence, but spoke about deterrence in the later period. One has no option but to believe in deterrence when one's adversary believes in it. All crisis situations have witnessed escalation control; that is why in Vietnam, Korea, Iraq or in Kargil nobody opted for the use of nuclear weapons.

• Another leading commentator opined that threat emanating from Pakistan is of a 'synthetic character' and definitely not military. Pakistan does not have the capability of becoming a military threat to India. He further argued that Pakistan fixation is a disaster to Indian military and state, as it mentally reduces India to the size of Pakistan. He suggested that India should prepare for larger threats like China. He also stated that escalation control is a minute issue and not worth devoting so much time as done by the Stimson Center. Taking a similar kind of stand, another former General said that India's dilemma is how to react to the proxy war initiated by Pakistan. India's military strategy is mostly reactionary. Though limited war is not advocated, India cannot afford 'to do nothing'. Parakram was a similar kind of exercise with limited objectives of stopping Pakistan's jihadi terrorism and proxy war.

• Two senior former generals pointed out that in the pre-nuclear era as well war escalation took place as in the 1965 war. Therefore, according to one general, it would be very dangerous to generalize the lessons of Kargil. But at the same time he insisted on the fact that Pakistani leadership is responsible and realist, though they tend to gamble when it comes to India. Kargil intrusion is a classic example of this attitude. He also insisted that rather than escalation, unauthorised acquisitions by jihadi groups or nuclear accidents are likelier outcomes. Hence, safety and security of nuclear weapons/material are more relevant concerns in South Asia. Another Professor of security studies expressed similar views regarding the threat of militants acquiring nuclear weapons. He maintained that the use of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan is a rare possibility.

• Many participants agreed with the argument that escalation control depends on the political environment and internal situation of the countries in South Asia. The Kargil crisis has knocked out the bogey of Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint. Many participants questioned the possibility of calibrated political goals.

• A senior military officer suggested that escalation depends on risk taking capacity of nuclear powers, value of victory for them and manipulation capacity of the security environment. He emphasized that the thinking that limited war can be managed is not rational. When there is relative propensity, it always tends to get out of control. He pointed out that the issue of escalation control, brinkmanship, wrong messaging and misperception, are important issues which cannot be ignored.

• A leading civilian strategic analyst claimed that the nuclear tests have put certain limitations on India's options vis-?-vis Pakistan and limited war is one of the options open but in which there is always a risk of escalation. He stressed that political and military leadership in India is yet to tune themselves to the nuclear environment and they should work out options and possibilities of war under nuclear environment.

Responses

• Prof Chari argued that there can be two views about the efficacy of drawing threshold limit and that ambiguity in doing so is deliberate. He maintained that Pakistan is deliberately keeping its threshold limit low as it strengthens Pakistan's deterrence. He stated that credibility is very important in this exercise because without credibility there cannot be effective deterrence.

• Gen Malik stuck to his stand that political goals are calibrated and has direct bearing on escalation. It can be reviewed according to circumstances. He highlighted that overall political objectives of nations change in a war scenario. The objective is not win or defeat but success or failure. This expression shows the flexibility in political goals. He accepted that the US dimension is important in nuclear escalation scenario and did not rule out the possibility of nuclear weapons being used by the US to twist Nawaz Sharif's arms during the Kargil crisis.

• After thanking all the participants for their thoughtful reactions and insightful comments, Michael Krepon said that the issue of calibration is the crux in escalation control. He justified the importance of the subject of escalation control by maintaining that the relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by miscalculation, which can be true in case of war as well. If conflict is a possibility and no one knows the threshold, then escalation control is a critical issue. He stressed that both countries will have to come up with their own answers to these dilemmas which would be region specific. He stated that though accidents can be due to many reasons and safety and security measures are important, one should not forget that even accidents can lead to escalation. He disagreed with the argument that threat posed by Pakistan is of a synthetic nature. According to him, it is real. It is worrisome that Pakistan does not play by the rules set by India. Therefore India has to believe in deterrence and escalation control because its adversary, Pakistan believes in it.

Session II: Signaling, Misperceptions and the Role of Intelligence

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BM Kapur

Invoking Napoleon, who had once stated that one needs to look into the past to be able to forecast the future, the speaker began by looking into the history of conflict in the subcontinent. As far as India is concerned problems arose from two quarters, on the eastern flank from China and on the west from Pakistan. While China sponsored insurgency in India's Northeast in reaction to its apprehension about India's support to the Tibetan cause, Pakistan caused trouble primarily because of its dissatisfaction with the outcome of partition, fuelled by its breakup as a result of India's support to the creation of Bangladesh. It did everything in its scope to harm India - waged four wars, befriended USA and China for moral, mental and material support, supported militancy in Punjab on an experimental basis and in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) as a deliberate policy. When it realized that it could not match India's military might, it deployed terror tactics in J&K and other places like Akshardham, Indian Parliament and to an extent even Godhra.

