The US Secretary of State, General Collin Powell, had emphasized that Washington was looking forward to New Delhi becoming a core member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) during his March 2004 visit to India. He felt that India could play the role of a 'regional policeman' in this new nuclear regime aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The US expressed hopes that the Indian Navy and Indian Air force would disrupt international trafficking in nuclear weapons technology and materials that fuel proliferation concerns.

India has to decide whether to join the US led security coalition in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, or steer clear of it. The PSI is the newest anti-proliferation project unveiled by President Bush on 31 May 2003 in Krakow, Poland. On 4 September 2003, the White House published the PSI "Statement of Interdiction Principles" in Paris. Originally consisting of 11 members, the PSI now has 15 members with Russia being the latest entrant in this anti-proliferation order. Its goal is to adopt a robust approach to effectively interdicting WMD materials and delivery systems; exchange intelligence inputs rapidly on suspected proliferation activities and to stop and conduct searches of air, sea and land cargo linked with dangerous technologies to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

While India has cautiously welcomed the US non-proliferation initiative, the PSI awaits several clarifications from Washington. It is clearly a U.S. sponsored anti-proliferation initiative comprising of members exclusively from the NATO, ANZUS, and US Mutual Defence Pact countries. It is thus an extension of US led military alliances. The PSI us thus an international effort, but is functioning without the United Nations' participation. How effective will a global initiative be that lacks the legal sanction of the World Body to combat proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology?

At the operational level, the PSI is basically directed against Teheran's and Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programmes. India has been the major victim of North Korea's missile transfers to Pakistan, which brings Indian cities within the range of Islamabad's nuclear arsenal, a fact which has been ignored by Washington. India must also avoid becoming part of any US led anti-Iranian strategic endeavour with which India has strategic cooperation in terms of the Teheran and Delhi Declarations. New Delhi should refrain from supporting any US' strategic ambition that seeks to deal with Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction proliferation action politically and diplomatically, contemplating military intervention against Iran.

The US record on anti-proliferation measures is tainted. For over two decades, Washington was indifferent towards the proliferation activities in South Asia. It turned a blind eye towards the blatant nuclear weapons and missile technology transfers from China to Pakistan thereby acquiescing in the covert development of Islamabad's atomic arsenal by Beijing. The US took no punitive measures against Pakistan for proliferating dangerous technology to Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea for over twenty years in exchange for IRBM technology. The question that arises here is that the PSI was announced in May 2003, four subsequent meetings were held till October 2003 to consolidate PSI interdiction actions; then why did Washington assiduously exclude Islamabad from interdiction and inspection? US inaction reflects its complicity in promoting proliferation in South Asia.

The deployment of Indian Navy and Indian Air Force assets for PSI interdiction activities would degrade their operational capabilities with serious consequences for South Asian security and the strategic capabilities. The PSI is also fraught with the risks of military escalation. Hypothetically, if India were to interdict Pakistan bound Chinese ships and aircraft, would China not escalate the stand-off? In such an eventuality will Washington intervene to ward off the crisis? The PSI also requires its members to submit their own ships and aircraft to inspection by other partners if they are suspected. This could become a mischievous principle directed against any future Indo-Iranian strategic cooperation, with the intention of wrecking it.

At present, India's priorities involve consolidating its strategic assets and security requirements. New Delhi must ensure that its future policies do not impinge on its existing strategic partnerships. Though PSI expresses concern over proliferation activities, it does not provide any framework for eliminating the smuggling of dangerous technology. This is obvious in South Asia. Therefore, India must seriously examine the credibility and legality of PSI before arriving at any decision in its supreme national interests.