The extraordinary civility shown by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh towards each other in their speeches to the United Nations General Assembly and their joint press conference in New York this September, in sharp contrast to the churlishness displayed by the two countries last year, has been variously interpreted. Optimists believe these are the intimations of a new dawn in India-Pakistan relations. Pessimists remind us that the mercurial course of India-Pakistan relations in the past suggests the need for caution, avoidance of naiveté, and the wisdom of adopting a wait-and-see-policy.

The bilateral peace process, traceable to Prime Minister Vajpayee's famous offer of his 'hand of friendship' to Pakistan in Srinagar last April, has come a long way. The positive developments since then can be enumerated: the two High Commissioners are back in position; the Delhi-Lahore road, rail and air links have been restored; large numbers of ordinary Indian citizens have visited Pakistan to watch the cricket matches. They have returned with tales of the warm hospitality shown to them by ordinary Pakistanis, which has usefully supplemented the Track-II dialogues and Track-III people-to-people meetings that have proliferated over the last decade. One round of negotiations on the eight issues listed under the composite dialogue (peace and security, including CBMs and Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary level; Siachen; Wullar Barrage/ Tulbul Navigation Project; Sir Creek; terrorism and drug trafficking; economic and cultural cooperation; and friendly exchanges in various fields at diverse levels) have been held. They yielded no results, but have re-engaged the two countries on these contentious issues. Further, a separate dialogue on nuclear CBMs was also held that yielded some modest results, notably a decision to establish another hotline between the two Foreign Secretaries. A long list of 72 CBMs was handed over by the Indian Foreign Minister to his Pakistani counterpart for consideration. Individually, they may be trivial, but their establishment would assist the normalisation process. Significantly, it was decided to continue these negotiations on all these issues with a time table drawn up for continuing contacts between the two Foreign Ministers and, later, during the Dhaka SAARC Summit, between the two Prime Ministers.

At the functional level, the ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, announced last November, is holding up, which has permitted India to proceed with its fencing, which would enable cross-border terrorism to be reduced. Imperceptibly, moreover, a change has occurred in the respective position of the two countries on the contentious Kashmir issue. No longer does Pakistan harp on the need to resolve this dispute before other issues can be discussed, or insist on the UN resolutions on Kashmir being implemented. Neither does India claim that the accession of Kashmir to India as being valid and that there is nothing more to discuss, or insist upon a cessation of cross-border terrorism before any discussions on Kashmir could proceed. The significance of the Kashmir question for the bilateral relationship is undeniable, since it was the only or major theatre of operations in all past India-Pakistan conflicts that took place in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Several issues identified for discussion within the composite dialogue, moreover, pertain to Kashmir viz. Siachen, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, and Kashmir itself. Similarly, the 72 CBMs listed by India pertain to Kashmir, like establishing peace and tranquility along the LoC, new communication links between army officials in Kashmir, opening the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus route and the Jammu-Sialkot route, mechanism for allowing border and cross-LoC trade/personal interactions at selected points.

Collectively, all these developments herald a turnaround in the India-Pakistan bilateral relationship. It is arguable, however, that some dramatic event like a spectacular act of terrorism could easily derail the present entente. Old mindsets and vested interests in both countries that have no stakes in normalising India-Pakistan relations persist; indeed, they have much to lose in this process, especially their present centrality in the polity. The contrary factors must also be noticed that includes the public mood that craves for peace and stability in the subcontinent; the steady pressure of the United States and the international community on both countries to spare them from constant India-Pakistan crises that have continued despite their having conducted nuclear tests and declared themselves as being nuclear weapon powers; and the realisation in both countries that they are occupying the nether end of the Human Development Index and the upper end of Transparency International's Corruption Index. Above all, the Kargil conflict (1999) and the border confrontation crisis (2001-02) have made it clear that armed conflict between them is no longer an available option to resolve their differences.

Could all these factors in totality render the India-Pakistan standoff ripe for resolution presaging a normalisation of their relations?