As far as Jehadi use of mass destruction is concerned, it is more applicable to other parts of the world than the subcontinent. Jehadi terrorism is primarily a western concern. The change in US posture should not be construed as being beneficial to the situation in the region. The US policy of 'with us or against us' has in fact distanced India from the US. As far as Kargil was concerned, it was bound to happen, irrespective of the existence of nuclear weapons. The basis for the Kargil crisis lay in the developments that took place in 1971 when Pakistan broke up paving way for Bangladesh. For India, the biggest adversary is China, followed by Pakistan.

The existence of a nuclear Pakistan is a stabilizing factor as it balances their conventional weakness and eases instability. Pakistan, however, continues to react to ensure military stays in power. The reassuring fact is that both parties know the adverse consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. They know nuclear weapons are neither 'usable' nor 'winnable'. Sanity exists yet rhetoric continues for the sake of pacifying its domestic constituency. Instability will continue till Pakistan comes to terms with itself. India on its part must show restraint.

Rajesh Rajagopalan

Rajesh Rajagopalan in his discussion of Feroz Hassan Khan and Rahul Roy Chaudhary's chapters respectively on "Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia" and "Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control", spoke on the issue of Signaling, Misperceptions and the Role of Intelligence. Rajagopalan started by making a point that signaling varies at different points of times. Nevertheless, the problem of signaling exists and is dependent on a lot of factors. He believed that limited war was possible and the most important part in escalation control was played by the political leadership of a state.

The nature of signaling, clarity of the message being passed, as well as the receiver's capacity to discern it, play an important role in overcoming misperceptions. Rajagopalan cited the example of India's ex-Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee where he sent three different messages simultaneously which he said confused the receiver. He also opined that one must be clear about "whom you are sending the message to?"

When US President Nixon had sent a task force to the Bay of Bengal, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi misperceived the signals, whereas it was directed at China and Pakistan. Rajagopalan also took the example of the Kargil Crisis of 1999 where Pakistan was sending signals to actors at various levels; the international community, the US, India, its domestic population and its political constituency. He called this a problem of "mixed signals", which was also given by India during the occasion of 'Operation Parakram'.

Rajagopalan's basic assertion was that the role of the political leadership in signaling, which had been ignored so far, was very important. The political leadership, in his view, was a rational actor who had stakes in peace and thus would control escalation. This was noticeable in the paradox of signaling. He argued that the fact that one was signaling showed that one's options were limited and thus the likelihood of escalation itself remained limited. Thus, signaling was a resort to "rhetoric" to limit the use of force. Parakram proved that the Indian government was not keen on war.

Taking the example of the Kargil war, Rajagopalan said that the political leadership on both sides was aware of the cost of escalation. Therefore, the political leadership would intervene irrespective of the military strategy in order to limit escalation. On the issue of nuclear threshold, his case was that caution was observed even more. He took the instance of the 'Cuban missile crisis' where despite United State's superiority over the Soviet Union and the willingness of the US military as well as the Executive to attack, the political leadership under President Kennedy intervened to limit escalation.

He concluded that there was an element of politics which was missed out in the debate on "escalation control" in South Asia.

Gurmeet Kanwal

He began by saying that for American scholars 'strategic stability in South Asia' has become something like a cottage industry. Giving voice to the general opinion of the Indian analysts at the conference he opined that there was no danger of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. He conceded, though, that there was a risk of one taking place. The risk was of a conventional war erupting between the two countries that originate from the instability injected by the proxy war Pakistan has been sponsoring in India. This proxy war contained a dangerous mix of "jehadi terrorism". According to him, there was a greater risk of nuclear terrorism than of the danger of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

He went on to discuss signaling emanating from the Pakistani side which has been clear in conveying that its nuclear threshold is low and that it would not be reluctant to put the nuclear weapons to early use. Two key questions were then posed (1) do the Pakistanis mean it, and (2) what are India's options if they do?

Kanwal listed two options that India has. One option would be to carry out small-sized or division offensive operations across the international border and take control of narrow strips of territory which would still not breach Pakistan's perceived threshold. These territorial gains could then be used as a bargaining chip once the ceasefire is announced. But he pointed out that Pakistan would have realistically gained something from the conflict as well and thus in the absence of serious military threat to it, it would have no disincentive to stop its proxy war against India.

India, according to Kanwal, could opt for a second course which is to conduct deep offensive strikes to destroy Pakistan's war-waging machinery. It would considerably add to the strength of India's deterrence if Pakistan is convinced that the former could do so. If that happens and Pakistan perceives a threat to its very existence as a nation-state it would exercise the nuclear option. Kanwal then asked a key question which he answered in the affirmative - Won't Pakistan realize that nuking Indian troops (whether on Pakistan soil or Indian) will result in massive punitive retaliation which would be consistent with India's nuclear doctrine?

Kanwal applauded the tremendous nuclear restraint India has exhibited over the past fifty-seven years despite the casualties it has suffered both in terms of loss of civilian life and military personnel in the three wars and the proxy wars. But he warned that while threshold of India's tolerance has not been crossed up till now, the strategic consciousness in the country was hardening. Therefore, "proxy war cum jehadi terrorism" after a point could provoke conventional war, which if in Kashmir could easily escalate into nuclear warfare. It was imperative then that both India and Pakistan take steps to implement confidence building measures such as setting up NRRCs.

Discussion

The discussion that ensued elicited the following observations

• The perfection of the art of signaling and intelligence is doubtful. It failed in Iraq and in many other cases despite US having the best means of intelligence gathering mechanisms and expertise.

• Reading or unreading a message is a complex exercise. Messages have multiple meanings and are not always specific. Sometimes even silence conveys a particular message.

• During escalation there are certain statements and actions that are contradictory to each other. They are part of escalation dynamics and cannot be read as misperceptions on the part of the actors.

• One should be able to distinguish between signals sent by the political leadership and by the military leadership. The signals from the latter are clear and cannot be called as bluff. This distinction requires greater inspection.

• In reality, signaling means nothing at all. If a message is to be conveyed, it can be conveyed through different means and not necessarily through media.

• Though 'Operation Parakram' achieved partly its objectives, it signaled lack of political will on the part of Indian government. Any similar such operation in the future won't be that effective.

• As adversaries advance in socio-economic fields they become more responsible and rational actors. The kind of ideological orientation currently followed in Pakistan is bad. At the same time, one cannot conclude that Islamabad is irrational.

Concluding Remarks

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Michael Krepon

Krepon commended the attempts to seek alternatives to escalation dominance. The application of Western theories, rooted in the Cold War, to the study of subcontinent does not differ from what the South Asian analysts are doing - this is evident from the echoes of escalation dominance, coercive diplomacy, limited war and massive retaliation.

While conceding that the political leadership exercise greater control, Krepon cautioned that there were still many limitations as was evident during the Cuban missile crisis where there were many instances of near failure.

On the signaling from the military and civilian leadership Krepon opined that "If you don't know your adversary, you will be subject to miscalculations." He also questioned the knowledge about the adversary without interacting with them. He called for enhancing information gathering and developing more effective intelligence. Pakistani Military's views about conventional balance may change, but the growing lack of parity they see could reinforce the option of resorting to use of unconventional weapons. Finally the impact on the nature of Indo-Pak relations due to this lack of parity has been widely discounted by some sections of the strategic community.

Dipankar Banerjee

Banerjee opined that the day's discussions were indeed very fruitful. At the same time it exposed the enormous gaps in knowledge and understanding among even senior experts and strategists dealing with these subjects in India. Communications, signaling and messaging in a nuclear environment is perhaps the most crucial element in stabilizing deterrence. This is indeed a different art. Signaling is a matter of communication, vital in a nuclear setting, where a misunderstanding or misperception could be very destabilizing. The meaning of intelligence in a nuclear setting also assumes a somewhat different character. While certain information must at all times remain concealed from one's adversary, some elements of nuclear weapons capability may well require a certain transparency, in order to reinforce deterrence.

Resolution of contentious issues in the backdrop of nuclear deterrence calls for an urgent need for a common language to address the issues, which otherwise could pave way for misperceptions. While not ruling out the lapses on the part of the actors involved, the need to minimize it becomes paramount. The need of the hour is to begin to learn the rules of this game, which constitute many imponderables.

Deterrence players might have respective perceptions and expectations, but what must never be in doubt is the possibility of a nuclear exchange in the sub-continent between India, Pakistan and China. Hence this calls for deep understanding of the numerous issue regarding escalation control in a nuclear environment in Southern Asia.